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Abstract
Injection vulnerabilities, such as SQL Injection (SQLi), are ranked amongst the most dan-
gerous types of vulnerabilities. Despite having received much attention from academia and prac-
titioners, the prevalence of SQLi is common and the impact of their successful exploitation is
severe. In this dissertation, we propose several security testing approaches that evaluate web ap-
plications and services for SQLi vulnerabilities and common IT infrastructure components such
as Web Application Firewalls for their resilience against SQLi attacks. Each of the presented
approaches covers a different aspect of security testing, e.g. the generation of test cases or the
definition of test oracles, and in combination they provide a holistic approach.
The work presented in this dissertation was conducted in collaboration with SIX Payment
Services (formerly CETREL S.A.). SIX Payment Services is a leading provider of financial ser-
vices in the area of payment processing, e.g. issuing of credit and debit cards, settlement of card
transactions, online payments, and point-of-sale payment terminals. We analyse the challenges
SIX is facing in security testing and base our testing approaches on assumptions inferred from
our findings. Specifically, the devised testing approaches are automated, applicable in black box
testing scenarios, able to assess and bypass Web Application Firewalls, and use an accurate
test oracle. The devised testing approaches are evaluated with SIX’ IT platform, which consists
of various web services that process several thousand financial transactions daily.
The main research contributions in this dissertation are:
• An assessment of the impact of Web Application Firewalls and Database Intrusion Detection
Systems on the accuracy of SQLi testing.
• An input mutation technique that can generate a diverse set of SQLi test cases. We pro-
pose a set of mutation operators that are specifically designed to increase the likelihood of
generating successful SQLi attacks.
• A testing technique that assesses the attack detection capabilities of a Web Application
Firewall by systematically generating SQLi attacks that try to bypass it.
• An approach that increases the attack detection capabilities of a Web Application Firewall
by inferring a filter rule from a set of bypassing SQLi attacks. The inferred filter rule can be
added to the Web Application Firewall’s rule set to prevent attacks from bypassing.
• An automated SQLi test oracle that is designed to meet the specific requirements of SQLi
testing in an industrial context and that is independent of any specific SQLi test case gener-
ation technique.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
In recent years, the World Wide Web evolved from a static source of information to an important ap-
plication platform. Banking, shopping, education, social networking and even government processes
have become available through the web. The rise of cloud-backed applications and web-centric oper-
ating systems like Windows 10 or ChromeOS further accelerated this shift.
The popularity of web applications can be attributed to their availability, accessibility and flexi-
bility. However, this also caused the web to become the target of malicious attackers. Recent studies
found that the number of reported web vulnerabilities is growing sharply [Fossi and Johnson, 2009].
Web applications experience on average 27 attacks per hour and as many as 24158 attacks per hour
at peaks because of attack automation [Beery and Niv, 2013]. Amongst the various types of attacks,
the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) ranks injection attacks as the most dangerous
attacks, while stating that the impact of injection attacks is severe and their prevalence is common.1
Injection attacks like SQL Injection (SQLi) exploit poorly validated input fields to inject code frag-
ments that can cause the application to behave in an unintended way or expose sensitive data. The
concept of SQLi vulnerabilities was first described in 1998 [Forristal, 1998] and has since received
much attention from academia as well as practitioners, yet SQLi incidents occur on a frequent basis
since developers work under pressure and are not always fully aware of injection issues, and web
applications and services are increasingly complex.
In this work, we study the challenges of security testing in an industrial context and try to under-
stand why SQLi is still prevalent despite being well studied. Based on our analysis, this dissertation
presents several complementary security testing approaches for web applications and services. The
work has been done in collaboration with SIX Payments Services (formerly CETREL S.A.), a leading
financial service provider in Luxembourg and Switzerland. The devised testing strategies are moti-
vated by the challenges SIX is facing in security testing and are evaluated with SIX’ IT platform,
which consists of various web services that process several thousand financial transactions daily.
SIX offers a range of web services to its institutional clients, e.g. international banks and mer-
chants, for the management of payment cards and handling of financial transactions. Since the web
1For details refer to: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A1-Injection
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services are accessible via the Internet, SIX has a strong interest to secure their IT platform from
malicious users. Typically, credit card data and financial transactions are a valuable target for hackers
and therefore SIX invests considerable efforts to keep its platform and data secure. We developed
in collaboration with SIX several security testing approaches to perform vulnerability assessments of
their web services and to increase the overall resilience against cyberattacks.
According to the software engineering body of knowledge, software testing consists of the dy-
namic verification that a program provides expected behaviours on a finite set of test cases, suitably
selected from the usually infinite execution domain [Pierre Bourque, 2014]. More specifically, soft-
ware security testing is an activity to measure the quality of security relevant properties of a program
or service. Examples of security relevant properties are confidentiality, integrity, availability, authen-
tication, authorization, and nonrepudiation [Felderer et al., 2015].
This dissertation presents several approaches that are specifically designed to tackle the challenges
of security testing in an industrial context and are evaluated with our collaborator’s web services.
Since the web services of our partner rely heavily on relational databases, we target SQLi vulnerabil-
ities, one of the most common and severe type of vulnerabilities according to OWASP. The presented
testing approaches are applicable in black box testing scenarios, i.e. in scenarios where the source
code of the subject application can not be analysed or modified for the purpose of testing, which
is a common scenario in companies like SIX. Furthermore, the presented testing approaches aim to
achieve a high degree of automation in order to avoid that tedious manual tasks become a bottleneck
and to minimize human error. Each of the presented approaches covers a different aspect of SQLi
testing, e.g. test case generation or the definition of test oracles, which provide in combination a
holistic approach to SQLi testing.
1.2 Research Contributions
In this dissertation, we investigate the challenges of testing web applications and services for SQLi
in an industrial context and we devise several testing approaches that tackle the identified challenges.
Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• In collaboration with our industrial partner we identified challenges in security testing that
might limit the applicability or effectiveness of state-of-the-art testing techniques in an indus-
trial context. The devised testing techniques in this dissertation mainly address these identified
challenges. This is covered in Chapter 3.
• A technique that leverages database intrusion detection systems to increase the accuracy of
SQLi test oracles. Furthermore, our proposed technique considers the influence of Web Ap-
plication Firewalls (WAFs) on the results of penetration testing, which are a common build-
ing block in IT environment of financial service providers. This contribution has been pub-
lished [Appelt et al., 2013] and is discussed in Chapter 4.
• An input mutation technique that can generate a diverse set of test cases to evaluate web services
for SQLi vulnerabilities. We propose several mutation operators that are specifically designed
to increase the likelihood of generating successful SQLi attacks. This contribution has been
published as conference paper [Appelt et al., 2014] and Chapter 5 introduces our approach.
• A testing technique that systematically assesses the attack detection capabilities of WAFs. Our
technique uses machine learning to identify attack patterns that are likely to be missed by a
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WAF under test and systematically exploits such patterns to generate attacks that are likely to
bypass the WAF. This contribution has been partly published as conference paper [Appelt et al.,
2015] and is currently under review at the journal IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.
Chapter 6 presents the approach.
• A technique that improves the attack detection capabilities of a WAF. Given a set of attacks that
are not correctly identified by a WAF, this technique infers a filter rule that matches the missed
attacks and can in turn be added to the WAF’s rule set.
• A SQLi test oracle that is designed to meet the specific requirements of SQLi testing in an
industrial context and that is independent of any specific SQLi test case generation technique.
This contribution has been submitted to the International Conference on Automated Software
Engineering (ASE 2016) and is currently under review.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
Chapter 2 presents the foundations and concepts that are used throughout this dissertation. Sec-
tion 2.1 introduces SQLi, a common and severe type of attack on web applications and services.
Section 2.2 introduces protection mechanisms that aim to prevent the exploitation of SQLi vulnera-
bilities and are typically used in corporate IT environments.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the challenges in security testing that we identified in collaboration
with our industry partner. The testing techniques presented in this work are based on the identified
security testing challenges.
Chapter 4 proposes to consider WAFs and Database Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDSs) as parts of
the security testing process. We present a testing technique that uses DIDS to increase the accuracy of
state-of-the-art penetration testing tools, in particular if the subject under test is protected by a WAF.
Chapter 5 combines our proposed technique from Chapter 4 with an input generation approach that
can generate a diverse set of SQLi attacks. In contrast to the previous chapter, our proposed input
generation approach generates SQLi attacks that are likely to result in syntactically correct, malicious
Structured Query Language (SQL) statements and, thus, is effective at detecting exploitable SQLi
vulnerabilities.
Chapter 6 presents a testing technique to assess the attack detection capabilities of a WAF. The
technique uses machine learning algorithms to learn attack patterns, which are likely not to be detected
by a WAF, and systematically exploits these patterns to generate SQLi attacks.
Chapter 7 presents a technique to improve the attack detection capabilities of a WAF. Starting from
a set of missed attacks, our technique infers a filter rule that can be added to a WAF’s rule set in order
to identify the previously missed attacks.
Chapter 8 presents a test oracle that is specifically designed to meet the requirements of testing for
SQLi vulnerabilities in an industrial context.
Chapter 9 summarises the presented testing techniques and discusses future work.
Appendix A provides a detailed analysis of two variants of the WAF testing technique (ML-Driven
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D and ML-Driven B) presented in Chapter 6. We used the insights gained in this analysis to devise
an enhanced variant of our WAF testing technique (refer to ML-Driven E).
Appendix B provides detailed evaluation results for the WAF testing technique presented in Chap-
ter 6.
4
Chapter 2
Foundations
2.1 SQL Injection
In this section, a precise definition for each of the terms related to SQLi testing, which will be used
throughout this dissertation, is given. Understanding the meaning of terms such as vulnerable, de-
tectable and exploitable might seem intuitive; however, their precise definition might influence the
interpretation of results and evaluation of testing techniques.
In most cases, when input values are used in SQL statements, their values are used as data and not
as part of the SQL code to be executed. For example, the following Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP)
code forms a SQL statement by concatenating a string literal with the user-provided input variable
$country:
$sql="Select * From hotelList where country =’".$country."’";
$result = mysql_query($sql) or die(mysql_error());
The depicted SQL statement returns a list of hotels. The user-provided value of the input parame-
ter $country is intended to limit the result list to hotels of a specific country. However, if this input
is not properly validated and checked for malicious values, a user can provide an input such as:
’ ; drop table hotelList;--
The result of concatenating this input with the previous SQL statement would be:
"Select * From hotelList where country =’’ ;
drop table hotelList;--’;
When the database server executes this SQL code, the Select statement would return no values
while the drop table statement would delete the table hotelList (if permission to drop tables is not
configured correctly at the database level to prevent such actions). The rest of the command will not be
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executed because it is commented out (- symbol). The input in this case was interpreted as SQL code
rather than data, allowing the user to alter the database causing loss of information and unavailability
of the system because the table was deleted. We define an SQLi vulnerability as follows:
2.1 Definition: SQL Injection Vulnerability. A SQLi vulnerability is caused by a block of code
statements where potentially malicious input data can be interpreted as SQL code instead of being
treated as data.
Data is classified as untrusted if it is received from an external source. For example, the input
values in a user-provided web service request are typically considered to be untrusted data. Whether
all or part of the untrusted data is interpreted as SQL code depends on the attack string used and
the logic of the application. For example, in the previous SQL statement if the attack string was
Luxembourg’; drop table hotelList;- then part of the input value (Luxembourg) is
treated as data while the rest (drop table hotelList;- ) is interpreted as SQL code.
In the context of black box testing, the statement that causes a vulnerability can typically not be
localised. Therefore, we refer instead to an input parameter being vulnerable:
2.2 Definition: Vulnerable SQLi Input Parameter. A vulnerable SQLi input parameter is the entry
point through which potentially malicious data enters an application under test that is subsequently
used in an SQLi vulnerability in at least one execution of the system.
In this work, we use the term vulnerability to refer to a vulnerable SQLi input parameter, except
if stated otherwise.
The goal of an SQLi testing approach is to detect vulnerabilities. Whether a vulnerability is
detected or not also depends on the oracle used. Therefore, we define a detectable vulnerability as
follows:
2.3 Definition: Detectable SQL Injection Vulnerability. An SQLi vulnerability is a vulnerability
that can be detected given a specific oracle.
In some cases, an SQLi vulnerability exists in an application but an attacker might not be able to
exploit it. For example, an application might not properly validate an input value that is assumed to be
numeric to ensure that it actually contains a numeric value; thus, it is vulnerable to SQLi. However, a
WAF might be configured to block any requests containing non-numeric data for the vulnerable input
parameter (a concept known as virtual patching). Although the application is vulnerable, an attacker
would not be able to use the vulnerability to gain any benefit. We can define an exploitable SQLi
vulnerability as follows:
2.4 Definition: Exploitable SQL Injection Vulnerability. An exploitable SQLi vulnerability is a
vulnerability that can be used to cause an information leak, an unauthorised change in the state of the
database or system, the database to be unavailable or any other unintended and harmful interaction.
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Figure 2.1. Venn diagram illustrating the relationship between the different input pa-
rameter classifications.
In some cases, deciding if a vulnerability is exploitable can not be done automatically and re-
quires manual inspection by engineers who have the domain knowledge to decide if a vulnerability is
exploitable. For example, a vulnerability in the system might be exploited to leak information but the
information that is leaked is not sensitive or can be obtained by any user through alternative methods.
However, an automated approach might be able to estimate the probability of a vulnerability being
exploitable based on some heuristics. Vulnerabilities can then be ranked based on this probability to
reduce the time required for manual inspection or focus efforts on vulnerabilities that might pose a
higher threat.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the different classifications of input parameters.
A subset of all input parameters might be vulnerable, while a subset of those vulnerabilities is ex-
ploitable. Detectable vulnerabilities could either be exploitable or not exploitable. The intersection
of detectable vulnerabilities and exploitable vulnerabilities (E ∩ D) is the set of critical security faults
that the testing process can find. The set of exploitable vulnerabilities that are not detectable (E - D)
represents the false negatives of the testing process.
2.2 Runtime Protection Mechanisms of Web Applications
Since an application can in general not be guaranteed to be free of vulnerabilities, several protection
mechanisms are available that guard applications at runtime by shielding them from attacks. Having
such protection mechanisms in place reduces the risk of a potentially vulnerable application from
being exploited. This is in particular important in companies that depend on the secure and reliable
functioning of their IT systems and, thus, such companies frequently employ application protection
mechanisms (consider the example of our industry partner described in Chapter 3).
Several types of runtime protection mechanisms are used to protect against SQLi attacks. Two
commonly used security mechanisms in practice are Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) and Database
Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDSs). Since both of these mechanisms can have a significant impact
on security testing and play a major role throughout this work, Section 2.2.1 introduces WAFs and
Section 2.2.2 introduces DIDSs.
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2.2.1 Web Application Firewalls
Firewalls are commonly used to protect hosts in a private network from malicious request originating
from outside the network. Over the years, several different types of firewalls were developed. The first
generation of firewalls operate on the network layer by examining network packets, e.g. for source
and destination ports and addresses. Typically, the inspection of packets is done according to some
rule set, i.e. a network firewall forwards a packet to its destination if it complies with the rule set or
drops a packet otherwise. For example, for a network firewall that protects a web server it might be
desirable to drop any incoming packets whose destination port is not 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTPS). By
doing so, the firewall effectively protects internal network services on other ports than 80 and 443,
which were in particular in the early days of the Internet often vulnerable, from external attackers.
With the rising popularity of web applications and services the attacker’s focus shifted from vul-
nerabilities in network services to vulnerabilities in web-based systems. To exploit such vulnerabili-
ties, an attacker sends specially crafted HTTP requests, which target input sanitization bugs or other
flaws in the web application code (for example SQLi). Network firewalls are not effective in stopping
attackers from exploiting application-level vulnerabilities, since legitimate and malicious requests use
the same destination port and, thus, are typically not distinguishable for network firewalls. To defend
from this new threat, a new generation of application-protocol aware firewalls was introduced. For
example, for web applications and services, HTTP Firewalls were introduced, which are nowadays
commonly known as Web Application Firewalls.
A WAF examines every HTTP/S request submitted by the user to the application to decide if
the request should be accepted (if the request is legitimate) or rejected (if the request is malicious).
The WAF makes this decision by examining each input value in the request and checking if the
value matches the expected format (whitelist filtering) or if the value matches a known attack pattern
(blacklist filtering). Typically, this matching is performed according to a set of rules (i.e. regular
expressions). For example, consider the following blacklist rule from a popular open-source rule set:1
/\*!?|\*/|[’;]--|--[\s\r\n\v\f]
|(?:--[^-]*?-)
|([^\-&])#.*?[\s\r\n\v\f]|;?\\x00
The depicted regular expression matches SQL comments, e.g. /**/ or #, which are frequently used
in SQLi attacks and, thus, requests containing this strings might be blocked. Similarly, a whitelist rule
for a parameter that is expected to contain a credit card number checks if a received input conforms
to the format of a credit card number, e.g. a string consisting out of 16 to 19 digits, and blocks the
request otherwise.
The performance of the WAF and the protection it provides depends on this set of rules. Since
these rules are created and maintained manually by the application owner, they might be error-prone
and security holes might be introduced by mistake. On the other hand, attackers are continually
searching for ways to evade firewalls by using mechanisms such as obfuscation, where semantically
1See OWASP Core Rule Set: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_-
Project
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equivalent encodings of attack patterns are used that might not be recognized by the WAF. WAFs
are commonly used in industry and, for example, using a WAF is necessary to be compliant with the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard [PCI Security Standards Council, 2013] for systems
that process credit cards.
There are several reasons why a WAF may provide insufficient protection, including implementa-
tion bugs or misconfiguration. One way to ensure the resilience of a WAF against attacks is to rely on
an automated testing procedure that thoroughly and efficiently assesses its attack detection capabili-
ties. This work addresses this challenge for SQL injections, one of the main types of vulnerabilities
in practice.
2.2.2 Database Intrusion Detection System
Database Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) are the subject of a large body of literature [Chung et al.,
2000, Bertino et al., 2005, Srivastava et al., 2006, Hashemi et al., 2008, Valeur et al., 2005, Santos
et al., 2014] and several commercial DIDSs are available (e.g., GreenSQL [GreenSQL LTD., 2013],
Oracle Audit Vault and Database Firewall [ora, 2014]). A DIDS monitors the access to a database and
is often implemented as a proxy that intercepts the SQL statements sent from the application to the
database. DIDSs have an advantage over WAFs in that they have access to the SQL statement after it is
formulated and, therefore, have more information to decide if an SQL command is an attack. Vendors
claim that this increased visibility results in the accurate detection of illicit database accesses like
SQLi. A study compared several intrusion detection tools, which operate on different system levels
such as Network, Application, or Database, and finds GreenSQL, a Database Intrusion Detection
System, to be the most accurate amongst the compared tools, although far from being perfect [Elia
et al., 2010].
Besides intrusion detection, some commercial solutions provide also intrusion prevention mecha-
nisms (e.g. GreenSQL). Such solutions can usually be configured to either a prevention mode, where
the execution of malicious statements is blocked, or to a monitoring mode, where suspicious state-
ments are allowed to execute, but logged for further examination by an administrator. For software
testing purposes, in particular the latter mode is promising, since preventing a statement from exe-
cution might adversely affect the functionality of the application under test, which might potentially
lead to false positives.
Typically, DIDSs use either a risk-based or learning-based approach to decide if an SQL statement
is malicious. The risk-based approach assigns a risk score to each intercepted SQL statement, which
reflects the probability of the statement being malicious. To calculate the risk score, each statement
is assessed according to various criteria, e.g. for SQL fragments frequently used in SQLi attacks like
the comment sign or a tautology. In the learning-based approach, the security engineer first sets the
DIDS to a learning mode and issues a number of legal requests that exercise the application’s normal
behaviour. The DIDS, thereby, learns the different forms of SQL statements that the application
can execute. When the learning is completed, the security engineer sets the DIDS to the detection
mode, where any statement that does not comply with the learned statements is flagged as malicious.
The effectiveness of the DIDS is dependent on this learning phase: If the requests issued in the
learning phase do not represent all legal behaviour of the application, legal requests might be flagged
as suspicious when the DIDS is used in practice and this might lead to a high false positive rate.
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Chapter 3
Overview of Research Problems and
Proposed Solutions
The testing strategies presented in this work were elaborated in cooperation with our industrial partner,
SIX Payment Services (formerly CETREL S.A.). SIX Payment Services is a provider of financial
services in the area of payment processing, e.g. issuing of credit cards and debit cards, settlement of
card transactions, online payments, and point-of-sale payment terminals. We identified several key
challenges that SIX is facing with respect to security testing and we believe that these challenges are
representative for similar companies. The working assumptions of the testing approaches proposed
in this work are in essence derived from these key challenges.
Lack of source code. External companies develop various components of the business critical
software at SIX and our partner does not have access to the source code. In consequence, our partner is
not able to analyse, instrument, or modify the source code for purposes of software testing. However,
although our partner is not the developer of the software, they are responsible for the security of the
provided financial services and must ensure that no vulnerabilities within the various components
can be used to steal customer funds or to misuse the provided services in any other unintended way.
Failure to do so might lead to severe financial losses as can be seen from incidents1 that occurred at
similar companies. For this reason, our partner has to test the software for security vulnerabilities.
What complicates security testing in this case is that the source code is not available and thus no
details about its inner workings are known.
Black box security testing techniques are usually applied in scenarios where the source code is not
available. These techniques typically start by identifying input fields of the application under test, e.g.
by processing WSDL files or web crawling. Then, malicious request containing various attack types,
e.g. SQLi, are submitted to the application under test and the response is analysed to determine if the
attack was successful. However, recent studies assessed black box testing techniques and found that
their effectiveness and accuracy is limited. Khoury et al. [Khoury et al., 2011] conducted a study of
several state-of-the-art security scanners and found that this ineffectiveness might be caused by their
limited ability to deeply explore an application and their limited ability in analysing responses. A
1Interested readers are referred to:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/nyregion/eight-charged-in-45-million-global-cyber-bank-thefts.html
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/03/thieves-jam-up-smuckers-card-processor/
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/03/mastercard-visa-warn-of-processor-breach/
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similar study found that while state-of-the-art scanners are efficient in finding low hanging fruit, e.g.
reflective cross-side scripting, they fail finding hard to detect vulnerabilities, e.g. local and remote file
inclusions [Chen, 2015].
In this work, we address the described issues by developing security testing approaches that do
not require access to source code. To increase the effectiveness and accuracy of state-of-the-art black
box testing, we propose to observe the interactions of the subject application under test with its en-
vironment, e.g. database accesses or network traffic. While it is common for companies like SIX to
have no access to the source code, they often own and operate the hardware and network on which
the software is executed. By observing, for example, the database connection of the tested application
during a test run, we expect to devise more precise test oracles. Chapter 4 introduces the idea of using
a commercial database Intrusion Detection System (IDS) as a test oracle. Chapter 5 further develops
this idea and combines it with an effective approach for test case generation. Based on our experience
of using a commercial database IDS as a test oracle, Chapter 8 introduces a new SQLi test oracle that
is tailored for the specific requirements of security testing.
Effort intensive testing. Due to the need to comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI-DSS), SIX has to perform security tests on all applications that process credit card data
[18]. These tests have to occur at least once a quarter and have to be applied to all running software, no
matter if the code or the configuration was changed. Additionally, security tests have to be performed
prior to deploying modified applications to production systems. All these testing activities lead to a
high workload for the responsible security team. From a business perspective, it is desirable to lower
the time and manual labour involved in testing to reduce the costs.
To reduce the manual testing efforts required for PCI-DSS compliance, it is desirable to have tech-
niques that enable a higher degree of automation. Therefore, all approaches developed in this work
aim to achieve test automation. In particular, Chapter 5 introduces an automated testing technique
to detect SQLi vulnerabilities in web services, Chapter 6 introduces an automated approach to test
WAFs and Chapter 7 devises an automated approach to improve attack detection rules.
Lack of effective testing strategies for WAFs. Our industry partner employs several defence
mechanisms to increase the resilience of their IT systems against cyberattacks. For example, they set
up a WAF to defend against attacks on their web services or a database intrusion detection system to
detect illicit data access. While such systems can considerably reduce the risk of successful attacks,
their configuration and maintenance can be time consuming and error-prone. As a result, miscon-
figuration and the lack of time and tools for thoroughly testing configuration changes may result in
weakening the defence mechanisms.
We analysed our partner’s procedure of configuring and maintaining the WAF and found two key
scenarios that reduce the WAF’s attack detection capabilities: Firstly, in case the WAF’s configuration
changes, the validation efforts focus on avoiding false positives, i.e. legitimate requests that are being
flagged as attacks, while the attack detection capabilities of the WAF are neglected. This imbalance
between testing efforts is mainly due to the lack of suitable attack generation tools that can test WAFs.
On the other hand, the IT Security Engineer has an extensive test suite of legitimate requests, which
makes testing for false positives straightforward and comparably easy. Secondly, there is a plethora
of ways to obfuscate attack strings, some of which the IT Security Engineer is not aware of, and this
might lead to incomplete WAF filter rules that do not catch obfuscated attacks.
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We address the identified issues by deriving a systematic and automated testing technique for
WAFs in Chapter 6. The approach generates a diverse set of attacks and checks if a WAF correctly
identifies the attacks. Furthermore, our approach considers a large number of attack obfuscation
methods. Chapter 7 introduces an approach to transform attacks, which are not correctly identified
by a WAF, into a regular expression. This regular expression can in turn be added to the WAF’s
configuration to block attacks similar to the missed ones.
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Chapter 4
Assessing the Impact of Web Application
Firewalls and Database Intrusion Detection
Systems on SQLi Testing
While security testing can be effective at finding vulnerabilities, it does not provide guarantees that an
application is free of vulnerabilities. To reduce the remaining risk of a successful attack, practitioners
typically use, in addition to security testing, several run-time protection mechanisms to protect their
applications against attacks, such as WAFs and database IDSs. WAFs monitor the Hyper Text Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) traffic received by the application under protection for attack strings while database
IDSs monitor the communication between the application and the database for suspicious SQL state-
ments (refer to Chapter 2.2 for details). We believe that these two technologies can be utilised in the
security testing process and can also affect the results of evaluating different techniques.
In this chapter, we assess the impact of using WAFs and database IDSs on testing for SQLi vul-
nerabilities, which are one of the most widely spread types of vulnerabilities [Christey and Martin,
2007, The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), 2013]. We propose that WAFs can be
used to prioritise vulnerabilities by focusing developers effort on vulnerabilities that are not protected
by the WAF. We also investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of using a database IDS as oracle for
SQLi testing instead of just relying on the output of the application. We expect that using a database
IDS would enhance the detection rates of vulnerabilities.
The results of our case study on two service-oriented web applications with a total of 33 opera-
tions and 108 input parameters indicate that using a database IDS as an oracle does indeed improve
detection rates. The results also confirm our expectation that it is more challenging to find vulnera-
bilities when the subject under test is protected by a WAF. In our case study, the used WAF protects
many of the vulnerabilities, but however, not all vulnerabilities. Therefore, testing through the WAF
can be used to prioritise vulnerability localization and repairing efforts.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 discusses the purpose and implications
of using WAFs and database IDSs for security testing. Section 4.2 proposes an SQLi testing approach
that uses an exiting DIDS as test oracle. Finally, Section 4.3 presents a case study to evaluate our
proposed approach together with a discussion of results and threats to validity.
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4.1 Influence of Web Application Firewall and Database
Intrusion Detection System on Security Testing
WAFs and DIDSs are common building blocks in corporate IT environments. In fact, in some industry
sectors, e.g. payment card processing, a WAF is mandatory for the purpose of compliance [PCI
Security Standards Council, 2013]. Given that many companies have such systems already in place,
it is worth examining if these systems can be utilized for the benefit of security testing. This section
discusses the potential benefits and implications of including WAFs and DIDS in the security testing
process, for example an increased vulnerability detection rate, fewer false positives, and vulnerability
prioritisation.
4.1.1 Web Application Firewalls
Naturally, using a WAF affects the security assessment of an application; some input parameters
might be vulnerable if the application is accessed directly, but not vulnerable when a WAF protects the
application. For example, an input parameter that flows to an SQL statement might not be validated
for SQLi attack patterns, but the WAF is configured to detect and reject such attack patterns. In some
cases in practice, e.g. for legacy systems with known vulnerabilities, all validation and filtering might
be delegated to the WAF. Testing applications with such a set-up using approaches that only take into
account the application itself and not the WAF might result in determining that all inputs that are used
in SQL statements are vulnerable. In consequence, such approaches suffer from a high false positive
rate.
Ideally, all vulnerabilities should be patched even if a WAF protects the vulnerable parameter.
However, with limited time and resources dedicated to testing, which is often the case in industry,
test engineers might want to focus on fixing vulnerabilities that can still be exploited even when using
a WAF. Therefore, testing an application for SQLi vulnerabilities through a WAF can be used to
identify and prioritise vulnerabilities that can be exploited through the WAF.
Testing through a WAF can also have other useful applications, such as testing the WAF itself.
This can be useful, for example, if a choice needs to be made by the application owner between dif-
ferent alternative WAFs. The application can be tested using each WAF and the firewall that provides
the most protection can be chosen. Finally, testing the WAF could help in evaluating and refining its
rule set. When a vulnerability is found that can be detected while using a WAF, the developers, after
fixing the application code to eliminate the vulnerability, can define new rules or adjust existing rules
to protect the application against similar types of vulnerabilities. This might be useful to protect the
application against similar types of vulnerabilities that might be introduced in subsequent versions of
the system.
4.1.2 Database Intrusion Detection System
Existing black box SQLi testing approaches commonly use an oracle that analyses the HTTP output of
the application under test to decide if a vulnerability was detected [Antunes and Vieira, 2009, Ciampa
et al., 2010, Huang et al., 2003]. In this work, we propose using a database IDS, which is implement
as a proxy and intercepts all SQL statements, as an oracle (refer to Chapter 2.2.2 for a description
of database IDS). Since such a IDS has access to the SQL statement after all input values have been
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inserted in the statement and all processing is done, we expect that using an IDS as an oracle would
enhance vulnerability detection rates.
4.2 Implementation
We developed a prototype tool in Java that uses a set of standard attacks as test cases and a state-of-
the-art database proxy as an oracle. In particular, the tool is expected to help verify that an oracle that
observes database communications to detect SQLi vulnerabilities could improve the detection rate of
an SQL testing approach. The architecture of the tool is depicted in figure 4.1. The testing process
can be divided into three sub-processes: test case generation, delivery mechanism and vulnerability
detection.
Figure 4.1. Architecture of the prototype testing tool.
The test case generation process takes a valid test case as input, i.e. a test case where the input
data conforms to the specification of the operation under test. This valid test case is transformed into
a malicious test case by replacing one input parameter value at a time with an SQLi attack chosen
from a list of standard attacks. We provided the tool with a list of 137 standard attacks that was
compiled by Antunes and Vieira [Antunes and Vieira, 2009] and represents common SQLi attacks. A
parameter is replaced with an SQL attack from the list until a vulnerability is detected or all attacks
are used. This process is repeated for each input parameter of the operation under test. The delivery
mechanism encapsulates all implementation details that are necessary to deliver the malicious test
case to the SOAP-based Web Service and obtain a response. The vulnerability detection process uses
the state-of-the-art database proxy GreenSQL as an oracle to detect vulnerabilities.
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GreenSQL is an SQLi attack detection and prevention tool that supports both the learning-based
approach and the risk-based approach discussed in Section 2.2.2. In our case study, we used the
learning-based approach to detect malicious SQL statements. In brief, in the learning-based mode
GreenSQL learns during a training phase all legitimate SQL statements for a database under protection
and in the detection phase it blocks all statements that were not learned during training. We chose
GreenSQL based on the results of a previous study that compared GreenSQL to five similar tools and
found it to be the most effective in detecting SQLi attacks [Elia et al., 2010].
4.3 Evaluation
We designed a case study to answer the following research questions:
RQ1: What is the impact of using an oracle that observes communications to the database on
SQLi vulnerability detection?
We expect that an oracle that observes the database to determine that a vulnerability was detected
might improve the detection rates of an SQLi testing approach compared to an oracle that only relies
on the application’s output, e.g. HTTP responses. However, using such a database oracle might result
in a high number of false positives or have other implications on the results. To answer this question,
we conduct an experiment where we compare our prototype tool with SqlMap, a state-of-the-art SQLi
testing tool with an oracle based on the HTTP output. We compare the number of vulnerabilities de-
tected and the number of test cases that needed to be generated before the vulnerability was detected.
We also examine the requests that detected vulnerabilities for both approaches to investigate whether
they led to the formulation of executable malicious SQL statements and, therefore, led to detecting
exploitable vulnerabilities.
RQ2: How does testing the web services directly and testing them through a WAF impact the
effectiveness of SQLi testing?
Generating test cases that are able to detect vulnerabilities in web services through a WAF is natu-
rally expected to be more challenging than testing the application directly, since the WAF provides an
additional layer of protection. However, vulnerabilities that can be detected while testing through the
WAF pose a more pressing threat since they are completely unprotected. To answer this question, we
test the application using the two testing approaches (the state-of-the-art tool and our prototype tool)
through a state-of-the-art WAF and compare the results to those obtained without using the WAF. A
reduction in the number of vulnerabilities found might indicate that testing through the WAF can be
used to prioritise fixing vulnerabilities that are not protected by the WAF. Such reduction might also
indicate that we need more advanced test generation techniques for security testing that can penetrate
the more sophisticated protection techniques of WAFs and identify harder to detect vulnerabilities.
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4.3.1 Subject Applications
We selected web service applications rather than traditional web applications to eliminate the effects
of crawling the web application on results. Web services have well-defined and documented APIs that
can be used to call the different operations in the application. On the other hand, web applications
require a crawling mechanism to be built into the testing technique to explore the application and find
input fields that might be vulnerable. The crawling mechanism might impact the effectiveness of the
overall testing approach as noted by previous studies [Bau et al., 2010, Doupé et al., 2010, Khoury
et al., 2011].
Table 4.1. Details about the two applications we used in the case study
Application #Operations #Parameters LoC
Hotel Reservation Service 7 21 1,566
SugarCRM 26 87 352,026
Total 33 108 353,592
We chose two open-source web service applications as subjects for the case study. Table 5.2
provides information about the number of operations, input parameters and lines of code for the
chosen applications. The Hotel Reservation Service (HRS) was created by researchers1 to study
service-oriented architectures and was used in previous studies [Coffey et al., 2010b]. SugarCRM, is a
popular customer relationship management system (189.000 downloads in 20132). Both applications
are implemented using PHP, use a MySQL database and provide a Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP) Application Programming Interface (API).
4.3.2 Case Study Set-up
To perform the case study, we conducted two sets of experiments. In the first set of experiments (Fig-
ure 4.2), we applied our prototype tool and a state-of-the-art black box security testing tool that relies
only on the output of the application to the two case study subjects. We selected SqlMap [Damele
et al., 2013] as a representative for traditional black box testing tools that rely only on the output. We
chose SqlMap because it is an open source free tool that provides support for testing web services
as well as web applications. SqlMap is also one of four tools listed on the Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP) website [The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), 2013]
for automated SQLi testing. The tool was also used in previous studies [Ciampa et al., 2010, Halfond
et al., 2009].
In the second set of experiments (Figure 4.3), we applied the same two tools to our case study
subjects but tested the applications through a WAF to answer RQ2. We selected ModSecurity for
our experiments. ModSecurity is a WAF that protects web servers (e.g. Apache, IIS, Nginx) from
common threats including SQLi. Since ModSecurity requires a rule set to identify and reject attacks
as discussed in Section4.1.1, in our case study we used the OWASP [The Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP), 2013] core rule set (version 2.2.7).
1http://uwf.edu/nwilde/soaResources/
2http://sourceforge.net
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Figure 4.2. Experimental set-up for RQ1: The effect of observing database communi-
cations on detection rates.
Figure 4.3. Experimental set-up for RQ2: The influence of testing through a Web Ap-
plication Firewall.
Our prototype tool is deterministic; therefore we ran the tool once on each application and for
each set-up. SqlMap, on the other hand, is not deterministic; therefore we ran the tool 30 times
for each application and each set-up. We used the default configuration for SqlMap, except for a
minor modification that omits test cases that cause the database to pause the execution of a query, for
example by calling the sleep() operation, to avoid long execution times.
4.3.3 Results
This section discusses the results of running the experiments that we described in the previous sec-
tion on each of the two case study applications. For each experiment, we counted the number of
vulnerabilities found by each tool and the number of tries (requests) that the tool needed to generate
and execute before finding each vulnerability. As we mentioned before, SqlMap is non-deterministic,
therefore, we repeated any experiments that involve it 30 times and calculated the average number of
vulnerabilities and tries.
Table 4.2 summarises all the results obtained from our experiments. Both, the prototype tool and
SqlMap, were run on the two web service applications once with a WAF and once without. The
results show that the prototype tool, which uses a proxy as an oracle, detects more vulnerabilities
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than SqlMap, which relies only on the output of the application, for both applications and using both
set-ups (with and without WAF). The only exception is HRS without a firewall where both tools find
the same number (6) of vulnerabilities. Manual inspection showed that none of the vulnerabilities
reported by either tool is a false positive. We also observe that the number of tries or test cases that
the tool needs to execute before detecting the vulnerability (if a vulnerability is found) is significantly
higher for SqlMap compared to the prototype tool (1,306.55 vs 6.3 and 566.77 vs 2). These results
indicate that using a database proxy as an oracle for SQLi testing could improve detection rates and
could also enhance the efficiency of the testing process by detecting vulnerabilities faster.
Table 4.2. Collected data for the described experiments.
Prototype SqlMap
Application Firewall #Vulner. avg. # tries #Vulner. avg. # tries
Hotel Reservation Service
without 6 6.3 6 1,306.55
with 6 28 0 -
SugarCRM
without 6 2 3.87 566.77
with 3 34 0 -
The difference in the number of detected vulnerabilities when testing with and without a WAF can
help us answer RQ2. As we expected, testing through a WAF is more challenging and both testing
tools find fewer vulnerabilities in both applications. The only exception is the result of the prototype
tool for the Hotel Reservation Service, where the tool found the same number of vulnerabilities with
and without a firewall. SqlMap was unable to detect any vulnerabilities for both applications when
using a firewall. We also noticed that when vulnerabilities are found, the number of tries needed
to find the vulnerabilities also significantly increased (34 vs 2 and 28 vs 6.3). The prototype tool
found three vulnerabilities when testing through the WAF for the SugarCRM application. Therefore,
these three vulnerabilities are unprotected by the WAF and any debugging or fault repairing effort
should be first focused on these three vulnerabilities since the risk of them being exploited is higher.
Another conclusion we might draw from these results is that we need more sophisticated test genera-
tion techniques and oracles for SQLi testing. SqlMap, a state-of-the-art-tool, was unable to find any
vulnerabilities in both applications when using a WAF, while our prototype tool detected six in one
application and three out of six in the other. A more sophisticated test generation technique might be
able to detect vulnerabilities not found by either tool. Moreover, as hackers are continuously search-
ing for new ways and attack patterns to penetrate WAFs and find security holes in applications, SQLi
testing should attempt to emulate these attackers and identify vulnerabilities before the attackers do.
We investigated why the prototype tool finds only three out of six vulnerabilities in SugarCRM in
the set-up with a WAF and if there is a difference between the detected and undetected vulnerabilities.
Surprisingly, we found that the WAF blocks the valid test cases that are used to test the three missed
vulnerable parameters. Recall that our prototype tool uses these valid test cases as a starting point to
generate malicious test cases (see Section 5.2) and we assume that the WAF lets these valid test cases
pass. However, in our case study this is not for all tested parameters the case and, thus, malicious test
cases that are generated from blocked valid test cases are also blocked.
The reason that the valid test cases are blocked is that some of their parameters are formatted
as a series of numbers and letters separated by dashes. The rule set of ModSecurity, which is the
WAF used in our case study, includes a rule that blocks any request that contains more than five
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special characters (e.g., hash signs, quotes, dashes). Some of the valid test cases violate this rule
and therefore they are blocked. We expect that this does not happen in practice: Typically, security
engineers customise the configuration and rule set of the WAF to ensure that the normal operations
and functionality of the application are not affected. This highlights the need for using real industrial
case studies when evaluating tools and techniques to obtain more realistic results that reflect what
happens in real systems and contexts.
We also examined the test cases that successfully detected vulnerabilities when using our proto-
type tool. We found that these test cases changed the structure of the SQL statements they affected
causing GreenSQL to flag them as SQLi attacks. However, we also found that the resulting SQL state-
ments were not executable because they were syntactically incorrect. For example, one of the attack
strings used that detected a vulnerability was ’ UNION SELECT. The vulnerable SQL statement
was:
$sql="Select * From hotelList where country =’".$country.’"’;
The SQL statement after injecting the variable $countrywith the attack string ’ UNION SELECT
would be:
Select * From hotelList where country =’ ’ UNION SELECT’
GreenSQL will detect this statement as an SQLi attack since the structure of this statement differs
from the previously learned statements. However, the statement itself is not executable and would
cause the database server to raise a syntax error when attempting to execute the statement. If the
resulting SQL statement was syntactically correct and executable, we might be able to have more
confidence in that the detected vulnerability is exploitable. If one of the test cases that detected the
vulnerability was used by an attacker, he or she would not be able to gain any benefit from the attack.
This suggests that we need to enhance the oracle to get more useful results that can help identify not
just detectable vulnerabilities but also exploitable vulnerabilities and produce test cases that result
in executable SQL statements that change the behaviour of the application. This can be done, for
example, by improving the oracle by combining the database proxy with an additional oracle that
checks the syntactical correctness of the resulting SQL statement.
4.3.4 Threats to Validity
This section discusses the threats to validity of our results in this study using the standard classification
of threats [Wohlin et al., 2000]:
Internal Threats: The internal threats to validity in this study are related to generation of test
cases and the stopping criterion of each approach when studying the effect of the test oracle. Both
approaches start from a valid test case when testing each web service operation. We used the same
initial test cases for both the prototype tool and SqlMap to avoid experimenter bias.
External Threats: The external threats are related to the choice of case study subjects, the SQLi
testing approaches and the ability to generalise results. Although we only used two systems in the
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case study, one of the two systems is used by real users as the number of downloads indicates. More
experiments with different types of systems might be needed before being able to generalise results.
Although we only used two approaches to generate test cases, these two approaches are representative
of the state of the art in black box testing, as the review of related work indicates.
Construct Threats: We used the number of detected vulnerabilities to measure effectiveness
and used the number of test cases generated before a vulnerability is detected to measure efficiency.
Detecting vulnerabilities is the goal of any SQLi testing approach, therefore, the number of vulnera-
bilities seems like the most natural choice to measure effectiveness. The number of requests (or test
cases) issued before detecting a vulnerability is a more reliable method of measuring efficiency since
execution time might be effected by the environment and/or other processes performed by the CPU
while running the experiments.
4.4 Related Work
This chapter briefly reviews existing techniques for black box SQL injection testing and also review
the results of empirical studies that compare different black box testing techniques.
Huang et al. [Huang et al., 2003] proposed a black box SQL injection approach that learns the
application’s behaviour and then compares this to the behaviour of the application when SQL injection
attacks are submitted. Antunes and Vieira [Antunes and Vieira, 2009] use a similar oracle but focus on
SQL and server errors rather than the whole output. For example, if the legal test case led to an SQL
or server error but the attack was successful, the approach infers that a vulnerability was found since
the attack was able to circumvent the checks that caused the original error. Ciampa et al. [Ciampa
et al., 2010] analyse the output, including error messages, of both legal and malicious test cases to
learn more about the type and structure of the back-end database. This information is then used to
craft attack inputs that are more likely to be successful at revealing vulnerabilities. These approaches
use an oracle that relies on observing and analysing the output, while we propose using a database
proxy as an oracle to enhance detection rates.
Fonseca et al. [Fonseca et al., 2014] proposed to evaluate web application security mechanisms,
e.g. DIDSs and web application vulnerability scanner, by injecting vulnerabilities into the source
code of web applications and automatically attacking them. The DIDS was evaluated by attacking
the injected vulnerabilities and by checking if the DIDS identified the attacks. The web application
vulnerability scanners were evaluated by testing the web applications and by checking if they find
the injected vulnerabilities. In contrast to our work, the subject under test are web applications while
Fonseca et al. assess DIDS and web application scanners.
Several empirical studies evaluated and compared commercial, open-source and research black
box SQL injection testing tools [Bau et al., 2010, Doupé et al., 2010, Vieira et al., 2009]. These
studies found that black box testing tools have low detection rates and high false positive rates for
SQL injections. This result highlights the need to improve both test generation approaches and oracles
for SQL injection testing. In this paper, we focus on improving the oracle by using database proxies
rather than relying on the output of the application.
Elia et al. [Elia et al., 2010] evaluated several intrusion detection tools, including the database
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proxy GreenSQL that we use in this paper. The study injects security faults into the applications
under study and then automatically attacks the application to evaluate the effectiveness of the intrusion
detection tools studied. These papers focused on testing and comparing security mechanisms, such as
WAFs and database proxies, while we propose utilising these tools in the security testing process.
4.5 Summary
SQLi attacks are a major threat to web applications. It is therefore highly important to test such appli-
cations in an effective manner to detect SQL injection vulnerabilities. In many situations, for example
when the source code is not available or adequate code analysis technologies are not applicable, one
must resort to black box testing. This paper examined the impact of WAFs and DIDSs on black box
SQL injection testing. We propose to use WAFs to prioritise repairing efforts of SQLi vulnerabilities
by testing the application with and without a WAF and then to prioritise fixing vulnerabilities that
are not protected by the WAF. We also propose to use DIDSs, which monitor the communications
between the application and the database and flag any suspicious SQL statements, as an oracle for
SQL injection testing.
We conducted a case study on two service oriented web applications where we compared the
effectiveness and efficiency of two SQL injection tools: SqlMap, which is a state-of-the-art black
box testing tool with an oracle that analysis the HTTP responses of the tested application, and our
prototype tool, which uses a DIDS (GreenSQL) as an oracle. The results confirm that using a DIDS
increases the detection rates of SQL injection testing and also results in finding vulnerabilities with
significantly lower numbers of test cases. A more detailed investigation of the test cases revealed
that using database proxies helps in detecting more vulnerabilities, but a more sophisticated oracle is
needed to be able to reason about the vulnerabilities’ exploitability, i.e., if an attacker would be able
to gain any benefit from the vulnerability.
We also compared the results of the two testing tools when testing through a WAF (ModSecurity)
and when testing the applications directly. The results showed that testing through the WAF is more
challenging, causing our prototype tool to only detect 50% of vulnerabilities for one application,
while SqlMap detected vulnerabilities for neither application. These results have two implications:
Firstly, testing through WAFs can be used to prioritise fixing vulnerabilities that are not protected
by the WAF. Secondly, the inability of SqlMap to detect any vulnerabilities when testing through
the WAF, although some of those vulnerabilities were detectable by our prototype tool, suggests that
we need to further improve the test case generation and oracles of black box SQL injection testing.
An improved approach for the generation of test cases is introduced in the next chapter. Chapter 8
introduces a test oracle tailored for the needs of SQLi testing.
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µ4SQL: An Input Mutation Approach to the
Generation of SQL Injection Test Cases
This chapter introduces a black box automated testing approach for SQLi vulnerabilities, called
µ4SQL. Starting from “legal” initial test cases, the approach applies a set of mutation operators
that are specifically designed to increase the likelihood of generating successful SQLi attacks. More
specifically, new attack patterns are likely to be generated by applying multiple mutation operators
on the same input. Moreover, some of our mutation operators are designed to obfuscate the injected
SQL code fragments to bypass security filters, such as WAFs, while others aim to repair SQL syntax
errors that might be caused by previous mutations. As a result, our approach can generate test inputs
that produce syntactically correct and executable SQL statements that can reveal SQL vulnerabili-
ties, if they exist. By producing SQLi attacks that bypass the firewall and result in executable SQL
statements we ensure to find exploitable vulnerabilities as opposed to vulnerabilities that can not be
exploited, for example because a filter blocks all attacks. In addition, concrete sample attacks pro-
duced by our approach can help developers to fix the source code or the security filter’s configuration.
Our approach is fully automated and supported by a tool called Xavier.
We have evaluated our approach on some open-source systems that expose web service interfaces.
Compared to a baseline approach, called Std, which consists of an up-to-date set of 137 known SQLi
attack patterns, our approach is faster and is significantly more likely to detect vulnerabilities within
a limited time budget. Moreover, when the subject systems are protected by a WAF, none of the
inputs generated by Std that reveal vulnerabilities can get through the firewall, while our approach
can still generate a good amount of inputs, getting through the firewall and revealing all-but-one
known vulnerabilities.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 presents our proposed mutation
operators and security testing approach. Section 5.2 introduces the implementation of our approach.
Finally, Section 5.3 presents the evaluation together with a discussion of results and threats to validity.
5.1 Approach
We propose an automated technique, namely µ4SQL, for detecting SQLi vulnerabilities. Our tech-
nique rests on a set of mutation operators that manipulate inputs (legitimate ones) to create new test
25
Chapter 5. µ4SQL: Input Mutation Operators for SQL Injection Testing
inputs to trigger SQLi attacks. Moreover, these operators can be combined in different ways and
multiple operators can be applied to the same input. This makes it possible to generate inputs that
contain new attack patterns, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting vulnerabilities.
Specifically, we want to generate test inputs that can bypass web application firewalls and result
in executable SQL statements. A WAF may block SQLi attacks and prevent a vulnerable web service
from being exploited. Therefore, effective test inputs need to get through the WAF in order to reach the
service. Furthermore, they should lead to executable SQL statements as otherwise, security problems
are unlikely to arise since the database engine will reject them and consequently no data would be
leaked or compromised.
This section introduces our proposed mutation operators to generate test data. For each mutation
operator, along with its definition, a concrete example is provided. In some operators we discuss also
their preconditions with respect to input and previously applied operators. We will then discuss our
test generation technique and the automated tool we developed to support the technique.
5.1.1 Mutation Operators
Mutation operators (MO) can be classified by their purpose into the following three classes: Behaviour-
changing, syntax-repairing and obfuscation. Table 5.1 provides a summary of all mutation operators.
5.1.1.1 Behaviour-Changing
This class of mutation operators mutates inputs with the aim of changing the application’s expected
behaviour if the application is vulnerable to SQLi. For example, a mutated input could cause the
application to return more database rows than expected, exposing sensitive data to an unauthorised
user. We define the following behaviour-changing operators:
Example: from original input: 1; MO_or produces a mutated input: 1 OR 1=1. As a result, if the
SQL statement that takes the input is predefined as "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" + input, the
input will change the logic of the statement and turns it as follows: SELECT * FROM table WHERE
id=1 OR 1=1. This resulting statement will return all the data of table.
Operator: MO_and
Adds AND x=y to the WHERE clause of an SQL statement where x and y are random numbers
or single characters enclosed in single or double quotes and x is not equal to y.
Rationale:
By adding a contradiction to the WHERE clause, no rows will be affected by the SQL statement.
This type of malicious input cannot be used to exploit a vulnerability but because the result of
such input is known, this type of input can be used to confirm that a vulnerability is present.
Preconditions:
MO_or has not been applied.
Example: original input: 1, mutated input: 1 AND 1=2. That will turn, for example, a predefined
statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" + input to: SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1
AND 1=2, thus, negating the logic of the original statement.
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Table 5.1. Summary of mutation operators classified into behaviour-changing, syntax-
repairing, and obfuscation operators.
MO name Description
Behaviour-Changing Operators
MO_or Adds an OR-clause to the input
MO_and Adds an AND-clause to the input
MO_semi Adds a semicolon followed by an addi-
tional SQL statement
Syntax-Repairing Operators
MO_par Appends a parenthesis to a valid input
MO_cmt Adds a comment command (-- or #) to
an input
MO_qot Adds a single or double quote to an in-
put
Obfuscation Operators
MO_wsp Changes the encoding of whitespaces
MO_chr Changes the encoding of a character lit-
eral enclosed in quotes
MO_html Changes the encoding of an input to
HTML entity encoding
MO_per Changes the encoding of an input to
percentage encoding
MO_bool Rewrites a boolean expression while
preserving it’s truth value
MO_keyw Obfuscates SQL keywords by ran-
domising the capitalisation and insert-
ing comments
Operator: MO_uni
Adds the SQL UNION operator followed by an additional SELECT statement to the input.
Rationale:
The UNION operator combines the result set of two or more SELECT statements into a single
result set. Injecting a UNION in an SQL statement allows the attacker to access any table in the
database and not limit him/her to tables used in the predefined statement. The result set returned
from each SELECT statement must have the same number of columns and the ith column in both
result sets must be of the same data type, otherwise a run-time error will occur.
Preconditions:
The predefined SQL statement has been determined to be a SELECT statement.
Example: original input: 1, mutated input: 1 UNION SELECT login, password from table2. This
changes the predefined statement: "SELECT productName, manufacture FROM table WHERE id="
+ input to SELECT productName, manufacture FROM table WHERE id=1 UNION SELECT login,
password fromtable2.
Operator: MO_semi
27
Chapter 5. µ4SQL: Input Mutation Operators for SQL Injection Testing
Adds a semicolon (;) followed by an additional SQL statement to the input. The resulting query
has the form sql_stmt1; sql_stmt2, where sql_stmt1 is the original SQL statement and sql_stmt2
is a randomly chosen SQL statement from a predefined list.
Rationale:
SQL statements separated by a semicolon are executed by the server from left to right, unless an
error is encountered. If this operator is applied successfully, any SQL statement can be injected
after the semicolon giving the attacker complete control over the database if no other restrictions
are applied (e.g., the database user has no privilege restrictions defined on the database level).
Example: original input: 1, mutated input: 1; SELECT waitfor(5) FROM dual. This changes the
predefined statement: "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id=" + input to: SELECT * FROM users
WHERE id=1; SELECT waitfor(5) FROM dual.
5.1.1.2 Syntax-Repairing
As mentioned before, a SQLi attack aims to change the behaviour of the application by injecting ma-
licious inputs. Therefore, the malicious input itself is expected to contain SQL statement fragments.
This type of input, unlike regular valid inputs, could cause an SQL syntax error when being combined
with its targets, i.e., predefined SQL statements. Since the approach we propose is a black box tech-
nique, the predefined SQL statement syntax is unknown to the test generator making it challenging
to generate inputs that do not cause syntax errors. This class of mutation operators mutates inputs
with the goal of trying to repair SQL syntax errors when they might be encountered. The mutation
operators we define in this class are the following:
Operator: MO_par
Appends a closing parenthesis to the end of an input.
Rationale:
In some cases, an input provided by the user is used as a parameter for an SQL function call or
within a nested SELECT statement. In such scenarios the input is inserted within parenthesis,
for example, func_name(input). If such input is vulnerable to injections, this vulnerability can
only be exploited when the opening parenthesis of the function call is matched with a closing
parenthesis. Otherwise, the injected input would be interpreted as part of the function’s parame-
ter, which might cause a syntax error or cause the injection to have no effect on the application’s
behaviour.
Preconditions:
A behaviour-changing mutation operator has been previously applied.
Example: original input: 67, mutated input: 67). When the input is further mutated with MO_or
and MO_cmt, the obtained mutated input will be: 67) OR 1=1 -{}-. Let us consider a predefined
statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE character=CHR(" + input + ")", where function CHR
converts an integer to its corresponding Unicode character. The changed SQL statement: SELECT *
FROM table WHERE character=CHR(67) OR 1=1 – ).
Operator: MO_cmt
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Adds an SQL comment command (double dashes -- and the hash character #) to the input. Any
SQL that follows a comment command is not executed.
Rationale:
an SQL comment command can be useful to repair syntax errors that were caused by previous
mutations. By appending an SQL comment command at the end of the mutant, everything
following the comment will be ignored by the parser, which might help fixing SQL syntax errors.
Preconditions:
Another operator, such as MO_par, has been previously applied and caused a syntax error.
Example: original input: 67, after being mutated with MO_or and MO_par: 67) OR 1=1. This
changes the predefined statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE character=CHR(" + input +
")" to a combined statement, which causes a syntax error: SELECT * FROM table WHERE charac-
ter=CHR(67) OR 1=1).
We then apply MO_cmt to obtain: 67) OR 1=1 #. The final statement: SELECT * FROM table
WHERE character=CHR(67) OR 1=1 #) Applying this mutation causes the last parenthesis to be
ignored by the parser, thereby avoiding parser error due to the unbalanced number of parentheses.
Operator: MO_qot
Adds either a single quote (’) or a double quote (") to the mutant.
Rationale:
If an input that is vulnerable to injections is of type string, it may be enclosed in single or double
quotes in the predefined SQL statement. The SQL parser will treat the mutant, including the
injected SQL, as a string literal and will not execute any SQL commands within the mutant. To
be able to exploit the vulnerability, we have to first exit the string context by closing any open
quotes before any SQL commands can be injected.
Preconditions:
A behaviour-changing mutation operator, which contains a character literal, has been previously
applied.
Example: original input: Smith, mutated with MO_or: Smith OR 1=1. This changes the predefined
statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE name=’" + input + "’" to combined statement, which
does not result in the desired change of behavior, since the mutant is treated as a string literal: SELECT
* FROM table WHERE name=’Smith OR 1=1’). After being further mutated with MO_qot
and MO_cmt: Smith’ OR 1=1 #, the final statement is SELECT * FROM table WHERE name=’Smith’
OR 1=1 #), which is syntactically correct and changes the logic of the original statement.
5.1.1.3 Obfuscation
Some applications employ input filters, e.g., a web application firewall, to defend against SQLi at-
tacks. In essence, a WAF examines every input to check for suspicious string patterns typically used
in SQLi attacks, such as SQL keywords, and blocks them. For example, a WAF uses a blacklist that
defines forbidden characters or strings to decide if an input is suspicious. In practice, such filters pro-
tect many security-critical systems. For example, a software system, which handles credit card data,
has to employ a WAF to prevent attacks and to be compliant with industry security standards. Obfus-
29
Chapter 5. µ4SQL: Input Mutation Operators for SQL Injection Testing
cation mutation operators try to avoid filtering by mutating an input to a semantically equivalent input
but in a different form. This might prevent the filter from recognising the forbidden characters/strings
in the mutated input. We define the following obfuscation mutation operators:
Operator: MO_wsp
Replaces a whitespace with a semantically equivalent character (+, /**/, or unicode encodings:
%20, %09, %0a, %0b, %0c, %0d and %a0).
Rationale:
An application might filter inputs that contain string patterns known to be used in SQLi attacks,
for example, a single quote followed by a whitespace. Representing the whitespace in a different
encoding might cause the malicious input to avoid this filter.
Preconditions:
The input contains at least one whitespace.
Example: original input: 1 OR 1=1, mutated input: 1+OR+1=1. This changes the predefined
statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" + input to SELECT * FROM table WHERE
id=1+OR+1=1.
Operator: MO_chr
Replaces a character literal enclosed in quotes (’c’) with an equivalent representation, where c is
an arbitrary printable ASCII character. Equivalent representations are:
• Short binary representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with b’1100001’.
• Long binary representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with _binary’1100001’.
• Unicode representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with n’a’.
• Hexadecimal representation, for example, ’a’ is replaced with x’61’.
Rationale:
If a filter rejects a mutant generated by a behaviour-changing mutation operator which contains
a character literal, this operator can be used to obfuscate the mutant. For example, MO_or
generates mutants with a tautology, e.g. OR ’a’=’a’. A filter may may be configured to identify
suspicious inputs by checking for a tautology pattern. To avoid this filter, this operator changes
the representation of one of the tautology’s operands, while preserving the semantic meaning.
For example, OR ’a’=’a’ could be mutated to OR ’a’=x’61’, where x’61’ is the hexadecimal
representation of ’a’. This new mutant might not be recognized as a tautology by the filter and,
therefore, avoid filtering.
Preconditions:
A behaviour-changing mutation operator, which contains a character literal, has been previously
applied.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO_or: 1 OR ’a’=’a’, further mutated with MO_chr:
1 OR ’a’=x’61’. This changes the predefined statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" +
input to: SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1 OR ’a’=x’61’.
Operator: MO_html
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Changes the encoding of a mutant using HTML entity encoding. In HTML entity encoding, a
character can be encoded in two ways: (i) numeric character reference in the form &#N where
N is the character’s code position in the used character set in decimal or hexadecimal represen-
tation; (ii) Character entity reference [W3C, 2012] in the form &SymbolicName. For example,
&quot; is the encoding for the single quote character (’).
Rationale:
Using HTML entity encoding might help evade a filter that is designed to reject a certain char-
acter, but does not recognize the same character if received in HTML entity encoding.
Preconditions:
For character entity reference encoding, only characters with symbolic names can be encoded.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO_or: 1 OR ’a’=’a’, further mutated with MO_html:
1 OR &quot;a&quot; = &quot;a&quot;. This turns the predefined statement: "SELECT * FROM
table WHERE id=" + input to: SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1 OR &quot;a&quot; = &quot;-
a&quot;.
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Operator: MO_per
Changes the encoding of a mutant using percent encoding:%HH, where HH is a two digit hex-
adecimal value referring to the character’s ASCII code. For example, the single quote character
(’) is encoded as %27.
Rationale:
Using percent-encoding is useful if a filter rejects a certain character, but does not recognize the
same character if received in percent encoding.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO_or: 1 OR ’a’=’a’, further mutated with MO_per: 1
OR%20’a’=’a’. This turns the predefined statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" + input
to SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1
OR%20’a’=’a’.
Operator: MO_bool
Replaces a boolean expression with an equivalent boolean expression. For example, the boolean
expression 1=1 which is used in MO_or could be obfuscated as not false=!!1. Both expressions
evaluate to true, which maintains the same semantic meaning of the mutant after obfuscation.
Rationale:
A filter might be configured to look for and reject a certain boolean expression which is used as
part of a request which is frequently used in SQLi attacks, e. g. a tautology. By obfuscating the
boolean expression, the filter might fail to recognise the attack making it possible to perform the
attack.
Preconditions:
Can only be applied to input values that contain a boolean expression.
Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO_or: 1 OR 1=1, further mutated with MO_bool: 1 OR
not false=!!1. This turns the predefined statement "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" + input to:
SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1 OR not false=!!1.
Operator: MO_keyw
Obfuscates SQL keywords and operators using different techniques: Randomly changing the
case of some letters, adding comments in the middle of a keyword or replacing a keyword with
an alternative representation. Most SQL parsers are case insensitive, e.g. the keyword select,
SELECT or SeLeCt are all valid. Some parsers accept keywords which contain a comment in the
middle of the keyword (e.g. sel/*comment here*/ect). Finally, some keywords have alternative
forms, e.g. OR can also be expressed as ||.
Rationale:
A filter might be configured to reject a request that contains any SQL keyword, since SQL
keywords are frequently used in SQLi attack strings. By obfuscating the SQL keywords in an
input, the filter may fail to recognise those keywords making the attack successful.
Preconditions:
The input value contains at least one SQL keyword.
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Example: original input: 1, mutated with MO_or: 1 OR 1=1, further mutation with MO_keyw: 1
|| 1=1. This changes the predefined statement: "SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=" + input to:
SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=1 || 1=1.
5.1.2 Test Generation
A single or multiple mutation operators of different types can be applied to a single input parameter
to generate desired inputs. The latter case aims at detecting subtle vulnerabilities that can only be
triggered with an input generated by combining multiple mutation operators. For example, consider
an application that filters inputs by searching for known attack patterns that can be generated using
one of the behaviour-changing operators. To form a successful attack, it is necessary to first apply a
behaviour-changing operator and then apply one or more obfuscation operators.
Each chain of mutations has to start from a valid test case, which satisfies the input validations of
the application under test. Starting from a valid test case ensures that we avoid generating test cases
that would be directly rejected by the application due to dependencies between inputs or complex
input structures that are unlikely to be generated randomly. Moreover, valid test cases have the benefit
of being more likely to satisfy input validations and reach critical parts of the application, such as SQL
queries. For example, if an application expects a credit card number together with other inputs, which
we wish to mutate, the credit card number has to follow a well-defined format; otherwise the test case
would be instantly rejected. With the presented approach, valid test cases from existing functional
test suites can be reused or, if such test suites do not exist, valid test cases can be manually created
using SoapUI1 and similar tools.
Algorithm 1 formally defines the test generation algorithm: Starting from a valid test case, each
input is mutated a predefined number of times. The function Apply_MO (Line 4) randomly applies one
or more mutation operator(s) to the current Input. The function uses a simple grammar that defines the
different legal ways to combine operators and ensures that all preconditions for the applied operators
are satisfied. The operation under test is then called with the updated test case TC′. If the oracle flags a
vulnerability, all SQL statements that were issued as a result of the call are checked. If the percentage
of executable SQL statements (i.e., statements that do not contain a syntax error) is above a predefined
threshold P, the input is reported as vulnerable and the test case is saved to help the test engineer in
debugging and fixing the vulnerability (Line 5-8). In our experiments we choose P= 100%, meaning
that all triggered SQL statements must be executable.
Figure 5.1 shows an example of a SOAP message (a test case) generated by our approach. Here
the input values of the parameters minPrice, maxPrice, and start are kept from the original test case,
while the input value of the parameter country has been mutated to contain a SQLi attack.
5.1.3 Test Oracle
When a malicious input is sent to a target system, it may result in making the system misbehave if
successful. In most cases, the manifestation of abnormal behaviours can be observed from the re-
sults the target system returns (e.g., web pages showing unintended content) or from the surrounding
environment (e.g., crashes, illegal calls to the operating system, or unintended accesses to data). In
1http://www.soapui.org
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Algorithm 1 Test Generation Algorithm
Input:
TC: A test case: ArrayOf(Input)
OP: A web service operation to be tested
Output:
TS: Test Suite for SQLi vulnerabilities
V: Set of vulnerable inputs
1: TS = /0
2: for all Input in TC do
3: while max_tries_not_reached do
4: TC′ = apply_MO(TC,Input)
5: if call(OP,TC′) = VulnrFlagged then
6: if executable_SQL ≥ P then
7: V = V ∪ Input
8: TS = TS ∪ TC′
9: end if
10: end if
11: end while
12: end for
13: return TS, V
<soapenv:Envelope>
  <soapenv:Header/>
  <soapenv:Body>
    <urn:getRoomsByRate>
  <minPrice xsi:type="xsd:float">100</minPrice>
  <maxPrice xsi:type="xsd:float">400</maxPrice>
  <country xsi:type="xsd:string">"||not 0--</country>
  <start xsi:type="xsd:integer">1</start>
    </urn:getRoomsByRate>
  </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
Figure 5.1. Example of a generated test case, the parameter country contains a mutated
SQLi attack.
our experiments, because we focus on SQL injections, we deploy a database proxy that intercepts
the communication between the target system and its database, to identify if an input is potentially
harmful or not. For example, we can use GreenSQL2 for this purpose. A previous study that com-
pared GreenSQL to five similar tools has found it to be the most effective in detecting SQL injection
attacks [Elia et al., 2010].
Details of using a database proxy as oracle has been discussed in our previous work [Appelt et al.,
2013]. Typically, a database proxy is deployed and trained with normal database accesses. Such
training data are the results of regular usage of the systems or the execution of existing functional test
suites. Based on the training data, the proxy learns regular patterns of legal SQL statements. Once
2http://www.greensql.com
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trained, the proxy will continue observing the traffic between the system and its database and raise
alarms when identifying suspicious database queries. Each alarm corresponds to one database SQL
statement, and one test case can result in multiple SQL statements and thus multiple alarms. To avoid
false positives due to incomplete training, manual inspection may be needed to verify that all SQL
statements flagged actually point to a vulnerability in the system.
5.2 Implementation
The presented mutation approach has been implemented as a Java tool, called Xavier3. It can be used
to test SOAP-based web services for SQLi vulnerabilities. Figure 5.2 shows the key components of
the tool (Test generator and Monitor) and how it is used in practice. The test generator takes as inputs
the WSDL file of the web service under test and a sample test case for each web service operation
that has to be tested. Such a sample test case can be easily generated by professional tools, such as
SoapUI, or by existing approaches [Bartolini et al., 2009]. The tool, then, examines the sample test
case to find all input parameters for an operation and replaces each parameter, one at a time, with a
SQLi attack generated with our mutation approach. The modified test case will be sent to the web
service under test (the SUT in the figure). In some settings, there could be a web application firewall
(the WAF component) deployed in between the test generator and the SUT. The oracle component
(the DB proxy component in the figure) observes the interactions between the SUT and its database
to detect malicious SQL statements. Finally, the Monitor component of Xavier constantly queries the
oracle component to know whether generated inputs reveal a SQLi vulnerability.
In Xavier, we integrate GreenSQL to intercept SQL statements. The database proxy uses a learn-
ing approach to detect SQLi vulnerabilities. Therefore, it has to be trained in a learning phase to
recognise legal SQL statements. In the detection phase, the proxy considers all intercepted state-
ments, which have not been learned previously, as SQLi attacks.
WAF SUT
Monitor
Data
base
Test 
generator
XAVIER
DB
ProxyWSDL
Input 
samples 
test reports
Figure 5.2. Components of Xavier and how Xavier is used in practice.
Every suspected malicious statement is further analysed if it forms syntactically correct SQL. An
attacker is only able to exploit a SQLi vulnerability, if he can inject the malicious input in such a way
that the resulting SQL statement is free of syntax errors. Otherwise, the attacker is unable to reach his
goal, e.g., to obtain/modify data or change the application’s control flow, if the malicious statement is
3Contact us for download
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not executed. The tool MySQL-Proxy4 is used to monitor if an SQL statement has been executed or
if there was an error during execution.
5.3 Evaluation
We have evaluated the effectiveness of our approach on two open source systems and in two different
settings: with and without the presence of a web application firewall (WAF). The main motivation for
the latter is that, in most contexts, including those of our industry partners, such a firewall is typically
present (or sometimes integrated) and is the first protection layer encountered by attackers. Such sit-
uations are therefore deemed more realistic. The firewall deployed in our experiment is ModSecurity
with the OWASP Core Rule Set (version 2.2.0). As the baseline for our evaluation, we considered a
comprehensive list of known SQLi attack patterns.
We aim at evaluating the performance of our proposed mutation technique in comparison with
standard attacks. More specifically, we investigate the following research questions:
RQ1: Are standard attacks and mutated inputs (generated by µ4SQL) likely to reveal ex-
ploitable SQLi vulnerabilities?
RQ2: With and without the presence of the WAF, which input generation technique performs
better?
5.3.1 Subject Applications
Two open-source subjects, namely HRS and SugarCRM were used in our experiments. HRS was cre-
ated by researchers to study service-oriented architectures and was used in previous studies [Coffey
et al., 2010a]. SugarCRM is a popular customer relationship management system (received 189K+
downloads as of 20135). These systems provide web service APIs to the external world. Such in-
terfaces allow other systems, namely service consumers, to access to the business functionality and
data of the subject systems. However, they are also target for SQLi attacks if the inputs through those
interfaces are inadequately treated.
Table 5.2. Size in terms of web service operations, parameters, and lines of code of the
subject applications.
Application #Operations #Parameters #LoC
HRS 7 21 1,566
SugarCRM 26 87 352,026
Total 33 108 353,592
Table 5.2 provides information about the number of operations, input parameters and lines of
code for the chosen applications. In terms of size in number of lines of code, HRS and SugarCRM,
4http://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.1/en/mysql-proxy.html
5http://sourceforge.net
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with 1.5KLoCs and 352KLoCs respectively, are not particularly large but they provide a respectable
number of services with many input parameters, with known vulnerabilities. SugarCRM and HRS are
both implemented using PHP, use a MySQL database, and provide a SOAP-based Web Service API.
Those are popular technologies used in the implementation of many web services.
5.3.2 Treatments
We refer to the baseline approach consisting of 137 known attack patterns as Std (Standard attacks).
Such patterns were consolidated in a repository of SQLi attack patterns [Antunes et al., 2009]. They
include different contemporary categories of attacks, such as Boolean-based, and UNION query-
based. In the context of our study, the whole set of attack patterns of Std is applied for every individual
input parameter. The second treatment used in our study is our approach, µ4SQL.
5.3.3 Variables
We used GreenSQL 6 as the oracle (database proxy) for the generated test inputs of Std and µ4SQL.
To train GreenSQL, we have created a test suite for each of the subjects consisting of a wide range
of legitimate input values. To avoid false positives due to incomplete training, in our experiments, we
manually verified that all SQL statements flagged by GreenSQL did actually point to a vulnerability
in the system and were not legal statements which had simply not been learned.
Given a set of test cases targeting a specific web service parameter, we define T as the total
number of test cases that generate SQL statements that are flagged (alarm) by the database proxy.
Among these tests, we further investigate if their generated SQL statements are executable or not. We
refer to Te for the total number of tests that can lead to flagged and executable SQL statements. To
compare Std and µ4SQL, we need to consider both T and Te, as we will see that looking at T alone
would lead to very different conclusions since only executable SQL statements can be exploitable.
Non-executable statements can be generated because the corresponding inputs, after being processed
by a target, result in syntax-errors. Such statements hardly have a security impact since the database
engine would reject them and, hence, no data would be leaked or compromised.
If a technique yields higher Te, it is considered to be more effective at detecting exploitable vul-
nerabilities. In other words, when Te is high, it is more likely to detect exploitable vulnerabilities for a
test suite of fixed size. Moreover, it is also likely to detect vulnerabilities faster, i.e., we need a smaller
number of tests to be executed in order to detect the vulnerabilities. This, in practice, is important
when dealing with a large number of services and input parameters.
Since one test case can give rise to multiple SQL statements, we need to determine how to compute
Te when there is a mix of executable and non-executable statements. Since, in practice, one single
flagged and executable statement generated by a specific input can entail serious consequences, when
more SQL statements are executable, the chance to uncover vulnerabilities is higher. In our analysis,
with the intent of being conservative in our results, a test t is considered to be part of Te if and only if
all the flagged statements generated by t are executable.
6http://www.greensql.com
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5.3.4 Results
We ran µ4SQL and Std on every parameter of the two selected subjects, SugarCRM and HRS. There
are in total 108 input parameters for all their web services. As described earlier, Std entails 137 test
executions for every parameter, whereas with µ4SQL, since it is non-deterministic, we need to run
more test executions to account for randomness. To do so in an efficient way, given the substantial
execution time (about 5.7 hours per vulnerable parameter on a virtual machine of 1Gb RAM and
2,6Ghz CPU) we generated and ran 1000 tests for each parameter. We, then, adopted a Bootstrapping
approach (sampling with replacement) [Efron and Tibshirani, 1993] and formed 10k test suites (each
has 137 tests) by sampling from these 1000 tests, so that each test suite would be comparable with
Std with respect to Te. In the tables 5.3 and 5.4, we report the percentage of T and Te for Std on
each subject and their average percentage for µ4SQL over 10k test suites. We only report results for
vulnerable input parameters as per the results of the two test techniques and after being confirmed
through manual inspection.
Table 5.3. Results of Std and µ4SQL on the subject applications when no WAF is
enabled.
Subject Parameter Std µ4SQL
%T %Te %T (avg) %Te (avg)
HRS country 12.41 5.84 40.62 21.80
arrDate 35.04 9.49 42.05 12.50
depDate 35.04 9.49 42.96 12.03
name 35.04 9.49 43.36 12.91
address 35.04 9.49 39.81 11.00
email 35.04 9.49 41.73 11.24
SugarCRM value 37.23 0.0 41.48 22.51
ass_user_id 32.85 8.03 42.49 13.91
query1 32.85 3.65 9.82 0.30
query2 54.74 5.84 81.72 33.45
order_by 59.85 10.95 85.98 33.55
rel_mod_qry 47.45 2.92 49.79 0.00
Table 5.3 shows our results when subjects were not protected by the WAF. The first and second
column indicate the subjects and their vulnerable parameters, the subsequent columns show the per-
centage of tests that generate flagged SQL statements (%T ) and the percentage of such flagged tests
(out of 137) that also lead to executable SQL statements (%Te). For µ4SQL, as indicated, such per-
centages are averages over 10k test suites. For HRS, both techniques find six SQLi vulnerabilities.
With regards to the parameter country, GreenSQL flags 12.41% of 137 test cases of Std as SQLi at-
tacks and, among them, 5.84% generate executable SQL statements. Results for the remaining five
parameters found to be vulnerable by Std are identical: 35.04% of the tests lead to SQL statements
being flagged by GreenSQL and among them, 9.49% generate executable SQL statements. While
µ4SQL and Std detect the same vulnerabilities, %T and %Te are higher for µ4SQL: across reported
parameters, T ranges from 39.81% to 43.36% and Te from 11% to 21.80%. For SugarCRM, both
techniques detect five out of six vulnerabilities, but both Std and µ4SQL failed to generate an exe-
cutable SQL statement for one parameter, that is value and rel_mod_query, respectively. Except for
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parameter query1 µ4SQL has always a higher T measure. Similarly, µ4SQL has a higher Te measure
for all parameters except for query1 and rel_mod_query.
Even when using µ4SQL, %Te is generally lower than %T across input parameters. However,
it is large enough to be highly likely to detect an exploitable vulnerability by running a few dozens
test cases or less, as only one flagged test case leading to an executable SQL statement is enough to
demonstrate the vulnerability of a parameter. Taking the parameter ass_user_id as an example, with
a average %Te of 13.91%, running 50 test cases would yield a very small probability, 0.0006 (i.e.,
(1−0.1391)50), of missing the vulnerability. %T is typically much larger than %Te, thus showing
that generating executable SQL statements is rather difficult.
Table 5.4. Results of Std and µ4SQL on the subject applications protected by the WAF.
Subject Parameter Std µ4SQL
%T %Te %T (avg) %Te (avg)
HRS country 0.73 0.0 36.84 20.69
arrDate 2.19 0.0 35.91 9.11
depDate 5.84 0.0 36.59 11.42
name 6.57 0.0 38.34 11.72
address 7.30 0.0 39.67 9.64
email 6.57 0.0 36.33 9.88
SugarCRM value 2.19 0.0 37.42 20.48
ass_user_id 5.11 0.0 29.35 6.89
query1 0.73 0.0 8.97 0.20
query2 3.65 0.0 76.56 31.43
order_by 7.30 0.0 80.08 31.96
rel_mod_qry 6.57 0.0 44.82 0.0
Table 5.4 shows the results of the experiments when the subjects were protected by the WAF.
For HRS, once again, both approaches were able to generate for each vulnerable parameter SQLi
statements that were flagged by GreenSQL (%T > 0). However, one important difference is that only
µ4SQL was able to generate test cases that lead to executable SQL statements. Std failed to do so
for all tested parameters. Similarly, for SugarCRM, %T is significantly higher for µ4SQL than Std.
And once again, only µ4SQL was able to generate test cases that led to executable SQL statements
for five out six vulnerable parameters (except rel_mod_qry), whereas Std failed to do so for all tested
parameters. Our conclusions are similar to the results when no WAF is present, except that %T and
%Te tend to be lower with a WAF. This is to be expected as some of the attacks generated are filtered
out by the WAF.
Regarding the performance of µ4SQL on the parameter query1, the vulnerability, though not
impossible to find, is still extremely difficult to detect (only 0.3% of test cases can uncover it). Further
work is needed to investigate the reasons.
We further examined why µ4SQL experienced, for parameter rel_mod_qry, a sharp drop from T
(49.72% without WAF) to Te (0%). µ4SQL failed to trigger an executable statement for this parameter
since, given the SQL statement into which the test case is injected, non of the mutation operators could
possibly result in a syntactically correct statement. The vulnerable statement is:
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SELECT opportunity_id id FROM accounts_opportunities , opportunities WHERE [...] AND
<test case inserted here> AND [...]
The injection occurs in the where clause of the SQL statement. MO_or and MO_and are the
mutation operators that target SQLi vulnerabilities in the where clause. For both of these operators,
all generated mutants for this particular SQL statement begin either with a single quote or a double
quote, e.g. "||’d’=’d’– or ’ or 1, but since there is no matching opening single or double quote an
syntax error is introduced. For example, once concatenated with the mutant the statement becomes:
SELECT opportunity_id id FROM accounts_opportunities , opportunities WHERE [...] AND
"||’d’=’d’– AND [...]
Improving how the mutation operators append a clause can solve this problem. For example, in
this particular case, starting the mutant with a number instead of a quote prevents a syntax error. With
this additional fix, the vulnerability will be detected. More generally, we expect that the performance
of µ4SQL will be further improved once we improve the mutation operators.
Answering the research question RQ1, we can see that both techniques can, in most cases, reveal
vulnerabilities (%Te > 0) when the subjects were not protected by the WAF. However, when they
are protected, only µ4SQL can reveal such vulnerabilities (in 10 out of 12 parameters) while Std
revealed none of them. Such a difference is highly significant as it has many practical implications to
be discussed below.
RQ1: Both the mutation-based technique and the standard attack patterns can reveal SQLi
vulnerabilities when no firewall was used. Most vulnerabilities are highly likely to be de-
tected with at most a few dozen test cases or less.
To provide a better view of the comparison between the two input generation techniques, we
produced a set of plots. All of them are available in the appendix. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 depict the
results when the subjects were protected with a WAF. The box-plots depict the results of µ4SQL
(recall it is non-deterministic) in terms of %T (lower part) and %Te (upper part). The dash and
triangle dots are the result of Std. As we can see, without having to resort to a statistical test, the
differences are clearly significant. In the upper part of the figures, none of the tests generated by Std
could result in executable SQL statements and therefore missed all the vulnerabilities. By contrast,
µ4SQL missed only one of the vulnerabilities in SugarCRM. In short, from the figures and above
tables, we can see that the performance of µ4SQL in terms of generating tests that lead to flagged and
executable SQL statements is significantly better than Std.
RQ2: Our mutation-based technique (µ4SQL) generates a higher percentage of tests that
can reveal SQLi vulnerabilities. Further, in the presence of a WAF, µ4SQL is the only
technique that is capable of doing so.
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Figure 5.3. Results obtained from HRS with firewall enabled: the box-plots depict the
results of µ4SQL, the dashed line depicts the results of Std. None of the executable SQL
statements generated by Std can get through the WAF.
5.3.5 Discussion
Results without the WAF indicate that both approaches can detect vulnerabilities in the examined
subjects. Both techniques were able to provide, for most vulnerable parameters, test cases leading to
SQL statements that are flagged by GreenSQL and deemed executable. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that a significantly higher percentage of test cases generated flagged and executable statements
when using µ4SQL. The practical implications of these results is that, since the execution time of
a test case generated by either Std or µ4SQL is comparable, when testing many services with many
input parameters, µ4SQL will be a more effective and less costly technique to detect exploitable vul-
nerabilities. They will be more likely to be detected within a fixed test budget and will be detected
faster.
Results with the WAF are even more dramatic. Only µ4SQL is able, for all parameters but one, to
generate flagged and executable SQL statements. Since the presence of a WAF or similar protection
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Figure 5.4. Results obtained from SugarCRM with the firewall enabled.
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mechanism is a much more realistic situation in practice, these results imply that in many situations,
standard attacks are not effective when looking for tangible evidence that there are exploitable SQLi
vulnerabilities.
When the subjects were protected by the WAF, there was an even more contrasting difference
in the results of the techniques. With the WAF enabled, µ4SQL achieved results that are similar to
when no WAF was used: T and Te experienced only a slight drop. That difference was due to the
WAF identifying and blocking only a small number of attacks. This is an evidence that the proposed
obfuscation mutation operators are effective at bypassing the WAF. On the contrary, the test results
for Std dropped considerably. T experienced a large drop and Te went down to zero. This can be
attributed to the WAF recognising most of the test cases as SQLi attacks and blocking them. The low
percentage of test cases which bypass the firewall do not result in executable SQL statements.
Overall, the results indicate that the obfuscation and syntax-repairing have helped µ4SQL in by-
passing the WAF and triggering executable SQLi attacks.
5.3.6 Threats to Validity
The potential threats to validity of our results fall into the internal and external categories:
Internal threats: This is about whether the associations we observed between treatments (test
techniques) and generated executable SQL statements can be confidently interpreted as due to the
inherent properties of the techniques. For Std we used a comprehensive list of 137 known attack
patterns mentioned in [Antunes et al., 2009]. As far as we are aware, this is the state of the art for
penetration testing in practice. Regarding µ4SQL, since it is non-deterministic and to account for
randomness, we generated and ran 1000 tests per parameter and then sampled (with replacement, a
procedure called Bootstrapping) 10K test suites of 137 test cases to enable a statistical comparison
with standard attacks. We have also inspected the reports of GreenSQL to remove any false alarms.
We chose ModSecurity as a WAF and used the OWASP Core Rule Set. This is a popular setting
in practice and used in many production systems.
External threats: This concerns the generalization of the results. Obviously, like any study in
specific systems, it needs to be replicated. The computation cost of running such experiments is
however high and, although we only used two systems in the experiments, them are from different
domains and SugarCRM is used by real users as the number of downloads indicates. Although we
compared only two test techniques, they are representative of the state of the art in black box SQLi
testing, as the review of related works indicates.
5.4 Related Work
Previous research on SQLi detection used both white-box and black box approaches to detect vulner-
abilities. Several white-box approaches used taint analysis to identify invalidated inputs that flow into
SQL statements [Kieyzun et al., 2009b, Shin, 2006, Smith et al., 2010, Wassermann and Su, 2007].
Fu and Qian [Fu and Qian, 2008] suggested using symbolic execution to identify the constraints that
need to be satisfied to lead to a SQLi attack. Shar et al. [Shar et al., 2013] used data mining of the
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source code to predict vulnerabilities. As well as requiring access to the source code, which as we
mentioned before might not always be possible, most of these approaches rely, in some aspects of
their algorithms, on a set of known vulnerability patterns.
Existing black box approaches also rely on known injection patterns when generating test cases.
Ciampa et al. [Ciampa et al., 2010] proposed an approach that analyses the output, including error
messages, of both legal and malicious test cases to learn more about the type and structure of the back-
end database. This information is then used to craft attack inputs that are more likely to be successful
at revealing vulnerabilities. Antunes et al. [Antunes et al., 2009, Antunes and Vieira, 2009] also
analysed the difference in the behaviour of an application when using malicious and legal inputs to
detect vulnerabilities. Huang et al. [Huang et al., 2003] used a test generation approach that uses
known attack patterns.
Known SQLi patterns have been enumerated and discussed by various academics [Antunes et al.,
2009, Antunes and Vieira, 2009, Halfond et al., 2006b] and online security sources [The Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP), 2013, SQL Injection Wiki, 2013]. However, relying on these
patterns might not be sufficient to test an application as attackers are always finding new techniques
to exploit vulnerabilities. Moreover, there might be a large number of different representations for the
same pattern, for example, using different encodings.
Some approaches proposed run-time prevention techniques rather than testing techniques. In
the majority of these approaches [Halfond and Orso, 2005b, Halfond and Orso, 2006, Lee et al.,
2012, Shin et al., 2006, Wei et al., 2006], static analysis is used to collect all possible forms of SQL
statements that can be produced by the program. At run-time, if the structure of an SQL statement
does not match any of those collected forms, the statement is flagged as a potential attack. Sekar
[Sekar, 2009] combined taint analysis and policies to detect injection attacks at run-time. Run-time
prevention approaches are complementary to testing approaches and can also be used as an effective
oracle for testing [Appelt et al., 2013].
Mutation testing has been proposed and studied extensively [Jia and Harman, 2011] as a method
of evaluating the adequacy of test suites where the program under test is mutated to simulate faults.
Shahriar and Zulkernine [Shahriar and Zulkernine, 2008] defined SQLi specific mutation operators
to evaluate the effectiveness of a test suite in finding SQLi vulnerabilities. Mutation analysis was
also used by Fonseca et al. [Fonseca et al., 2007] to compare the effectiveness of commercial security
testing tools. The mutation operators we propose in this paper mutate test inputs to increase the
likelihood of triggering vulnerabilities rather than the program under test to evaluate the effectiveness
of test suites in finding faults.
Holler et al. [Holler et al., 2012] proposed an approach called LangFuzz to test interpreters for
security vulnerabilities, such as memory safety issues, by mutating the input code. The approach has
been applied successfully to uncover defects in Mozilla JavaScript and PHP interpreter. However, our
approach differs in various aspects: (1) We target SQL injection vulnerabilities that require different
mutation operators and test generation techniques; (2) The observability of failures in the case of SQL
vulnerabilities is much more challenging than looking for crashes. We need to intercept communi-
cation between a SUT and its database to analyse SQL statements for executability and vulnerability
detection.
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5.5 Summary
SQL injections have been ranked among the most common and dangerous category of web vulner-
abilities. Security testing can be applied to find such vulnerabilities and prevent their exploitation.
Automated testing techniques are important, not only to detect vulnerabilities in web services before
they can be published, but also to reduce testing effort in contexts where the numbers of services and
their input parameters are large. In particular, there is a need for black box techniques that do not
require access to the source code, as this is a common constraint when third party components are
used or software development is (partly) outsourced. Existing techniques that have investigated this
specific problem are bound to known attack patterns that may become out-dated, especially given the
fast evolution of web services and the technologies they are build on. Their performance may also
be limited by the presence of application protection mechanisms, such as WAFs, which may block
known attacks. Our results confirm this problem by showing that state-of-practice, standard attacks
do not, in most cases, make it through the firewall. In addition, the few that were not blocked by the
firewall lead to non-executable SQL statements because of syntax errors.
We presented in this paper an automated mutation technique for SQL injection vulnerabilities,
supported by a tool, which focuses on mutating the input values of web service parameters. This
technique makes use of a set of mutation operators that are able (1) to generate inputs with a high
likelihood of modifying the behaviour of services, (2) to correct inputs to remove possible syntax
errors due to mutations, and (3) to obfuscate attacks to increase their chances to make it through the
firewall. The ultimate goal of our technique is to generate randomised inputs to detect SQLi vulner-
abilities that lead to executable SQL statements, are passing the firewall, and are unduly revealing or
compromising data in the database. Our experimental results have demonstrated that our technique
and tool performed much better than state-of-practice standard attack patterns, and that the probabil-
ity of detecting SQL injection vulnerabilities is high, even in the presence of a firewall, and with a
reasonable number of test case executions for each input parameter in each service.
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Chapter 6
A Machine Learning-Driven Approach to
Testing Web Application Firewalls
WAFs are an indispensable mechanism to protect online systems from attacks. However, the fast
pace at which new kinds of attacks appear and their increasing sophistication require WAFs to be
updated and tested regularly as otherwise they will be circumvented. In this chapter, we focus our
research on WAFs and SQL injection attacks, but the general principles and strategy could be adapted
to other contexts. We present a machine learning-driven testing approach to automatically detect
holes in WAFs that let SQLs injection attacks bypass them. At the beginning, the approach can
automatically generate diverse attacks and then submit them to a system that is protected by a WAF.
Incrementally learning from the attacks that are blocked or bypassing the WAF, our approach can
then select attacks that exhibit characteristics associated with bypassing the WAF and mutate them to
efficiently generate new bypassing attacks. We developed a tool that implements the approach and
evaluated it on ModSecurity, a widely used WAF, and a proprietary WAF that protects a financial
institution. Evaluation results indicate that our proposed technique is efficient at generating SQL
injection attacks that can bypass a WAF and can be used to identify successful attack patterns.
The key contributions in this chapter are:
• A machine learning-driven testing technique for WAFs with an adaptive test selection and gen-
eration heuristic, which effectively generates attacks that are likely to bypass a tested WAF,
Section 6.1.3.
• A large-scale evaluation with two WAFs, an open-source WAF and a proprietary WAF, that
protects a financial institution, Section 6.2.5.
• Assessing the influence of the selected machine learning algorithm on the test results by com-
paring two alternative classification models, both adapted to large numbers of features and
datasets, but with complementary advantages and drawbacks: RandomTree and RandomFor-
est, Section 6.1.3.3 and Section 6.2.5.2.
• An analysis how the found bypassing attacks and other testing output can be used to improve a
WAF’s rule set and to increase its the attack detection capabilities, Section 6.2.5.4.
Overall, three variants of our machine learning-driven and a random test strategy, which serves as
a baseline, are evaluated on two popular WAFs that protect three open-source and 44 proprietary web
services. In total, 84 web service parameters are tested, 10 times each for every technique. These
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experiments were conducted on a high performance computing cluster and the total computation time
is equivalent to 11.5 years on a single CPU core ( 3.5 weeks of parallel execution) [Varrette et al.,
2014].
The obtained results show that our proposed technique performs better compared to the base-
line. It is effective in generating many distinct attacks that are not correctly identified by the tested
WAFs. Furthermore, our approach enables the identification of attack patterns that are strongly as-
sociated with bypassing the WAFs, thus providing support for improving their rule set. All proposed
techniques are implemented in an automated testing tool called Xavier.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 discusses in detail our approach,
followed by Section 6.2, where we describe our experiments and results. Besides, we include two
appendixes. The first one reports on an in-depth investigation of the differences between the different
variants of our proposed machine learning-driven techniques, thus providing a rationale for the testing
technique proposed in this chapter; the second one reports detailed results for the conducted large-
scale experiment.
6.1 Approach
This section introduces our proposed approach for testing WAFs. Section 6.1.1 defines the input
space for this testing problem in form of a context-free grammar. Section 6.1.2 presents a simple
attack generation strategy that randomly samples the input space and serves as baseline. Section 6.1.3
presents a test generation strategy that utilises machine learning to guide the test generation towards
areas in the input space that are more likely to contain successful attacks. Finally, Section 6.1.4 details
the improvements to our proposed attack generation strategy compared to our previous work [Appelt
et al., 2015].
6.1.1 A Context-Free Grammar for SQLi Attacks
SQLi attack strings (or tests in our context) are small “programs” that aim at changing the intent
of a target SQL statement when they are injected into the statement. Therefore, we systematically
surveyed existing SQLi attacks published in the literature, e.g., [Halfond et al., 2006a, Antunes et al.,
2009, Antunes et al., ] and from other sources e.g., OWASP1, and SqlMap2. We then defined a
context-free grammar for SQLi attacks for generating and analysing SQLi attacks.
The grammar is defined in the Extended Backus Normal Form. An excerpt of the grammar is listed
as follows, in which <start> is the start symbol, “::=” is the production symbol, “,” is concatenation,
and “|” represents alternatives.
〈start〉 ::= 〈numericContext〉 | 〈sQuoteContext〉
| 〈dQuoteContext〉 ;
1https://www.owasp.org
2http://sqlmap.org
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〈numericContext〉 ::= 〈digitZero〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈booleanAttack〉, 〈wsp〉
| 〈digitZero〉, 〈parC〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈booleanAttack〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opOr〉, 〈parO〉, 〈digitZero〉
| 〈digitZero〉, [〈parC〉], 〈wsp〉, 〈sqliAttack〉, 〈cmt〉 ;
〈sQuoteContext〉 ::= 〈squote〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈booleanAttack〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opOr〉, 〈squote〉
| 〈squote〉, 〈parC〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈booleanAttack〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opOr〉, 〈parO〉, 〈squote〉
| 〈squote〉, [〈parC〉], 〈wsp〉, 〈sqliAttack〉, 〈cmt〉 ;
〈dQuoteContext〉 ::= 〈dquote〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈booleanAttack〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opOr〉, 〈dquote〉
| 〈dquote〉, 〈parC〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈booleanAttack〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opOr〉, 〈parO〉, 〈dquote〉
| 〈dquote〉, [〈parC〉], 〈wsp〉, 〈sqliAttack〉, 〈cmt〉 ;
〈sqliAttack〉 ::= 〈unionAttack〉 | 〈piggyAttack〉 | 〈booleanAttack〉 ;
〈unionAttack〉 ::= 〈union〉, 〈wsp〉, [〈unionPostfix〉], 〈opSel〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈cols〉
| 〈union〉, 〈wsp〉, [〈unionPostfix〉] , 〈parO〉, 〈opSel〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈cols〉,〈parC〉 ; 〈union〉 ::= 〈opUni〉 | /*!,
[50000], 〈opUni〉, */ ; 〈unionPostfix〉 ::= all, 〈wsp〉 | distinct, 〈wsp〉; 〈cols〉 ::= 〈digitZero〉;
〈piggyAttack〉 ::= 〈opSem〉, 〈opSel〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈funcSleep〉;
〈booleanAttack〉 ::= 〈orAttack〉 | 〈andAttack〉 ;
〈orAttack〉 ::= 〈opOr〉, 〈booleanTrueExpr〉 ; 〈andAttack〉 ::= 〈opAnd〉, 〈booleanFalseExpr〉 ;
〈booleanTrueExpr〉 ::= 〈unaryTrue〉 | 〈binaryTrue〉 ;
〈binaryTrue〉 ::= ... ; 〈binaryTrue〉 ::= 〈unaryTrue〉, 〈opEqual〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈parO〉, 〈unaryTrue〉, 〈parC〉
| 〈unaryFalse〉, 〈opEqual〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈parO〉, 〈unaryFalse〉, 〈parC〉
| 〈squote〉, 〈char〉, 〈squote〉, 〈opEqual〉, 〈squote〉, 〈char〉, 〈squote〉
| 〈dquote〉, 〈char〉, 〈dquote〉, 〈opEqual〉, 〈dquote〉, 〈char〉, 〈dquote〉
| 〈unaryFalse〉, 〈opLt〉, 〈parO〉, 〈unaryTrue〉, 〈parC〉
| 〈unaryTrue〉, 〈opGt〉, 〈parO〉, 〈unaryFalse〉, 〈parC〉
| 〈wsp〉, 〈trueAtom〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opLike〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈trueAtom〉
| 〈unaryTrue〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opIs〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈trueConst〉
| 〈unaryFalse〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈opIs〉, 〈wsp〉, 〈falseConst〉
| 〈unaryTrue〉, 〈opMinus〉, 〈parO〉, 〈unaryFalse〉, 〈parC〉 ;
〈terOne〉 ::= 1 ; 〈squote〉 ::= ’ ; 〈dquote〉 ::= " ; 〈digitZero〉 ::= 0 ; 〈digitOne〉 ::= 1 ; 〈digitXZero〉 ::=
〈digitOne〉 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 ; 〈digitIncZero〉 ::= 〈digitZero〉 | 〈digitXZero〉 ; 〈char〉 ::= a;
〈opNot〉 ::= ! | not ; 〈opBinInvert〉 ::= ~ ; 〈opEqual〉 ::= = ; 〈opLt〉 ::= < ; 〈opGt〉 ::= > ; 〈opLike〉 ::= like
; 〈opIs〉 ::= is ; 〈opMinus〉 ::= - ; 〈opOr〉 ::= or | || ; 〈opAnd〉 ::= and | && ; 〈opSel〉 ::= select
〈opUni〉 ::= union ; 〈opSem〉 ::= ; ;
〈cmt〉 ::= # | 〈ddash〉, 〈blank〉; 〈ddash〉 ::= -
〈inlineCmt〉 ::= /**/ ; 〈blank〉 ::= ; 〈wsp〉 ::= 〈blank〉 | 〈inlineCmt〉
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This grammar can be extended to incorporate other variants of SQLi attacks. For example, the
non-terminal <blank> can have more semantically equivalent terminal characters: +, /**/, or uni-
code encodings: %20, %09, %0a, %0b, %0c, %0d and %a0; the quotes (single or double) can be
represented using HTML encoding, and so on.
6.1.2 Grammar-based Random Attack Generation
Based on the proposed grammar, the random attack generation (RAN) procedure is straightforward:
beginning from the start symbol, a randomly selected production rule is applied recursively until only
terminals are left. Since there is no loop in the grammar, the attack generation will always terminate.
The output SQLi attack is produced by concatenating all terminal symbols.
In order to produce a set of diverse random SQLi attacks that yield a good coverage of the gram-
mar, each production rule is selected with a probability proportional to the number of distinct descen-
dant production rules from the current one.
Amongst the techniques presented in this work, RAN implements the most simplistic strategy for
sampling the input space defined by the attack grammar.
6.1.3 Machine Learning-Guided Attack Generation
If the difficulty to find bypassing attacks increases, i.e. because a WAF detects a large share of attacks,
a random attack generation strategy like RAN might prove to be inefficient. In such situations, a more
advanced test generation strategy that spends more computational effort on generating smart test cases
is expected to be more efficient. In this section we introduce a machine learning based approach,
called ML-Driven, to sample the input space in a more efficient manner than RAN does.
ML-Driven is inspired by search-based test generation [Banzhaf et al., 1998, McMinn, 2004,
Anand et al., 2013]. We face the problem to efficiently choose from a large set of SQLi attacks the
ones that are more likely to reveal holes in the WAF under test. The problem is challenging because
there is little information available to estimate how close a test comes to bypassing the WAF. When
a test is executed only one of the following two events can be observed: bypassing, or blocked. This
leaves the search with no guidance to effectively assess how close a blocked attack is from bypassing
the WAF. To tackle the problem, we use machine learning to model how the elements (attributes of
attacks) of the tests are associated with the likelihood of bypassing the WAF. In the search process,
tests that are predicted to have such high likelihood are considered to have a high fitness and are more
likely to be generated.
More specifically, ML-Driven employs, first, the random test generation technique described in the
previous section to generate an initial training set. These tests are sent to a web application protected
by the WAF. Depending on whether they bypass or are blocked by the WAF, they are labelled as
“P” or “B”, respectively. We encode these tests and use them as initial training data to learn a model
estimating the likelihood ( f ) with which tests can bypass the WAF. Using this measure we can rank,
select, and modify tests associated with high f values to produce new tests. These new tests are then
executed, and their results (“P” or “B”) are used to improve the prediction model, which will in turn
help generating more distinct tests that bypass the WAF.
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<start>
<sQuoteContext>
<squote> <wsp> <sqliAttack> <cmt>
<booleanAttack>
<orAttack>
<opOr> <booleanTrueExpr>
<binaryTrue>
‘ ␣ #
 OR
<dquote>  <char>   <dquote>  <opEqual>  <dquote> <char>   <dquote> 
 =“ ” “ ”a a
Figure 6.1. The derivation tree of the “boolean” SQLi attack: ’ OR“a”=“a”#.
In what follows, we will discuss in detail how tests are decomposed and encoded for machine
learning and the mutation process, which is the process to generate new SQLi attacks from previously
generated attacks. Finally, we describe ML-Driven , a machine learning test generation approach.
6.1.3.1 Attack Decomposition
We can derive a test from the grammar by applying recursively its production rules. This procedure
can be represented as a derivation tree. A derivation tree (also called parse tree) of a test is a graphical
representation of the derivation steps that are involved in producing the test. In a derivation tree, an
intermediate node represents a non-terminal symbol, a leaf node represents a terminal symbol, and a
edge represents the applied production. Figure 6.1 depicts the derivation tree of the boolean attack:
’ OR“a”=“a”#. In the course of generating this test, we first apply the <start> rule:
〈start〉 ::= 〈numericContext〉 | 〈sQuoteContext〉
| 〈dQuoteContext〉 ;
and derive <sQuoteContext>. We then apply the third ruleof the grammar to derive <squote>,
<wsp>, <sqliAttack>, and <cmt>. This procedure is repeated until all non-terminal symbols are
derived to terminal symbols. The attack string represented by a derivation tree is obtained by con-
catenating the leafs from left to right.
We use derivation trees to identify which substrings of a SQLi attack are likely to be responsible
for the attack being blocked or passing. Specifically, an attack is divided into substrings by decom-
posing its derivation tree into slices. The definition of a slice is as follows:
6.1 Definition: Slice. A slice s is a subtree T ′ of a derivation tree T such that T ′ contains a subset of
leafs of T .
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<squote> <wsp> <sqliAttack> <cmt>
<booleanAttack>
<orAttack>
<opOr> <booleanTrueExpr>
<binaryTrue>
‘ ␣ #
 OR
<dquote>  <char>   <dquote>  <opEqual>  <dquote> <char>   <dquote> 
 =“ ” “ ”a a
s1 s2 s4s3
Figure 6.2. Example subset of slices decomposed from the tree in Figure 6.1.
A slice is supposed to represent a substring of an attack, hence only such subtrees of a derivation
tree are considered that contain a subset of leafs. Otherwise, if the subtree contains the same leafs
as the derivation tree, the represented string is not a substring, but the same string as the derivation
tree. For example, for the derivation tree in Figure 6.1 the subtree with the root <sQuoteContext>
contains the same leafs as the derivation tree and is therefore not a slice.
6.2 Definition: Minimal Slice. A slice s is minimal if it has only two nodes: a root and only one child
that is a leaf.
The procedure to decompose a derivation tree into slices is detailed in Algorithm 2. Starting from
the root node the algorithm recursively computes slices from descendant nodes by calling VISIT(child,
root, S) in line 5. In line 11, the condition (root.lea f s\node.lea f s) 6= /0 ensures that only such slices
are considered that comply with Def. 6.1. In line 14, the recursion ends if the node forms a minimal
slice, as defined in Def. 6.2, otherwise the recursion continues.
Applying the decomposition procedure to the derivation tree in Figure 6.1 yields a set of 12 distinct
slices. Figure 6.2 shows a sample of four slices decomposed from the tree.
We conjecture that the appearance of one or more slices in a test could result in the test getting
blocked or bypassing. In the next sections we develop this idea further by analysing slices of a
collection of tests and predicting, using machine learning, how their appearance in the tests affect
their likelihood of bypassing a WAF or being blocked.
6.1.3.2 Training Set Preparation
Given a set of tests that have been labelled with their execution result against a WAF, that is a “P” or
“B” label, we transform each test into an observation instance to feed our machine learning algorithm.
1. Each test is decomposed into a vector of slices ti = 〈s1,s2, . . . ,sNiRANgle by applying the attack
decomposition procedure.
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Algorithm 2 Tree decomposition into slices.
1: procedure DECOMPOSETREE(root)
2: S← /0
3: children← root.childNodes
4: for all child ∈ children do
5: VISIT(child, root, S)
6: end for
7: return S
8: end procedure
9: procedure VISIT(node, root, S)
10: s← getSlice(node) . get the slice for which node is the root
11: if (root.lea f s\node.lea f s) 6= /0 then
12: S← S∪ s
13: end if
14: if s is minimal then
15: return
16: else
17: children← node.childNodes
18: for all child ∈ children do
19: VISIT(child, root, S)
20: end for
21: end if
22: end procedure
2. Each slice is assigned a globally unique identifier. If the same slice is part of multiple tests, the
same identifier references it. We map each unique slice to an attribute (a feature) of the training
data set for machine learning.
3. Every test is transformed into an observation of the training data set by checking whether the
slices used as attributes are present or not in the corresponding vector of slices of the test.
As a concrete example, we have three tests t1, t2, t3; the first two are blocked while the last can
bypass a WAF. Their decompositions into slices and labels are shown on the left side of Table 6.1,
and their encoded presentation on the right side of the table. In total, we have five unique slices from
all the tests and they become attributes of the training data set for machine learning. If a slice appears
in a test, its corresponding attribute value in the training data is “1”, and otherwise “0”.
Table 6.1. An example of test decompositions and their encoding.
t.id vector label
1 〈s1,s2,s3〉 B
2 〈s1,s2,s4〉 B
3 〈s4,s5〉 P
t.id s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 clz
1 1 1 1 0 0 B
2 1 1 0 1 0 B
3 0 0 0 1 1 P
6.1.3.3 Decision Tree and Path Condition
By decomposing tests into slices and transforming them into a labelled data set, we can now apply a
supervised machine learning technique to predict which slices or combinations of slices are associated
with tests bypassing a WAF or being blocked by the WAF. To be able to identify such slices, we rely
on machine learning techniques that provide an interpretable output model. That is, the reason for the
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classification of attacks into bypassing or blocked should be easily comprehensible. Therefore, we
selected decision trees for this task.
In a decision tree, a node represents an attribute from a data set; each branch represents a pos-
sible value of an attribute; and a leaf node represents a classification for all instances that reach this
node. In our context, each node represents a slice and the branches from the node can be “0” or “1”,
corresponding to whether the slice is absent or present. A leaf node classifies instances into blocked
or bypassing and is labelled accordingly with “B” or “P”. Figure 6.3 shows an example decision tree
learned from the data in Table 6.1.
The paths from the root node of the decision tree to its leaf nodes embody the combinations of
slices which are likely to be the reason for tests to bypass or to be blocked. More generally, we define
a concept of path condition as:
6.3 Definition: Path Condition. A path condition represents a set of slices that the machine learning
technique deems to be relevant for the attack’s classification into blocked or bypassing. The path
condition is represented as a conjunction
∧k
i (si = val), in which val = 1 | 0, and k is the number of
relevant slices.
The procedure for computing path conditions depends on the machine learning algorithm that is
used to build decision trees. We have selected two alternative algorithms and assessed their overall
impact on test results.
RandomTree. The most prominent difference to similar algorithms is that RandomTree relies on
randomization for building the decision tree [Breiman, 2001]. When selecting an attribute for a tree
node, the algorithm chooses the best attribute amongst a randomly selected subset of attributes. By
choosing only subset of attributes, the algorithm scales well with the size of the training data set. In
our context, a scalable learner is important since the data sets contain a larger number of attributes
and the decision tree is frequently rebuild, as described in Section 6.1.3.4.
Given a decision tree and a slice vector V of a test t, we can obtain the path condition for t by
visiting the decision tree from the root and check the presence (value = 1) or absence (value = 0) of
the attributes encountered with respect to V . The procedure stops once a leaf is reached. For instance,
Figure 6.3 presents a decision tree learned from the example data discussed in Table 6.1. For test t1,
the attribute s3 is present in the test’s slice vector 〈s1,s2,s3RANgle, thus t1 follows the left branch and
the path condition is (s3 = 1). Similarly, for test t3 with the slice vector 〈s4,s5RANgle, the attribute
s3 is not present, thus the right branch is followed leading to attribute s5, which is present in the slice
vector. Therefore, the resulting path condition for t3 is (s3 = 0∧ s5 = 1).
RandomForest. Machine classification methods are well-known to be unstable, that is, a small
change in the training data can result in a completely different classification model [Witten and Frank,
2011]. Ensemble methods have been proposed to address the issue. In essence, multiple models are
learned so that their collective predictions can mitigate bias in individual models. In this work, we
implement an ensemble of classifiers to guide the test generation, i.e., instead of using only one
RandomTree, we extend our technique to make use of ensembles of trees produced by RandomFor-
est [Breiman, 2001]. However, the benefits of RandomForest come at the cost of an increased compu-
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Figure 6.3. An example of a decision tree obtained from the training data in Table 6.1.
tational overhead, e.g. learning an ensemble of RandomTrees takes longer than learning only a single
RandomTree. We evaluate in Section 6.2.5 whether the benefits justify the increased computational
overhead.
A RandomForest consists of multiple RandomTrees. To classify an attack with the RandomFor-
est, first each individual RandomTree classifies the attack and computes the prediction confidence (a
measure for how likely the classification is correct, expressed as a probability). Then, all individual
classifications are consolidated into a common consensus by computing the average of the prediction
confidences for each class. Eventually, the class with the highest prediction confidence is chosen by
the RandomForest as final classification.
To compute the path condition for a given attack with RandomForest, for all trees that classify
the attack as bypassing a path condition is computed separately. Thereby, the path condition for each
tree is computed according to the previously described procedure. The overall path condition for the
entire RandomForest is, then, the conjunction of the path conditions computed from the trees.
6.1.3.4 ML-Driven Generation Strategy
Algorithm 3 details ML-Driven , our proposed machine learning based test generation strategy. From
an initial test set initTests, which can be generated by the random attack generator from Section
6.1.2 or obtained from previous runs of this strategy, we first execute the tests against a target WAF,
execute(initTests), line 2. In fact, we have to execute only the tests for which the result against
the WAF is not yet known. Then, the tests are transformed into the training set, trainData ←
trans f orm(initTests), line 3. Details of this step are discussed in Section 6.1.3.2. A classifier DT is
then learned from the data using either the RandomTree or RandomForest algorithm.
At line 6, the algorithm starts iterating through its main loop while the condition not-done holds.
The steps within the loop are:
1. Rank all tests from the current test set according to their probability to bypass the WAF,
rankTests(currentTests,DT ), line 7. The learned classifier DT is used to calculate the by-
passing probability.
2. Until the classifier is updated, new mutants are generated as follows:
• select the test with the highest ranking as candidate test for mutation,
t← selectTest(currentTests), line 9. If more than one candidate has been ranked equally,
the selection is random among them. If a test has been selected before, it will not be
selected again.
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Algorithm 3 ML-Driven SQLi attack generation.
1: procedure MLDRIVENGEN(initTests, out putTests)
2: execute(initTests)
3: trainData← trans f orm(initTests)
4: DT ← learnClassi f ier(trainData) . learn the initial classifier
5: currTests← initTests
6: while not-done do
7: rankTests(currTests,DT )
8: repeat
9: t← selectTest(currTests)
10: V ← getSliceVector(t)
11: pathCondition← getPath(V,DT )
12: s← pickASliceFrom(V )
13: while s 6= null do
14: if satis f y(s, pathCondition) then
15: newTests← mutate(t,s,MAXM)
16: currTests← currTests∪newTests
17: end if
18: s← pickASliceFrom(V )
19: end while
20: until shouldU pdClassi f ier(currTests)
21: execute(currTests) . new tests only
22: trainData← trans f orm(currTests)
23: DT ← learnClassi f ier(trainData)
24: end while
25: out putTests← f ilterBypassingTests(currentTests)
26: return out putTests
27: end procedure
• get the path condition from the classifier with the slice vector V of attack t, line 11.
• pick a slice s from V and check whether it satisfies the determined path condition,
satis f y(s, pathCondition). If it is the case, replace the slice with an alternative slice,
which also needs to satisfy the path condition, to generate new tests
newTests← mutate(t,s,MAXM).
3. When a predetermined number of mutants is generated, shouldU pdClassi f ier(currTests) eval-
uates to true and the loop is exited, line 20. In the following lines, all mutants are executed,
labelled with bypassing respectively blocked and added to the training data set. Finally, the
classifier is retrained with the training data set.
A slice is said to satisfy a path condition if it does not affect the truth value of the condition. That
is, it either appears in the predicate and complies with it, or does not appear in the predicate. In our
approach, we rank tests and select those that fall in a tree leave with a high likelihood of bypassing
the WAF. Therefore, we consider the path conditions of those tests to be good indicators about test
content that the WAF might ignore. As a result, in our mutation step, newTests←mutate(t,s,MAXM),
we select a slice s that does not appear in the path condition of t and replace it with equivalent
alternative slices that also need to satisfy the condition. Take, for example, t2 with its slice vector
〈s1,s2,s4RANgle. Since its path condition is (s1 = 1), we can select s2 or s4 and replace them with
their alternatives.
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Equivalent alternatives of a slice are determined based on the root symbol of the slice and all
production rules of the grammar that start with this symbol. For example, taking slice s2 in Figure 6.2
that starts with <wsp> and derives <blank>, we obtain only one production rule from the grammar:
〈wsp〉 ::= 〈blank〉 | 〈inlineCmt〉 ;
As a result, we determine only one alternative slice that starts with <wsp> and derives <inlineCmt>.
At the mutation step in line 15, newTests← mutate(t,s,MAXM), the parameter MAXM is an in-
teger value that limits the number of mutants that are generated for test t and slice s. If there are
more alternative slices for t and s than indicated by MAXM, only MAXM randomly selected alternative
slices are chosen and used, in turn, to form mutants. If there are less alternative slices than indicated
by MAXM, all slices are used to form mutants.
Assuming the total test budget is constant, MAXM controls our approach to explore the test space
either broadly or deeply. When MAXM is small, the approach generates fewer mutants per selected
test, but selects more tests for mutation, thus exploring the test space in a broader fashion. When
MAXM is large, to the opposite, the approach generates more mutants per selected test, but selects
fewer tests for mutation, thus exploring the test space in a deeper fashion. In the evaluation section two
variants of ML-Driven are distinguished: ML-Driven B (broad, with MAXM = 10) and ML-Driven D
(deep, with MAXM = 100). Section 6.1.4 presents a thorough analysis on how the parameter MAXM
influences the overall test results.
The classifier is regularly retrained during the course of a test run to incrementally improve its
precision. At line 20, shouldU pdClassi f ier triggers the retraining of the classifier after every 4000
generated attacks. To not exceed the resources of a typical personal computer and to finish in a reason-
able time we limit the training set to 6000 blocked attacks and 6000 bypassing attacks. The mentioned
values serve as defaults and can be customised by the user to match the available computing power
and time constraints.
6.1.4 Enhancing ML-Driven
In this section, we analyse the differences between ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D and how they
influence the efficiency of the approach. Based on the analysis, we introduce an improved variant of
our attack generation strategy called ML-Driven E.
ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D differ in how the test budget is spend, or more precisely, in the
value for the constant MAXM. As explained in Section 6.1.3.4, MAXM determines how many mutants
are generated from a selected test. For ML-Driven D MAXM is set to a lower value, which leads to
ML-Driven D selecting fewer tests for mutation, but generating more mutants per selected test. For
ML-Driven B MAXM is set to a higher value, which leads to ML-Driven B selecting more tests for
mutation, but generating fewer mutants per selected test. Note that for both variants the total test
budget is the same, but the allocation of the test budget differs.
A detailed analysis shows that no variant is superior over the other (see Appendix A): ML-Driven
D performs better at the beginning of a test run but ML-Driven B outperforms it in later stages. The
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reason for this phenomenon is because of the number of bypassing tests selected and their influence
on the overall performance. At the beginning, there are only a few available tests with a high bypass-
ing probability. Due to the lower value of MAXM, ML-Driven D selects only these tests for mutation
and, thus, generates more bypassing mutants. Since MAXM is higher for ML-Driven B, more tests
are selected for mutation, resulting in selecting not only the few tests with a high bypassing proba-
bility, but also tests with a low bypassing probability. In consequence, ML-Driven B generates fewer
bypassing tests. After some iterations, when more tests with a high bypassing probability are avail-
able, selecting more bypassing tests and mutating each less often proved to be more efficient in our
evaluation. ML-Driven B does exactly that and yields more bypassing tests than ML-Driven D.
We address the described issue with a more flexible approach for assigning the test budget to
individual tests called ML-Driven E. Instead of generating a fixed number of mutants per test, as done
with ML-Driven B/D, the number of mutants is calculated dynamically. The goal of ML-Driven E
is twofold: First, the available test budget should be allocated only to tests with a high bypassing
probability. Second, the test budget should be divided amongst all tests that have a high bypassing
probability.
Given the total mutation budget, a set T of tests selected for mutation, the probability P(x) of test
x to bypass the WAF, then the individual mutation budget m for test x is defined as:
m =
P(x)∑
t∈T P(t)
∗budget (6.1)
On the right-hand side, the fraction represents the relative bypassing probability of x by dividing
its bypassing probability with the sum of all bypassing probabilities. By multiplying the relative by-
passing probability of test x with the total budget, x is assigned a share of the total budget proportional
to its relative bypassing probability.
Algorithm 4 is an extended version of Algorithm 3 and includes the proposed modification to the
budget calculation.
Up to line 7, the algorithm is identical with the original algorithm (Algorithm 3). In line 8,
the method selectAttacksForMutation(rankTests) selects a set of attacks A that have the highest
bypassing probability from all available attacks rankTests. All attacks above a configurable threshold,
e.g. in our experiment 80%, are selected. The loop from line 9 to 21 is executed for each attack in
A to generate mutants. Within the loop, in line 10 mt ← getMutationBudget(t,A,DF) calculates the
individual mutation budget mt for attack t with regards to A and DF , the latter being the classifier.
This method is the implementation of Equation 6.1. Lines 11 to 20 describe the mutation procedure
for t and are mostly unchanged from the original version of the algorithm, except that the number of
generated mutants for t is set to mt .
6.2 Evaluation
This section evaluates the proposed testing strategies in two separate case studies: a popular open-
source WAF and a proprietary WAF that protects a financial institution. Section 6.2.1 introduces the
58
6.2. Evaluation
Algorithm 4 ML-Driven E.
1: procedure MLDRIVENGEN(initTests, out putTests)
2: execute(initTests)
3: trainData← trans f orm(initTests)
4: DF ← learnClassi f ier(trainData) . learn the initial classifier
5: currTests← initTests
6: while not-done do
7: rankTests(currTests,DF)
8: A← selectAttacksForMutation(rankTests)
9: for all t ∈ A do
10: mt ← getMutationBudget(t,A,DF)
11: V ← getSliceVector(t)
12: pathCondition← getPath(V,DF)
13: while mt > 0 do
14: s← pickASliceFrom(V )
15: if satis f y(s, pathCondition) then
16: newTests← mutate(t,s)
17: currTests← currTests∪newTests
18: mt = mt−1
19: end if
20: end while
21: end for
22: execute(currTests) . new tests only
23: trainData← trans f orm(currTests)
24: DF ← learnClassi f ier(trainData)
25: end while
26: out putTests← f ilterByPassTests(currentTests)
27: return out putTests
28: end procedure
case studies. Section 6.2.2 formulates the research questions. Section 6.2.3 explains the procedure
we followed to execute the experiments and Section 6.2.4 the measured variables. Finally, in Section
5.3.4 the results are presented.
6.2.1 Subject Applications
6.2.1.1 Open-Source WAF
In this case study, the firewall under test is ModSecurity, which implements the OWASP core rule
set. ModSecurity is an open-source web application firewall that can be deployed with the Apache
HTTP Server to protect web applications hosted under the server. Depending on the applications
under protection, different firewall rule sets defined for different purposes can be used. The OWASP
core rules target various kinds of attacks, e.g. Trojan, Denial of Service, and SQL Injection, and is
maintained by an active community of security experts.
The web applications under protection are HRS, Cyclos, and SugarCRM. HRS is a service-
oriented based system, providing web services for room reservation. It was developed and used
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in [Coffey et al., 2010a]. Cyclos is a popular open-source Java/Servlet Web Application for e-
commerce and online payment3. SugarCRM is a popular customer relationship management system4.
SugarCRM and Cyclos have been widely used in practice. In our experiment setting, the three ap-
plications are deployed on an Apache HTTP Server under Linux. ModSecurity is embedded within
the web server; it protects the application’s web services from SQLi attacks. Specifically, since these
web services receive SOAP messages5 from web clients, a malicious client can seed a SQLi attack
string into a SOAP message and submit it to the web services in order to gain illegal access to data or
functionality of the system.
In this chapter, note that our testing target is the WAF that protects the applications, not the
applications themselves, as our focus is on testing firewalls. HRS, SugarCRM, and Cyclos play
solely the role of a destination for SQLi tests that bypass the WAF.
6.2.1.2 Proprietary WAF
In the industrial setting, we evaluate our approach on a proprietary WAF that is used in a corporate
IT environment to protect back-end web services. To provide protection from malicious requests, the
WAF validates incoming requests in two steps: First, the values in a request are validated with respect
to data types (e.g. string or numeric) and boundary constraints, e.g. a credit card number is expected
to be a sequence of 16 to 19 digits. In a second step, each value is checked to make sure that it does
not contain known malicious string patterns (i.e., using a SQLi blacklist) commonly used in attacks.
Only if the request passes both validation steps the request is forwarded to the back-end services.
The web services under protection are the backbone of a financial corporation. They process
thousands of transactions daily. Clients interact with the web services using SOAP.
To evaluate our approach with the proprietary WAF, because of the massive number of test execu-
tions required by our experiments, we had to make use of a high-performance cluster [Varrette et al.,
2014] and, furthermore, we had to optimise a replica of the test environment to significantly decrease
response times when invoking services.
In our optimised test environment, all configurations related to request filtering, that is whether
a request is blocked or let through, are copied. Other configurations, e.g. logging or encryption,
are disabled. The web application under protection is replaced by a simple mock-up application,
which implements the same web service interface as the original application under protection. The
mock-up replays a set of recorded responses from the original application and, thus, the WAF remains
unaffected. Table 6.2 shows the message round trip time (RT T ) per operation computed over a time
span of 30 days with the actual environment (RT TACT ) compared to the optimised environment on the
HPC (RT THPC). As we can see, the time has been reduced significantly. Note that, even with these
optimisations, the total computation time of our experiments is equivalent to 8 years, 337 days, and
12 hours on a single CPU core.
Even though an optimised test environment is required from an experimental standpoint, in prac-
tice, testing the firewall is just a single test activity in an array of test activities (e.g., testing the WAF,
3http://project.cyclos.org
4http://sourceforge.net
5http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part1
60
6.2. Evaluation
services, front end). Given time and resource constraints, creating and maintaining test environments
that are specific for each single test activity is very costly. Based on our experience, we found that
test engineers prefer to test copies of the actual WAF configuration and services.
Since we, by design, optimised our test environment to enable large scale experiments, the test
execution times in our experimental setting is not representative of test execution times in the actual
environment (see Table 6.2). This is a problem as it biases the results of our experiments to the advan-
tage of approaches that are less expensive in terms of test case generation but lead to the execution of
more test cases, such as random testing. Therefore, in our analyses, we transform the time scale of the
optimised environment into a realistic one, accounting for the actual test execution times in practice.
Assume T = {t1, . . . , tn} is a set of timestamps measured on the experimental environment, such
that one timestamp is noted after the execution of every test. Then, for the i-th test case execution,
f (ti) = ti+(RT TACT −RT THPC)∗ i transforms a timestamp ti ∈ T into the corresponding timestamp in
the actual environment ( f (ti)). We will use the latter time scale to compare test strategies in a realistic
fashion.
Table 6.2. Average response time in milliseconds of some web service operations in our
experimental environment compared to the case study’s environment.
Op. 1 Op. 2 Op. 3 Op. 4
RT THPC 11,36 11,39 11,46 16,61
RT TACT 456,56 180,02 302,09 854,63
6.2.2 Research Questions
This work investigates several variants of a machine learning-driven testing strategy and a random
testing strategy. We compare and evaluate all these strategies for their capability of finding bypassing
attacks on both subject applications, i.e. ModSecurity and a proprietary WAF.
Since all testing strategies generate attacks from the same input space, i.e. the grammar introduced
in section 6.1.1, we evaluate how efficient the different strategies are in sampling the input space for
bypassing attacks. Therefore, we measure for each strategy how many distinct bypassing attacks are
found over time.
RQ1: How efficient are ML-Driven E, ML-Driven B, ML-Driven D, and RAN in finding by-
passing tests?
To assess the impact of machine learning on the test result, we implemented two alternative clas-
sifiers for each of the ML-Driven strategies: RandomTree and RandomForest (see Section 6.1.3.3).
The RandomTree algorithm is selected because it can handle large data sets with many instances and
attributes faster than comparable algorithms, i.e., C4.5 [Quinlan, 1993]. In our context, this is an im-
portant property because, during the course of a test run, the ML-Driven techniques frequently rebuild
the classifier to include new bypassing tests in the training set.
The RandomForest algorithm is also considered because it computes an ensemble of classifiers
and, thus, is expected to be more robust against changes in the training set. Ensemble methods avoid
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the instability known to some machine learning methods, that is, a small change in the training data
resulting in a significantly different classification model. Ensemble methods, like the RandomForest,
tackle this problem by learning multiple models so that their collective prediction can avoid biases in
individual models. However, RandomForest comes at a higher computational cost than RandomTree,
since multiple models have to be learned.
RQ2: Does the choice of machine learning algorithm matter?
We evaluate whether, in our context, the benefits of the RandomForest compared to the Ran-
domTree justify the increased computation overhead to learn the classifier. Therefore, we compare
how many bypassing tests are found over time with these two algorithms. In addition, we assess
whether the algorithms have an impact on the stability of the test result, i.e. we compare the variation
among repetitions of the same test run.
RQ3: Does the machine learning classifier’s accuracy improve over retraining iterations?
The classifier is regularly retrained during the course of a test run with the goal to incrementally
improve its accuracy. RQ3 assess the gained accuracy by comparing the F-measure of classifiers
obtained in consecutive training iterations.
RQ4: Are we learning new, useful attack patterns as the number of bypassing attacks in-
creases?
RQ4 assesses whether, as we find more bypassing tests, we also identify more attack patterns that
can be useful to improve the rule set of the WAF. In our context, an attack pattern is the underlying root
cause that enables an attack to bypass the WAF. For example, the attacks union *!50000*select pwd
from user and union *!50000*select 99 share the pattern union *!50000*select (root cause) while the
remainder of the attacks differ. We want to investigate whether identifying successful attack patterns
helps understanding why attacks are bypassing and eventually fix the WAF to correctly detect further
attacks.
In the ML-Driven techniques, such a pattern is characterised by a path condition (see Def. 6.3).
A path condition characterises the slices, or combination of slices, that are likely causing an attack to
bypass. Thus, a path condition represents a pattern that is not correctly detected by the WAF.
To answer RQ4, we measure how many path conditions can be extracted from a model that is
learned by the ML-Driven techniques. More specifically, we analyse the growth in the number of
path conditions as the number of successful, distinct attacks grows over time.
6.2.3 Procedure
We implemented the techniques proposed in this work into our SQLi testing tool called Xavier.
Xavier supports the automated testing of web services for SQLi vulnerabilities and has been de-
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scribed in [Appelt et al., 2014]. ML-Driven generates test cases in the form of SQLi attack strings,
such as ’ OR“1”=“1”#. To generate malicious requests, Xavier takes such attack strings and injects
them into sample SOAP messages, which are subsequently sent to an application under test. Xavier
therefore relies on sample SOAP messages as inputs. They can be taken from existing web service
test suites, or can easily be generated from the WSDL6 that describes the service interface under test.
In our experiments, when available, we use SOAP messages from the functional test suite of the
service under test (Cyclos and our industrial case study) or, otherwise, we manually create SOAP
messages from the WSDLs (HRS, SugarCRM). Each of these messages consists of a number of
parameters and their legitimate values, which the services expect and that the WAF has to let through.
In our testing process, each SOAP message is considered separately. A test generation technique,
ML-Driven or RAN, continuously generates attacks, injecting one attack each time into a parameter
of the selected SOAP message to create a new SOAP message, and then sends it to the web server.
Incoming SOAP requests to the web server are first treated by the WAF and only those that comply
with firewall rules are forwarded to web applications, and otherwise are blocked. In case a request
is blocked, the WAF replies to the client that issued the request with a special response, stating that
the request has been denied. When our testing tool, Xavier, receives such a response, it marks the
test, embedded in the original request, with a blocked label “B” (for blocked), and otherwise a passed
label “P” (bypassing).
6.2.4 Variables
The following variables are controlled or measured in our experiments:
Dt : The number of distinct tests that can bypass a target WAF at time t is a way to measure the
efficiency of a test strategy. Note that, given two distinct tests in the same attack category, one might
be caught by the WAF while the other bypasses it. This may be caused by tests in a category that
should be handled by different rules, some of them missing or incorrect in the current WAF rule set,
or by an identical rule that is not general enough to block all tests in a category. Therefore, identifying
similar but distinct bypassing tests is useful to identify attack patterns.
Dpc: The number of distinct path conditions that can be extracted from decision trees. Each path
condition characterises a string pattern that a group of bypassing attacks has in common. Such string
patterns can be added to the WAF rules to prevent further attack attempts containing the same pattern.
Hence, Dpc is a measure for how many attack patterns have been uncovered.
6.2.5 Results
6.2.5.1 Performance Comparisons
To answer RQ1, we applied the testing techniques to both subject applications and measured how
many bypassing tests were found over time (Dt). To account for the randomisation involved in the
testing techniques, we repeated each test run 10 times. Each time a new test was generated, we noted
the passing wall-clock time since the beginning and then executed it to see whether or not it could
6http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl
63
Chapter 6. Testing Web Application Firewalls
bypass the WAF. We compared the performance of the techniques based on the cumulative number
of distinct bypassing tests generated over time.
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Figure 6.4. Number of bypassing tests (Dt) found over time for all tested parameters
(10 repetitions each) for ModSecurity.
For ModSecurity, we selected randomly nine parameters in total for testing, three parameters from
each web application (HRS, SugarCRM, and Cyclos). Figure 6.4a depicts the average number of
distinct, bypassing tests generated over time for ModSecurity. This is an average over 10 repetitions
on nine SOAP parameters for each technique, measured within intervals of five minutes (the test
results for each individual parameter are in Appendix B.1). Figure 6.4b depicts the same data as
boxplots to help visualise statistical variation.
The first observation is that all techniques can generate tests that bypass the WAF, suggesting that
the WAF does not provide complete protection from SQLi attacks, putting online systems under its
protection at risk. Further, by observing executed SQL statements on the database, we found that
these bypassing tests can exploit SQLi vulnerabilities in HRS and SugarCRM. Second, the sharply
increasing plots corresponding to ML-Driven E, ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D indicate that they
are much more efficient than RAN, the baseline for comparison. Overall, the results show that the
ML-Driven techniques outperform RAN by an order of magnitude with respect to the number of
distinct bypassing tests generated.
Among the machine learning-driven techniques, ML-Driven E constantly finds the most bypassing
tests compared to ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D, which suggests that the concept of a more flexible
budget allocation works well. One issue with ML-Driven D/B is that at the beginning of the test
run, ML-Driven D finds more bypassing tests, while this is the opposite later in the test run. Since
both techniques implement the same algorithm, this phenomenon can be attributed to a difference in
the choice of parameters, or, more precisely, the parameter that determines the number of mutants
generated per test (a detailed analysis is provided in a Appendix A) While ML-Driven D and B
generate a fixed number of mutants per test, ML-Driven E adjusts the number of mutants in proportion
to the test’s bypassing probability. As a result, ML-Driven E spends the test budget more efficiently
and finds bypassing attacks faster.
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The plots for the ML-Driven techniques are also slightly oscillating, thus depicting the effect of
iterative re-training of the classifier. The flat segments match the time intervals where the classifier is
recomputed and no new tests are generated. The slopes of the plots tend to decrease over time as it
becomes increasingly harder to find new bypassing tests that have not yet been executed.
We now address RQ1 for the second subject application, the proprietary WAF. As for ModSecu-
rity, all techniques are evaluated using how many bypassing tests are found over time.
Due to the considerably higher complexity of the WAF in the industrial case study, we selected a
higher number of parameters for testing. Given that all testing strategies have to be applied to each
parameter and each test run is repeated 10 times, testing all parameters is infeasible. Therefore, we
selected one parameter for each distinct data type in the WSDL of the services under test, which
results in a total of 75 parameters. The WAF in this case study determines the input validation routine
to be executed for a parameter based mainly on the corresponding data type; hence selecting one
parameter per data type maximises the coverage of input validation routines.
Out of the 75 tested parameters, bypassing tests could be generated for 29 parameters. Each
testing technique is able to generate bypassing tests for all of these 29 parameters. Figure 6.5a depicts
the average number of distinct bypassing tests per test strategy. The average is computed from all
tested parameters and 10 repetitions per parameter.
0 125 250 375 500
Time (minutes)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
D
t
ML-Driven E
ML-Driven B
ML-Driven D
RAN
(a) Average number of bypassing tests (Dt)
0 125 250 375 500
Time (minutes)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
D
t
ML-Driven E
ML-Driven B
ML-Driven D
RAN
(b) Statistical variation for Dt
Figure 6.5. Number of bypassing tests (Dt) found over time for all tested parameters
(10 repetitions each) for the proprietary WAF.
Out of all techniques, ML-Driven E generates the most bypassing tests on average, followed by
ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D. RAN finds the least bypassing tests. Since the statistical variation in
the plots is high (see boxplot in Figure 6.5b), we separate the parameters into groups to better analyse
the results. Parameters in the same group share similar input constraints in terms of number of allowed
characters and tend to produce a similar number of bypassing test cases. It is worth noticing that this
particular WAF considers not only such input constraints but also other criteria (e.g., SQLi blacklist).
Therefore, parameters in a same group do not necessarily produce the same results. Table 6.3 shows
the groups: Group 1 has two parameters that share an input constraint that restricts the number of
characters to a maximum of eight. Similarly, Groups 2, 3, and 4 have similar constraints with 16, 25,
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and 35 characters, respectively.
Table 6.3. Groups of parameters with a similar input constraint.
#Parameter Input Constraint
Group 1 2 Up to 8 Char.
Group 2 7 Up to 16 Char.
Group 3 8 Up to 25 Char.
Group 4 12 Up to 35 Char.
From the plots for Groups 2, 3, and 4, an interesting trend can be observed. The more bypassing
tests for a parameter, the smaller the difference in test results across ML-Driven techniques. For
example, ML-Driven E is the most efficient in Group 2; ML-Driven B is the second most efficient
and ML-Driven D is by far the least efficient. For Group 3, the gap between ML-Driven D and
ML-Driven E/B decreases over time. Finally for Group 4, there is no significant difference across
ML-Driven techniques.
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Figure 6.6. Group 2: Number of bypassing attacks (Dt) found over time, proprietary
WAF, 7 parameters.
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Figure 6.7. Group 3: Number of bypassing attacks (Dt) found over time, proprietary
WAF, 8 parameters.
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Figure 6.8. Group 4: Number of bypassing attacks (Dt) found over time, proprietary
WAF, 12 parameters.
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The average number of bypassing tests for the two parameters in Group 1 is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.9a. All techniques tend to saturate after about 125 minutes and, after that, the number of
bypassing tests increases very slightly. RAN is the most efficient, reaching up to approximately 40
bypassing tests. All the ML-Driven techniques perform in a similar fashion, finding around 30 by-
passing tests. The most prominent difference of this group, as compared to the others, is that very few
bypassing tests are found. This is due to the fact that the number of allowed characters is only eight,
thus resulting in a small number of attacks to bypass. The test results for Group 1 show that RAN
performs better than ML-Driven techniques.
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Figure 6.9. Group 1: Number of bypassing attacks (Dt) found over time, proprietary
WAF, 2 parameters.
6.2.5.2 Influence of the machine learning algorithm on the test results
RQ2 assesses how the chosen machine learning algorithms, i.e. RandomTree or RandomForest, in-
fluence the test results. To answer this research question we run ML-Driven E, which proved to be
the most efficient variant of ML-Driven, with both RandomTree and RandomForest, and compare the
results. The evaluation is performed on the open-source case study (ModSecurity) in the same fashion
as for RQ1.
Figure 6.10a shows the average number of bypassing tests for nine selected parameters and 10
repetitions. The result indicates that ML-Driven E with RandomForest finds slightly more bypassing
tests than ML-Driven E with RandomTree. However, the difference is not practically significant. The
advantage of using a more stable classifier is partially lost due to the increased computation time for
constructing this classifier.
Figure 6.10b shows a sample boxplot corresponding to the observed statistical variation for one
representative parameter over 10 repetitions. We can see that the variation is small and similar for
RandomForest and RandomTree. Similar results are observed for the other parameters. Therefore,
to conclude, the choice of machine learning algorithm has no significant impact with respect to the
number of bypassing tests or the degree of variation among repetitions.
RQ4 considers both RandomForest and RandomTree, in analysing the number of obtained path
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(a) Average number of bypassing tests found for nine
tested parameters (10 repetitions each) in ModSecu-
rity.
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in ModSecurity.
Figure 6.10. Number of bypassing tests found with ML-Driven E using the RandomTree
algorithm compared to ML-Driven E using the RandomForest algorithm.
conditions.
6.2.5.3 Assessing the impact of iterative retraining on the classifier’s accuracy
The classifier is regularly retrained during the course of a test run with the goal to incrementally
improve its accuracy. In this section, the classifier’s accuracy over iterations is assessed by comparing
the F-measure of classifiers obtained in consecutive training iterations.
The parameter K of the RandomTree algorithm has a strong influence on the accuracy of the
learned classifier. K determines the percentage of the attributes that the algorithm considers when
building each decision tree node. When K is larger, more attributes are considered and the learned
classifier is likely to have a higher accuracy. However, a larger K also comes at a higher computational
cost for building the decision tree. Therefore, the choice of parameter K is a trade-off between the
classifier’s accuracy and its computational cost. To find an optimal choice for K in the context of the
presented problem, the RandomTree algorithm is run with different values for K and the F-measure
of the learned classifiers is compared.
Besides F-measure, Msize is also an important quality of a classifier since it affects the cost of
using the classifier. When Msize is larger, more computation time is required for ranking tests and
checking path conditions. Therefore, ideally, we prefer classifiers that are small (low Msize), accurate
(high F-measure), and that are less expensive to compute (low K).
Figure 6.11 depicts the average F-measure for class “P” and the average Msize over iterations.
Only plots for K equals to 20%, 40%, and 60% are displayed to avoid cluttering the figures. Plots for
K equals to 10%, 30%, and 50% share similar trends and, thus, do not affect the interpretation of the
results.
The results confirm the expectation that a higher K yields a higher F-measure and a lower Msize.
With an increase in K the F-measure and Msize are converging. For example, the difference between
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Figure 6.11. Average F-measure of class “P” (left Y-axis) and average model size (Msize,
right Y-axis) for different K values over iterations. The data were obtained from 20
repetitions.
K=20% compared to K=40% is considerably larger than between K=40% and K=60%. In addition,
though not shown on the figures, F-measure for class “B”, which is the majority class in training data,
remains constantly high (above 99%) regardless of K. Moreover, the results suggest that the accuracy
of the classifier does significantly improve over iterations, especially in the first four or five iterations,
though their size also grows steadily until iteration 10.
To conclude, K values within the range 40%±10 should be used for RandomTree in our context
and the training process should go, as a ballpark figure, through a minimum of 5 to 10 iterations.
Setting K around 40% produces classifiers that are a good trade-off between F-measure, Msize, and
the computational cost to build the classifier. Increasing K above that range would require more
time for training the classifier while bringing very little accuracy improvement. Note that all other
experiments in this chapter report only results for K equal to 40%.
6.2.5.4 Learning useful attack patterns
This section investigates how, and to which extent, ML-Driven techniques help identify attack pat-
terns, which are responsible for the bypassing attacks. As explained in Section 6.1.3, the ML-Driven
techniques compute a model (i.e decision tree(s)) that is used to guide the generation of new attacks.
However, this model can also be used to abstract common string patterns shared by and possibly
causing bypassing attacks.
To answer RQ4, we analyse the models that are learned during the test runs of ML-Driven E. We
use and compare the path conditions from test runs with both alternative machine learning algorithms,
RandomForest and RandomTree.
Figure 6.12 depicts the average number of path conditions that can be extracted from a model
(red) and the number of bypassing tests with which the model is trained (blue). Since the ML-Driven
techniques retrain the model in fixed intervals, the corresponding training iterations are depicted on
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the horizontal axis. These curves are based on the average of all test runs performed with the ModSe-
curity case study.
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Figure 6.12. Number of path conditions (red y-axis on the left) and bypassing tests
(blue y-axis on the right) for ML-Driven E with RandomTree and RandomForest.
The number of distinct, bypassing tests, which are used to train the model, is steadily increasing
for both techniques. This is due to fact that the further a test run progresses, the more bypassing tests
are found and are used, in turn, to retrain the model. The number of path conditions that can be ex-
tracted from a model is also steadily increasing for both techniques, although beginning from iteration
4, there are significantly more path conditions extracted with RandomForest than with RandomTree.
For RandomForest, the number of path conditions is close to 200 after 10 iterations, compared with
50 for RandomTree.
For both techniques the number of bypassing tests used to train the model and the number of path
conditions obtained from the model are concurrently increasing. This is no surprise as more test cases
lead to refined models. For RandomForest, that leads to even more path conditions since many more
trees are built.
6.2.5.5 Understanding bypassing attack patterns
A path condition can help determine the reason why a set of attacks is bypassing. This knowledge
can be utilised to stop further attack attempts from succeeding by inferring a string pattern from the
path condition that matches all the attacks described by it. Such a string pattern can be in turn added
to the WAF’s rule set to block all further attacks containing the same string pattern.
Let us consider an example of a path condition: pc1 = S1d ∧ S f 1∧ S5∧¬S11∧¬S25∧¬S26∧
¬S1b∧¬S15∧¬S2 f .
Table 6.4 shows the literals that are represented by the corresponding slices. An example attack
characterised by pc1 is 0/**/or 1#, which is an obfuscated variation of a tautology attack, e.g. " or
1=1. All attacks characterised by pc1 contain the slices S1d, S f 1 and S5. If a WAF blocks any input
71
Chapter 6. Testing Web Application Firewalls
containing these three slices, the attacks characterised by pc1 do no longer bypass.
Table 6.4. Slice encodings.
Slice Literal Slice Literal
S1d or Sb !
S f 1 or 1 S3 1
S5 /**/ S6 ∼1
S26 # S57 1
S2 S29 0
S0 0 S15 )
S f true
During test execution, the number of discovered path conditions increases. With more path con-
ditions, the reasons why attacks are bypassing can be more precisely characterised. To illustrate this
phenomenon, we analyse the path conditions obtained in different iterations of the same test run. To
limit the number of path conditions in this example, we only consider path conditions that contain the
slice S1d, like in pc1. This slice represents the SQL keyword or and can for example be part of a SQL
tautology attack, e.g. " or 1=1.
The previously analysed path condition pc1 is obtained from the first iteration of a test run. In
contrast, Table 6.5 shows more path conditions from the same test run obtained after the fifth iteration.
Table 6.6 depicts the string patterns that can be devised from the path conditions.
Table 6.5. Path Conditions from iteration 5.
Id Path condition
pc2 S1d∧S57∧¬S25∧¬S26∧¬Sc∧¬S14∧¬S1∧¬S3e∧¬S0∧¬S38∧¬S29∧
¬S5∧¬Se1∧¬S1c∧¬S1de∧¬S76∧¬S67
pc3 S1d∧S26∧S15∧¬S f ∧¬S1c∧¬Se1∧¬S25∧¬S5∧¬Sc∧¬S14∧¬S1de∧
¬S3e∧¬S76∧¬S29∧¬S38∧¬S67
pc4 S1d ∧ S29 ∧¬Se1 ∧¬S25 ∧¬S5 ∧¬S14 ∧¬S1de ∧¬S3e ∧¬S76 ∧¬S38 ∧
¬S67
pc5 S1d∧S f ∧S26∧¬S1c∧¬Se1∧¬S25∧¬S5∧¬Sc∧¬S14∧¬S1de∧¬S3e∧
¬S76∧¬S29∧¬S38∧¬S67
pc6 S1d∧S0∧¬S25∧¬S26∧¬Sc∧¬S14∧¬S3e∧¬S38∧¬S29∧¬S5∧¬Se1∧
¬S1c∧¬S1de∧¬S76∧¬S67
pc7 S1d ∧ Sc ∧ ¬S1c ∧ ¬Se1 ∧ ¬S25 ∧ ¬S5 ∧ ¬S14 ∧ ¬S1de ∧ ¬S3e ∧ ¬S76 ∧
¬S29∧¬S38∧¬S67
pc8 S1d∧S5∧S26∧S2∧S0∧Sb∧¬Sa8∧¬S7c3∧¬S f ∧¬S1e1∧¬S25∧¬Sd∧
¬Sc∧¬S14∧¬S15∧¬S26d∧¬S60∧¬S2e∧¬S2d∧¬S38∧¬S3
pc9 S1d ∧ S3 ∧ S5 ∧ S6 ∧ ¬S f ∧ ¬S25 ∧ ¬S f 1 ∧ ¬Sc ∧ ¬S26 ∧ ¬S1b ∧ ¬S5a ∧
¬S14∧¬S71∧¬S57
The first notable difference between both sets of path conditions is their number. In the first iter-
ation, only one path condition contains Slice S1d while there are eight of them by the fifth iteration.
When analysing the patterns identified by the path conditions, there are several interesting observa-
tions. First, pc2 to pc7 identify patterns of bypassing attacks that use Slice S1d, but require S5 to be
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absent (¬S5), thus suggesting the pattern identified in the first iteration was incomplete. For example,
pc5 characterises bypassing attacks containing slice S1d combined with the boolean identifier true
and the comment symbol #, e.g. " or true#. Such attacks are not matched by the pattern represented
by pc1 and, thus, would still bypass the WAF if only pc1 would be considered in fixing the WAF.
Given the learned patterns in Table 6.6, a simple strategy to stop attacks containing the SQL key-
word or might be first to identify the string that appears the most frequently in the patterns and to
block any input containing that string. In this example, the string or appears in all patterns. However,
blocking every input containing or would lead to many false positives. Therefore, or should be com-
bined with other frequently appearing strings. The second most frequent string is the SQL comment
character #. By blocking all inputs that contain both strings, or and #, the likelihood of false positives
is reduced and all attacks characterised by pc3, pc5, and pc8 are blocked. In a similar fashion, the
attacks characterised by the remaining path conditions can be blocked by filtering inputs containing a
combination of or and one of the characters ", /**/, 1, and 0.
The procedure of combining slices across path conditions is repeated until an acceptable rate of
false positives is achieved. Note that this strategy does not make use of the negated slices (¬S..) of
the path conditions. The absence of the slices was, however, part of the indicators why attacks can
bypass the WAF. Therefore, they are already recognised by the existing firewall rule set.
Table 6.6. Learned patterns.
Identifier Pattern
Iteration 1 pc1 or 1, /**/
Iteration 5 pc2 or, 1
Iteration 5 pc3 or, ), #
Iteration 5 pc4 or, 0
Iteration 5 pc5 or, true, #
Iteration 5 pc6 or, 0
Iteration 5 pc7 or, "
Iteration 5 pc8 or, /**/, #, , 0, !
Iteration 5 pc9 or, /**/, 1, 1
To conclude, from the example, we see that having more path conditions, either through more
iterations or using RandomForest, helps derive a better understanding of the patterns shared by by-
passing attacks. In turn, this puts a firewall administrator in a better position to devise an effective
patch for a WAF’s rule set.
6.2.6 Discussion
6.2.6.1 Differences between Case Studies
When comparing the testing results of the two case studies some notable differences stand out. First,
bypassing attacks could be found for each parameter protected by ModSecurity, whereas with the
proprietary WAF, only 29 out of 75 parameters lead to bypassing attacks. This can be attributed to
the fact that the latter strictly validates each input to follow an expected format. For example, a value
provided to the parameter credit card number must consist of 16 to 19 digits and, otherwise, the
request is rejected. SQL injection attacks typically require a larger character set and thus all attacks
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are blocked. Similarly, for the 46 parameters for which no attack is found, the expected input format
prevents attacks. However, it is not possible to define such strict validation rules for all parameters,
since the inputs might vary significantly in terms of character set and length. This is the case for the
other 29 parameters where the expected input format is very general and the input validation rules
rather loose, thus being prone to attacks. For example, the vulnerable parameter Address is expected
to be a string with a maximum of 35 characters, a constraint with which many of the SQLi attacks
comply.
Another major difference between the two case studies are the number of bypassing attacks per
tested parameter. For ModSecurity, about 1.000 bypassing attacks per parameter are found while, for
the proprietary WAF, they are on average 10.000. This significant difference can be attributed to the
attack detection capabilities of each respective firewall and highlights the difficulty of customising a
rule set for a particular IT environment in practice. In our experiment, we use a default rule set for
ModSecurity, while the proprietary WAF has a customised rule set to match a particular IT system.
Such a customisation is often necessary to achieve an acceptable false positive rate, but comes at the
cost of reduced attack detection capabilities due in part to the lack of suitable tools to test the firewalls.
6.2.6.2 Application of the Proposed Techniques
We have proposed and evaluated three variants of a machine learning driven technique for the gen-
eration of SQLi attacks, namely ML-Driven E, ML-Driven D, and ML-Driven B. ML-Driven D and
ML-Driven B entail different strategies in allocating the test generation budget. ML-Driven E recon-
ciles these differences and delivers a better performance. We have compared all these variants with
RAN, the baseline technique considered in our work, on ModSecurity (a popular open-source WAF)
and a proprietary WAF. Our experiments show that ML-Driven E outperforms all other techniques.
We have also demonstrated the usefulness of mining more bypassing attacks in devising string
patterns to fix WAFs. In our context, we experimented with RandomTree and RandomForest as
machine classifiers for ML-Driven E. Since we show that the latter helps extract more path conditions
that are useful in identifying patterns and fixing WAFs, we recommend the use of RandomForest.
6.3 Related Work
Previous research on testing attack detection capabilities has focused on testing an application’s build-
in input validation mechanisms as well as testing of dedicated firewalls. In what follows, we review
the related work in both areas.
Offutt et al. introduced the concept of Bypass Testing, in which an application’s input validation
is tested for robustness and security [Offutt et al., 2004]. Tests are generated to intentionally violate
client-side input checks and are then sent to the server application to test whether the input constraints
are adequately evaluated. Liu et al. proposed an automated approach to recover an input validation
model from program source code and formulated two coverage criteria for testing input validation
based on the model [Liu and Kuan Tan, 2008]. Desmet et al. verify a given combination of a WAF
and a web application for broken access control vulnerabilities, e.g. forceful browsing, by explicitly
specifying the interactions of application components on the source code level and by applying static
and dynamic verification to enforce only legal state transitions [Desmet et al., 2006]. In contrast, we
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propose a black box technique that does not require access to or modification of the tested applica-
tion’s source code. In our approach, we use machine learning to identify the patterns recognised by a
WAF as SQLi attacks and generate bypassing test cases that avoid those patterns.
The topic of testing network firewalls is addressed by an abundant literature. Although network
firewalls operate on a lower layer than application firewalls, which are our focus, they share some
commonalities. Both use policies to decide which traffic is allowed to pass or should be rejected.
Therefore, testing approaches to find flaws in network firewall policies might also be applicable to
web application firewall policies. Bruckner et al. proposed a model-based testing approach which
transforms a firewall policy into a normal form [bru, 2010]. Based on case studies they found that
this policy transformation increases the efficiency of test case generation by at least two orders of
magnitude. Hwang et al. defined structural coverage criteria of policies under test and developed a test
generation technique based on constraint solving that tries to maximise structural coverage [Hwang
et al., 2008]. Other research has focused on testing the firewalls implementation instead of policies.
Al-Shaer et al. developed a framework to automatically test if a policy is correctly enforced by
a firewall [Al-Shaer et al., 2009]. Therefore, the framework generates a set of policies as well as
test traffic and checks whether the firewall handles the generated traffic correctly according to the
generated policy. Some authors have proposed specification-based firewall testing. Jürjens et al.
proposed to formally model the tested firewall and to automatically derive test cases from the formal
specification [Jürjens and Wimmel, 2001]. Senn et al. proposed a formal language for specifying
security policies and automatically generate test cases from formal policies to test the firewall [Senn
et al., 2005]. In contrast, in addition to targeting application firewalls, our approach does not rely in
any models of security policies or the firewall under test, such formal models are rarely available in
practice.
6.4 Summary
WAFs play an important role to protect online systems. The fast pace at which new kinds of attacks
appear and their increasing sophistication require WAFs to be tested and updated regularly as other-
wise they will be circumvented. We propose a machine learning-driven approach to test the attack
detection capabilities of WAFs. The approach automatically generates a diverse set of attacks, sends
them to a WAF under test, and checks if they are correctly identified. By incrementally learning from
the tests that are blocked or bypassing the firewall, our approach selects tests that exhibit string pat-
terns associated with bypassing the firewall and mutates them using an attack grammar designed to
generate new and hopefully successful attacks. Identified bypassing attacks can be used to learn path
conditions, which embody successful attack patterns.
With such a set of bypassing attacks and path conditions that characterize them, a security expert
can fix or fine-tune the WAF rules in order to block imminent SQLi attacks. In the attacker-defender
war, time is vital. Being able to learn and anticipate more attacks that can circumvent a firewall in a
timely manner is very important to secure business data and services.
Though in this chapter our approach is proposed and evaluated in the context of SQL injection
attacks, it can be adapted to other forms of attacks by making use of other attack grammars targeting
different types of vulnerabilities.
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Our key contributions in this work include (i) enhancing our previous proposed techniques by
consolidating them and improving their performance, (ii) assessing the influence of two different and
adequate machine learning classifiers, and (iii) carrying out a large-scale evaluation on two popular
WAFs. Evaluation results suggest that the performance of our proposed testing approach is effective
at generating many undetected attacks and provides a good basis to identify attack patterns to protect
against. The next chapter proposes an automated approach that transforms the learned attack patterns
into a patch for a WAF under test. The goal of the devised patch is to prevent further attacks containing
the same patterns without blocking any legitimate requests.
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An Automated Approach to Repairing Web
Application Firewalls
The previous chapter introduced an automated testing approach for WAFs that is efficient at finding
bypassing attacks. Based on these bypassing attacks, this chapter introduces an approach that im-
proves the attack detection capabilities of a WAF under test. The proposed approach transforms the
bypassing attacks and related path conditions into a filter rule that, when added to the WAF’s rule
set, identifies the bypassing attacks without disrupting legitimate usage of the system. Experimental
results show that the generated filter rule is effective at blocking the previously bypassing attacks
(recall between 49% and 96%), while inducing a small number of false positives (false positive rate
between 0% and 3%) and, thus, is effective at repairing a WAF.
7.1 The WAF Fixing Problem
Consider the task of inferring some WAF filter rule, i.e. a regex, from a set of known bypassing
attacks. The goal of such a regex is to match bypassing attacks without matching any legitimate
requests. In this section, we precisely define the problem of finding such a regex and recast it as a
combinatorial optimization problem.
There is a potentially infinite space of regex candidates to consider when searching such a regex.
The path conditions, which are an output of the WAF testing approach described in Chapter 6, can
be used to focus the search to a subset that is likely to contain "good" solution candidates. A path
condition describes a string pattern that a group of bypassing attacks have in common. This makes
a path condition a natural fit to be translated into a regex in order to match all attacks described by
the path condition (see Table 6.6 for an example). Recall that our WAF testing approach typically ab-
stracts several path conditions from the bypassing attacks and each path condition describes a string
pattern shared by a distinct set of attacks. In order to infer a regex that matches all identified bypass-
ing attacks, we re-express the problem as a search problem focusing on the space defined by path
conditions:
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7.1 Definition: Search Space. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be a set of path conditions and let Si =
{si1, . . . ,sim} be the set of slices that appear as terms in some path condition pi = si1 ∧ . . .∧ sim,
pi ∈ P. The search space S for the WAF fixing problem is defined by the Cartesian product:
S = P (S1)× . . .×P (Sn) , (7.1)
where P (Si) denotes the power set of Si.
According to Definition 7.1, a candidate solution in the search space S is a n-tuple, which has
one element per path condition p ∈ P and each element in the tuple represents a combination of
slices of the corresponding path condition. For example, consider the three path conditions and their
corresponding power sets shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1. An example of three path conditions and their power sets.
Path Condition Slices P (Si)
p1 {s11,s12} /0,{s11},{s12},{s11,s12}
p2 {s21} /0,{s21}
p3 {s31,s32,s33} /0,{s31},{s32},{s33},{s31,s32},{s31,s33},{s32,s33},{s31,s32,s33}
A candidate solution for the given example is a 3-tuple, e.g. c1 = ({s11,s12},{s21},{s33}). The
first element of the tuple represents a combination of slices of p1, the second element a combination
of slices of p2, and the third element a combination of slices p3. Recall that the slices of a path
condition describe a string pattern that a group of bypassing attacks have in common and, hence,
by translating the slices of a path condition into a regex the bypassing attacks can be identified and
blocked. In the given example, the first element of c1 can be translated into regex r0, which identifies
any attacks that contain the slices s11 and s12. Similarly, the second and third element can be translated
into regex r1 and r2 that identify attacks containing the slice s21 and s33, respectively. Note that the
resulting regexes r0, r1, and r2 each match a distinct set of attacks and in order to block all attacks, a
superseding regex of the form r = r0 | r1 | r2 is necessary. In other words, r matches the attacks that
are matched by either r0, r1, or r2.
A typical test run of the WAF testing approach presented in Chapter 6 yields on average between
50 and 200 path conditions (see Figure 6.12). This number of path conditions results in a potentially
very large search space. To systematically guide the search towards an optimal solution, i.e. a regex
with a high attack detection rate and low false positive rate, a mechanism to assess the quality of a
solution is required. In what follows, we define how a solution’s quality is assessed.
Let R denote a set of requests that are processed by a WAF such that A⊂ R is a subset of malicious
requests and L⊂ R is a subset of benign requests. Note that each request is either malicious or benign
and, thus, A∩ L = /0 and A∪ L = R. Let M(c,R) denote a set of matched requests by applying a
regex c to R, let Mt p(c,R) = {x | x ∈ A∧ x ∈ M(c,R)} denote a set of true positive matches and
M f p(c,R) = {x | x ∈ L∧ x ∈M(c,R)} a set of false positive matches.
To assess the quality of a candidate solution we use the well-known measures false positive rate
and recall:
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7.2 Definition: Objective Functions. Given a candidate solution c ∈ S and a set R of request, we
assess the quality of c with:
f pr(c,R) =
∣∣∣M f p(c,R)∣∣∣
|L| (7.2)
recall(c,R) =
∣∣Mt p(c,R)∣∣
|A| (7.3)
A solution candidate is evaluated with respect to both objective functions, i.e. we search a solution
that maximizes recall and minimizes the false positive rate. The WAF Fixing Problem consists of
finding optimal trade-off solutions between recall and false positive rate. Note that there might be
several such optimal trade-off solutions that form a Pareto front. To compare the quality of two
candidate solutions, we define a relation ≺ that is based on the objective functions:
7.3 Definition: Dominated and nondominated Solutions. Given a candidate solution c ∈ S and a
set R of request, c is said to be nondominated if:
@c′ ∈ S : f pr(c,R)> f pr(c′,R)∧ recall(c,R)≤ recall(c′,R) ∨
f pr(c,R)≥ f pr(c′,R)∧ recall(c,R)< recall(c′,R) (7.4)
Accordingly, c is said to be dominated if there is a c′ ∈ S that satisfies Equation 7.4. In this case,
we use the notation c≺ c′ to indicate that c’ dominates c.
In our problem context, the practical implications of a legitimate request being wrongly classified
as an attack, i.e. a false positive, are more severe than that of an attack wrongly classified as a
legitimate request, i.e. a false negative. Before accepting a solution candidate, the user has to decide
for each false positive caused by the solution candidate if it impacts the functionality of the system
under test and, if so, choose the next best solution candidate. Therefore, we introduce a constraint on
the number of false positives to limit the required manual effort:
7.4 Definition: Feasible Candidate Solution. We say c ∈ S is a feasible candidate solution if it
satisfies the constraint: ∣∣∣M f p(c,R)∣∣∣< t , (7.5)
where t is a user-defined threshold for an acceptable number of false positives. Additionally, X ⊆ S
denotes the set of all feasible candidate solutions.
Based on the constraint we define a function g that measures the degree of constraint violation:
g(c) =
0 if c ∈ X∣∣∣M f p(c,R)∣∣∣− t if c /∈ X (7.6)
The problem addressed in this chapter can now formally be defined as the optimization problem:
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7.5 Definition: The WAF Fixing Problem. Given a set L ⊂ R of benign requests, a set A ⊂ R of
malicious requests, a set of path conditions defining the search space S, and a set X ⊆ S of feasible
candidate solutions, then the WAF Fixing Problem is to compute a set Copt :
Copt = {c | c ∈ X ∧@c′ ∈ X : c≺ c′} (7.7)
According to Definition 7.5, the WAF Fixing Problem consists of finding a set Copt of nondomi-
nated solutions in the space of feasible solutions.
7.2 Approach
This section introduces an approach to solve the WAF Fixing Problem. The presented approach is
based on the genetic algorithm NSGA-II [Deb et al., 2002]. We selected NSGA-II because it is
applicable to multi-objective optimization problems with a constrained search space like the WAF
Fixing Problem. The authors evaluate NSGA-II on several optimisation problems, of which many
have two objectives like the WAF Fixing Problem, and find that NSGA-II performs the best amongst
the compared genetic algorithms. We used the implementation of NSGA-II in JMetal, a popular
framework for genetic algorithms [Nebro et al., 2015].
A Genetic Algorithm (GA) is a search heuristic that is inspired by the evolutionary process in
nature, where the fittest individuals of a population prevail and pass on their genes to their offspring.
A GA imitates this concept and evolves a population of candidate solutions iteratively with the goal of
breeding better candidate solutions over multiple iterations. Starting from a randomly generated initial
population of candidate solutions, a GA generates an offspring population by performing crossover
and mutation operations on the individuals and by selecting the best candidate solutions according
to some criterion. The selection of candidate solutions is typically performed based on a fitness
value, which reflects the degree with which a candidate solution achieves a desired objective. In
the following, we describe how the essential components of a genetic algorithm, i.e. chromosomes,
selection, mutation, and crossover, are implemented in our context.
Chromosomes. A fundamental decision when using GAs is how to encode a candidate solution
and its properties. In the terminology of GAs, a solution candidate is called a chromosome. A chro-
mosome is composed out of several genes, each representing a possible value of a variable of the
candidate solution. In our context, each path condition that is used to define the search space is a gene
of the chromosome and each slice that is part of a path condition is encoded as a bit in the gene.
Table 7.2. An example of two candidate solutions encoded as chromosomes based on
the path conditions and slices depicted in Table 7.1.
id Candidate Solution
c1 ({s11,s12},{s21},{s33})
c2 ({s12}, /0,{s31,s33})
Table 7.3. Candidate Solutions
p1 p2 p3
s11 s12 s21 s31 s32 s33
1 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
Table 7.4. Corresponding chromosome encoding.
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Table 7.2 shows an example of two candidate solutions and their corresponding encoding as chro-
mosomes. The path conditions and slices used in this example are from the previous example in
Table 7.1. As in the previous example, there are in total three path conditions and, hence, the candi-
date solutions c1 and c2 are 3-tuples. The first element of c1 and c2 represents a combination of slices
of path condition p1. For c1, the first element is {s11,s12} and, thus, the chromosome encoding of p1
is s11 = 1 and s12 = 1. For c2, the first element is {s12} and, thus, the chromosome encoding of p1 is
s11 = 0 and s12 = 1. The second and third element of c1 and c2 are encoded in the same fashion.
Crossover and Mutation. To efficiently sample the search space, a GA creates new solution
candidates by performing crossovers and mutating the chromosomes of existing solution candidates.
To perform a crossover, two candidate solutions are randomly selected from the population and their
chromosomes are swapped starting from a randomly chosen gene in the chromosome. In the literature,
this method is called single-point crossover [Mitchell, 1998]. In contrast to crossover, which recom-
bines existing genes, the purpose of mutation is to introduce new genes into the population. In our
context, the mutation operation is implemented by flipping a randomly selected bit of a chromosome.
Selection. To effectively guide the breeding of offspring generations towards a desired objective,
a GA chooses the fittest individuals in a population and includes them in the offspring generation.
NSGA-II prioritises nondominated individuals in its selection process, a concept known as elitism,
and favours diverse individuals using a crowded distance estimation. Maintaining a population of
diverse individuals is important to prevent that the search prematurely converges towards a single
area. Therefore, the crowded distance estimation in NSGA-II tries to select a uniformly spread-out
Pareto front.
To perform the selection process, NSGA-II has to compute the fitness of the candidate solutions
in the population. In the context of the WAF Fixing problem, we measure the fitness of a candidate
solution with the objective functions false positive rate and recall, as defined in Definition 7.2.
7.3 Evaluation
In this section, we apply the approach introduced in the previous section to the WAF Fixing Problem
and evaluate the quality of the found solutions. The approach is applied to three datasets in total: Two
datasets from a WAF of a financial institution that processes thousand of transactions daily and one
dataset from a popular open-source WAF.
7.3.1 Research Questions
We address the following research questions in our evaluation:
RQ1: How effective are the found regular expressions in identifying bypassing attacks?
RQ2: To which extent do the found regular expressions misclassify legitimate traffic as attacks?
The goal of the proposed approach is to find a regular expression that identifies a set of bypassing
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malicious requests without affecting legitimate requests. Therefore, RQ1 investigates how many ma-
licious requests a generated regex identifies, i.e. recall. RQ2 investigates if the regex is misclassifying
legitimate requests as attacks, i.e. false positive rate.
7.3.2 Subject Applications
To answer the research questions we designed two sets of experiments. The subject applications used
in both settings are identical to the ones used in the evaluation of our WAF testing strategy in Chapter 6
(for a description of the experimental settings and the subject applications refer to Section 6.2.1). In
brief, the first set of experiments uses popular open-source subject applications, ModSecurity and
Cyclos, while the second setting uses proprietary software of a financial institution that processes
thousands of requests daily.
To evaluate our proposed approach we collected for each WAF under test a set of malicious re-
quests that are not correctly identified by the WAF and a sample of benign requests. The benign
requests represent the legitimate usage of the web application and, thus, the WAF under test is ex-
pected to let these requests pass. We collected the benign requests by executing the functional test
suite of the web application and logged each request that was sent to the web application. The ma-
licious requests were obtained by executing our WAF testing strategy and the path conditions were
learned from the malicious requests as detailed in Chapter 6. Table 7.5 lists the total number of
requests that were collected for both experimental settings.
Table 7.5. Experimental Settings.
Setting Operation #Benign Request #Attacks #Path Conditions
Open-Source doPayment 369 1244 39
Industrial
Operation 1 95 943 49
Operation 2 299 14385 102
7.3.3 Results
This section presents the results of the performed experiments. We conducted three experiments in
total, one for each of the datasets introduced in the previous section. In each experiment, we applied
the genetic algorithm to the WAF Fixing Problem using the legitimate requests, attacks, and path
conditions of the corresponding datasets. The genetic algorithm is configured to generate 200 gen-
erations. When generating offspring populations, the probability that a candidate solution is mutated
is set to 0.1 and the crossover probability is set to 0.9. The probabilities are chosen according to
recommendations in the literature [McMinn, 2004, Mitchell, 1998].
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Figure 7.1. Scatter plot of the solutions found by NSGA-II (left) and a comparison
between NSGA-II and random search depicting the increase of the hypervolume over
the number of fitness evaluations (right).
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The plots depicted on the left side of Figure 7.1 show a scatter plot of the found solutions for each
experiment. The solutions are compared based on how many legitimate requests a regex misclassifies
as attack (false positive rate) and how many attacks are correctly identified (recall). False positive
rate and recall are calculated according to Definition 7.2. Furthermore, we divide the found solutions
into dominated and nondominated solutions according to Definition 7.3.
Table 7.6 shows the nondominated solutions for each dataset depicted in Figure 7.1. In all experi-
ments, the genetic algorithm finds solutions with either zero false positives (doPayment, Operation 2)
or with a low false positive rate of 3% (Operation 1) and a high recall (71% doPayment, 96% Oper-
ation 1, 49% Operation 2). In addition, for all datasets there are alternative nondominated solutions
with a higher recall but also a higher false positive rate. Such alternative solutions might be preferable
if the resulting false positives can be tolerated or if the legitimate request causing the false positive
can be white-listed.
Table 7.6. Overview of the nondominated solution per dataset.
Operation
Non-dominated Solutions
FPR Recall
doPayment
0 0.71
0.3 0.711
0.98 0.75
1 1
Operation 1
0.03 0.96
0.2 0.98
0.23 0.991
1 0.998
Operation 2
0 0.49
0.003 0.494
0.966 0.997
0.969 1
We compare NSGA-II to a random search approach to assess the quality of the nondominated
solutions found by NSGA-II. The comparison is based on the well-known quality indicator hyper-
volume [Zitzler and Thiele, 1999]. A hypervolume measures the volume in the solution space that
is covered by members of the set of nondominated solutions. The larger the volume, the better the
solutions found by the approach. We executed both approaches, NSGA-II and random search, and
measured each time a nondominated solution was found the hypervolume. The plots depicted on
the right side of Figure 7.1 show the hypervolume for each approach and dataset. For the dataset
corresponding to Operation 1, the hypervolume of the solutions found by NSGA-II increases faster
compared to random search; hence NSGA-II requires less time to find good solutions. For the other
two datasets, the increase in hypervolume for NSGA-II and random search is comparable and its fast
growth indicate that good solutions are easy to find. In consequence, choosing NSGA-II over random
search is reasonable since it performs better when good solutions are hard to find (Operation 1) and
comparable otherwise (doPayment, Operation 2).
Based on the presented results we can answer RQ1 and RQ2:
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The attack detection rate of the nondominated regular expressions ranges from 49% to 96%
depending on the dataset.
The false positive rate of the nondominated regular expressions ranges from 0% to 3%
depending on the dataset.
To conclude, in our conducted experiments the proposed approach is effective at finding regular
expressions that do not misclassify legitimate requests, or only to a very limited degree, and that
identify a considerable number of attacks. Given that the proposed approach is automated, the attack
detection capabilities of the WAF under test can be significantly increased at the cost of only compu-
tation time. If complete automation is not a requirement, an IT Security Engineer can choose between
alternative regular expressions that provide varying degrees of recall and false positive rate.
7.4 Summary
WAFs are an important component in corporate IT environments and play a vital role in protecting
potentially vulnerable web applications and services. However, the rule sets of firewalls tend to
become complex and their configuration and maintenance can become time consuming and error-
prone, which might result in attacks staying undetected [Wool, 2010, Wool, 2004]. Therefore, WAFs
should be tested regularly and their rule set should be adjusted to avoid that attacks are bypassing the
WAF.
This chapter proposes an automated approach to increase the attack detection rate of a WAF.
We formalised the WAF fixing problem as a combinatorial optimisation problem and presented an
approach, which is based on the genetic algorithm NSGA-II, to solve the problem. Given a set of
bypassing attacks and corresponding path conditions, which are the test output of the WAF testing
strategy presented in Chapter 6, our approach infers a regular expression that, when added to the
WAF’s rule set, prevents the attacks from bypassing. By providing our approach with a set of legiti-
mate requests that represent the benign usage of the application protected by the WAF, we can guide
the genetic algorithm towards regular expressions that do not match legitimate requests and do not
affect the benign usage of the application. Experimental results show that the generated filter rule is
effective at blocking the previously bypassing attacks (recall between 49% and 96%), while inducing
a small number of false positives (false positive rate between 0% and 3%) and, thus, is effective at
repairing a WAF.
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Chapter 8
SOFIA: An Automated Security Oracle for
black box Testing of SQL-Injection
Vulnerabilities
When engineering secure software systems and services, software testing is one of the main practices
to detect faults as well as security vulnerabilities. Security testing (also called penetration testing) is a
branch of software testing devoted to stress programs with respect to their security features, with the
aim of identifying vulnerabilities. Security testing involves two major challenges, generating input
values (referred to as test payloads), intended to exercise vulnerabilities, and evaluating whether such
payloads manage to expose an actual vulnerability. The security oracle addresses the latter.
Security testing is highly expensive given the complexity of modern systems, typically providing
a wide range of services, and the sophistication of attacks and exploitations. To reduce effort and cost,
the research community has focused on automating security testing. Regarding SQLi, the test input
generation problem has been extensively investigated and automated approaches are available [Appelt
et al., 2014, Halfond et al., 2006a, Kieyzun et al., 2009a, Kindy and Pathan, 2011]. Automating the
test oracle problem for SQLi vulnerabilities, however, remains an open problem. This is a significant
obstacle to test automation, as manual oracles severely limit the number of test execution results a test
team can process [Barr et al., 2015].
In this chapter, we present SOFIA, a Security Oracle for SQLi Attacks. Our goal is to satisfy three
important requirements. First, it must be independent from known attack instances so that new types
of attacks can be detected in the future. This is an important leap forward since existing solutions
based on attack patterns can only detect publicly known and documented attacks. Second, the oracles
should not rely on knowledge about test input data or their generation algorithm in order to be usable
with any given test generation tool. Third, our proposed oracle should not require the source code
of the SUT, since we target black box testing. This is often a mandatory requirement for external
security testing (carried out by third-party penetration testers) or for systems whose source code is
not available.
Most of the existing SQLi oracles either require known attacks in the learning phase [Pinzón et al.,
2013] or access to source code [Halfond and Orso, 2005a, Bisht et al., 2010, Buehrer et al., 2005,
Kemalis and Tzouramanis, 2008]. The few approaches that still meet all the three requirements [Liu
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et al., 2009, Valeur et al., 2005] are fundamentally different than our solution in ways that affect recall
and false positive rates. Whereas they detect user inputs in SQL statements and compare them with
user inputs observed at learning time, we prune data from SQL statements and compare their parse
trees. By comparing structure instead of data, our goal is to enable SOFIA to yield high recall and low
false positive rates. The main motivation is that modelling all possible safe data is highly difficult,
if feasible at all, and incomplete models cause false positives. Further, we observed that a change in
query structure is the most direct manifestation of an SQLi attack.
SOFIA is built using one-class machine classification. SQL statements issued by a SUT to its
database are logged and parsed to create SQL parse trees, which are fed to a clustering algorithm.
The Tree edit distance is used to measure the distance amongst parse trees. Our approach consists
of two phases: Training and Testing. During training, legitimate SQL statements, which are obtained
from regular executions, are grouped into clusters of similar statements. We refer to this set of clusters
as a safe model. Such a model represents legitimate database accesses in the absence of attacks.
In the testing phase, when test inputs trigger new SQL statements, our oracle assesses whether the
statements can be assigned to the clusters of the safe model. In the positive case, we can assert that
the statements are safe and no vulnerability is reported. Otherwise, such statements are classified as
anomalous, and hence, vulnerability alerts are reported. We have carried out an experimental evalua-
tion in terms of false positive rate, recall rate, and computational cost on six real applications and with
three different attack generation tools. The obtained results show that the proposed oracle achieves
a very low false positive rate (0.6%) and misses no attack (100% recall) with a low computational
overhead.
The proposed oracle is meant to support security testing, by classifying SQL statements triggered
by test cases as legitimate statements or as SQLi attacks. However, since it relies on a black box
strategy and is trained only on legitimate executions, it could be also deployed as a database firewall
in production to filter SQL statements and block SQLi attacks before they are actually executed.
Investigating such potential application is out of the scope of this chapter though and we present and
assess the proposed oracle only in the context of security testing.
In Section 8.2, we discuss the requirements and our strategy for the security oracle. In Section 8.3
we present in detail our approach. Section 8.4 reports our experiments to assess the accuracy and
speed of the oracle. Finally, Section 8.6 summarizes this chapter.
8.1 Background
This section introduces the concept of tree edit distance, which is used in our approach to compare
the similarity of SQL statements.
Ordered labelled trees refer to a tree structure in which nodes are labelled and edges capture
predecessor-successor relationships amongst nodes. The left-to-right order amongst siblings is also
significant to the semantics of the trees. Parse trees that structure sentences or programs according to
some context-free grammars are ordered labelled trees.
Transforming one ordered labelled tree (or just tree for brevity) into another involves three basic
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types of edit operations: changing a node label, delete a node, and insert a node. As an example,
taking the trees t1 and t2 in Figure 8.1, transforming t1 into t2 can be performed with a sequence of
four edit operations: change e to k, delete c, delete d, add h, or alternatively: change e to k, change d
to h, delete c.
f
e d
ca
b
f
k h
ba
t1 t2
Figure 8.1. An example of two ordered labelled trees.
Formally, each edit operation oi is assigned a cost (usually one unit). The cost of a sequence of
edit operations S j = 〈o1,o2, . . . ,oN〉 is the sum of the cost of all operations oi. Since there are usually
alternative sequences to transform a tree into another, the tree edit distance between two trees is the
minimum cost amongst possible sequences. When the cost of all edit operations is equal to one,
then the edit distance between two trees is the number of operations of the shortest sequence that
transforms one tree into the other.
8.2 Requirements and General Strategy
8.2.1 Security Oracle Requirements
Most of the classifiers used as security oracles are learned on a training set that contains both positive
and negative examples (attacks and legitimate executions) [Avancini and Ceccato, 2013]. However,
these approaches are expected to suffer from two main limitations, namely, (i) the availability of
attacks, and (ii) the representativeness of attacks, especially when the sample is small as in most
practical contexts.
Documented attacks are usually unavailable for many systems. Some ethical attackers make their
techniques and payloads available on the Internet, but software developers are usually unaware of
them. Even if they are, the number of known attacks is limited. We also need to account for unknown,
new attacks that may appear after the system’s deployment. As a result, a security oracle would be
much more beneficial for testing (and also in other contexts like monitoring in production) if it does
not require the availability of documented attacks.
In addition, even when available, attacks used to train security oracle classifiers are often expected
to be representative of possible attacks that could target a system. Unfortunately, this is normally not
the case as new attacks are being introduced at a very fast pace. Therefore, a classifier should not rely
on documented attacks at the risk of being ineffective with new ones. Thus, the first requirement for
a security oracle is the following:
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Requirement Req1: The security oracle should be independent from known instances of
successful attacks.
Often in security testing, oracles depend on knowledge about what attack generation algorithm
and what test input data have been used to determine the expected output if there is a vulnerability.
For example, some oracles classify a test as a successful attack when the execution output contains the
same attack payloads as the inputs [Kieyzun et al., 2009a]. This strategy suffers from the observability
problem as the output can be masked by a generic error message, or worse, the impact of the successful
attack cannot be easily observed by the tester, e.g., like in second order SQLi attacks. Furthermore,
this strategy, because it is specific to test generation algorithms or input data, limits the portability
of the oracle. As a result, it may not work with most attack generation tools, without additional
adaptation overhead. It is desirable to define an oracle that is independent from attack generation
strategies so that it can be used with many attack tools and a variety of attack generation approaches.
The second requirement is, thus:
Requirement Req2: The security oracle has no knowledge on what input data are used to
test the system.
Often, systems are written using frameworks and third part libraries. Since commercial libraries
are rarely distributed with source code, a whitebox approach in the generation of a security oracle is
of limited applicability in real industrial settings. In many contexts, such as for third-party penetration
testers, access to source code is not an option. Thus, the third requirement is:
Requirement Req3: The security oracle should not rely on the source code of the SUT.
8.2.2 Our Strategy
Our strategy to create a security oracle for SQLi vulnerabilities that satisfies the above requirements
relies on a black box, security safe model, which is a model of safe execution inputs.
Safe model: To be independent from known attacks and attack tools, we decided to exclude attacks
from the training set used to learn the security oracle. We propose a security oracle that only takes
into consideration legitimate executions and builds a model of safe SQL statements. Tests will be
classified as legitimate if they generate SQL statements satisfying this safe model and potential attacks
otherwise.
Black box: The SQL statements sent by the SUT to the back-end database are the only features
considered by the oracle, either in the training phase and in the testing phase. As a result, such
an oracle can be deployed to test systems developed in many languages and has no dependency or
limitation regarding specific development frameworks.
The proposed safe model depends on the specific legitimate executions that are being considered.
However, using classical black box testing techniques, it is much easier to generate a large number of
representative legitimate inputs than it is to generate attacks. The next section explains in detail the
process to construct our security oracle.
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8.3 SOFIA: The Security Oracle
The procedure to build and apply the security oracle is summarized in Figure 8.2. It consists of two
phases, Training and Testing including five steps: Parsing, Pruning, Computing Distance, Clustering,
and Classification. These two phases share the first three steps. Clustering is exclusively part of
training while Classification is exclusively part of testing.
TESTINGTRAINING
SQL
Execution
Logs
Parse
Trees
Clustering
Pruned
Parse Trees
Distance
Matrix
Safe Model
Classification
Computing
Distance
New
SQL
Statements
Safe / Attack
Parsing
Pruning
process flow I/OLegend:
Figure 8.2. The overview SOFIA: the training process for learning safe models from
SQL execution logs; the classification process for classifying new SQL statements.
The process starts with a set of SQL statements, obtained from safe executions of a SUT, either by
executing functional tests or by monitoring regular system executions. The SQL statements are parsed
and the parse trees represent the objects to be classified. The fact that our oracle uses only legitimate
statements allows us to avoid the task of manual labelling training data (as legitimate statements or
attacks), as often required by other supervised techniques.
Information from the parse trees, which is specific to concrete SQL statements and irrelevant
for detecting attacks, is removed by pruning the parse trees. This helps not only in reducing the
number of unique trees to be clustered and better scale, but also improves the overall attack detection
performance.
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Clustering relies on the edit distance amongst pruned parse trees. Clustering is used to group
together similar SQL statements. Statements with low distance are assigned to the same cluster,
while statements with larger distance are assigned to different clusters. The final safe model consists
of the optimal partition of SQL statements computed by clustering. Note that the training process that
creates safe models from SQL execution logs takes place only once. Safe models are then ready to
support security testing in detecting SQLi vulnerabilities.
New statements triggered by executing security tests will be classified using the safe model, by
assessing their distance to the centres of the clusters. If a new statement is close enough to a cluster
centre, it satisfies the model and is classified as benign statement. Conversely, in the case a new
SQL statement does not fit into any existing cluster, it is considered anomalous and classified as a
potential attack. Further details of this process are provided in the sections that follow with the help
of a running example.
Regarding the defined requirements for the security oracle, Requirement 1 (independence from
known attacks) is satisfied since our approach relies only on logs of benign executions. Moreover, the
fact that the oracle considers only database logs ensures that requirement 3 is also achieved: no access
to the application source code is required. Our classification procedure complies with requirement 2
since it exclusively relies on the SQL statements sent to the database, and not the test case input
values.
8.3.1 Training Data
Training data are used to construct the security model. However, differently from other approaches
that require both attack and legitimate SQL statements, our approach only relies on the latter to learn
a classifier. In fact, our goal is to construct a model of safe executions, and classify as anomalous
everything that does not conform to this model.
Training data are collected by executing the functional test suite of a SUT, or by monitoring its
usage during production or acceptance testing. We collect execution logs containing SQL statements
executed on the database. To this end, different technologies can be used depending on the underlying
DBMS. For mysql we use the mysql-proxy tool1 that monitors all traffic to and from mysql databases.
This solution can be ported to other DBMSs as well. For example, for Java applications that use a
JDBC driver to connect to Oracle Database, we can customise the driver to log SQL statements.
Let us use a running example where the execution log includes the SQL statements shown in
Figure 8.3. While the three statements query the user and password columns from the table users,
they differ from one another in the where conditions.
8.3.2 Parsing
An SQLi attack modifies the semantic of SQL statements, usually by replacing a value with a piece
of SQL code, for example by adding a tautology to the where clause, or by injecting an additional
select or union statement. These injections, if successful, result in SQL queries that are valid SQL
1https://dev.mysql.com/downloads/mysql-proxy
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stmt1: select user, password from users
where id = 1;
stmt2: select user, password from users
where id = 2;
stmt3: select user, password from users
where id = 4 and role = 1;
Figure 8.3. Three samples of SQL log of the running example.
statements according to the SQL grammar, but yet have different parse trees. We resort to the parse
trees of SQL statements to detect SQLi attacks.
In our work, we rely on the General SQL Parser2 (GSP for short). GSP is a Java library that
supports various DBMSs, including Oracle, SQL Server, DB2, MySQL, Teradata, and Access. Output
parse trees are stored as XML documents for other analysis.
[root]
[select]
select [fields] [where]
user password where [expression]
id = 1
(a) stmt1
[root]
[select]
select [fields] [where]
user password where [expression]
id = 2
(b) stmt2
[root]
[select]
select [fields] [where]
user password where [expression]
[expression] and [expression]
id = 4 role = 1
(c) stmt3
Figure 8.4. Parse trees of the SQL statements.
Figure 8.4 shows the parse trees for the SQL statements of our running example. As we can see
in the figure, the parse trees contain information that is irrelevant and therefore detrimental to the
process of learning a classifier through clustering, e.g., specific user ids. Indeed, some elements in the
trees are very specific to the captured SQL executions and are irrelevant for the detection of attacks.
The pruning process, described next, aims at removing such irrelevant information from the parse
trees.
2http://sqlparser.com/
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8.3.3 Pruning
Pruning could be done according to different strategies depending on what piece of information should
be removed. To decide about the most effective pruning in our context, we should consider how
attacks are typically carried out. SQLi attacks aim at altering SQL statements by replacing data with
a new piece of SQL code, i.e. a string or numeric literal is replaced by code. Thus, two legitimate SQL
statements collected during the execution of the same feature but with different input data should only
differ in terms of data values. Instead, a legitimate statement and an attack statement should differ not
only with respect to data but also the SQL command structure in the maliciously injected part.
Based on the above consideration, we decided to prune data values in parse trees: We replace all
the constant numeric and string values in the tree with the same placeholder (e.g. with the empty
string or with the constant zero). As a result, statements that just differ in values are characterised by
a single pruned tree.
[root]
[select]
select [fields] [where]
user password where [expression]
id = ?
(a) stmt1 and stmt2
[root]
[select]
select [fields] [where]
user password where [expression]
[expression] and [expression]
id = ? role = ?
(b) stmt3
Figure 8.5. Pruned parse trees of the example SQL statements.
Figure 8.5 shows the pruned parse trees of our running example. Nodes with data values are
replaced with a place holder (the ? character). Since stmt1 and stmt2 only differ in data value of the
id attribute, their pruned versions are equivalent. For learning purposes, redundant versions of the
same pruned trees will be discarded. Out of the three statements of the training set for the running
example, only two distinct pruned trees will be considered to construct the safe model.
Our pruning procedure is straightforward. We analyse the XML parse trees and replace the content
of the leaf nodes of type Tconstant, which contain concrete data values, with a placeholder.
8.3.4 Computing Distance
Parse trees of SQL statements are ordered and labelled trees. A metric of tree edit distance for this
class of trees has been proposed by Zhang et al. [Shasha and Zhang, 1990], as discussed in Section
8.1. Zhang et al. have also proposed a fast algorithm to calculate tree edit distances in a polynomial
time complexity. Our work makes use of a tool called approxlib3, which implements this specific
algorithm.
Let us consider the SQL statement of the attack in Figure 8.6(a), for which the corresponding
(pruned) parse tree is shown in Figure 8.6(c). We note that this tree is quite similar to the parse
3http://www.cosy.sbg.ac.at/ augsten/src
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tree of the legitimate statement 3 in Figure 8.5(b). In fact, we note that these trees are more similar
(distance is 11) than the two legitimate statements stmt1 and stmt3 (distance is 22). This example
highlights the fact that parse tree distance alone is not enough to detect attacks. We need to infer
a classification amongst legitimate statements, in this case using clustering to group similar trees,
and compare a candidate attack with its closest cluster. The underlying rationale is that, though a
legitimate SQL statement does not obviously need to be similar to all legitimate statements resulting
from test executions, there should be a cluster with similar statements. Once parse tree distances are
computed amongst all the pairs of pruned parse trees, an algorithm can be applied to generate an
optimal set of clusters, as described next.
8.3.5 Clustering
We address our clustering problem using the k-medoids algorithm [Reynolds et al., 2006]. This
algorithm is a variant of k-means clustering, based on the search for k representative samples, namely
the medoids, amongst the observations of the dataset. After finding a set of k medoids, k clusters are
constructed by assigning each observation to the nearest medoid. We need to find k representative
samples that minimize the sum of the dissimilarities of the observations to their closest representative
object. Furthermore, we consider a measure of cluster diameter. The diameter of a cluster is the
maximal distance between the observations in the cluster and its medoid. To build a safe model,
training data are clustered into k clusters, characterised by their medoids and diameters.
The adoption of k-medoids clustering is more appropriate in our context than the standard k-
means [Jain, 2010] approach. K-means involves the notion of mean point, which in our case would
mean an average tree for all the observations in the same cluster. Since such a hypothetical tree is
insensible in our context, we adopt k-medoid, instead. It picks a representative element for each
cluster (i.e., the medoid), instead of computing a fictitious average tree.
It is very important to identify the appropriate number of clusters k. Clusters should be small
enough to distinguish attacks from legitimate statements based on parse tree distances, but clusters
should also be large enough to capture representative groups of similar legitimate statements. More
specifically, a too small value of k would elaborate a partition that contains few large clusters. A large
cluster would contain very different parse trees, with large distances from each other, and its medoid
would not be representative of all the members of the clusters. Also, with large clusters, the distance
between an attack and the cluster medoid may be comparable to the cluster diameter. Thus, actual
attacks would be wrongly classified as legitimate statements (false negatives).
On the other hand, a large number of clusters k may result in many clusters that contain too
few elements to be representative and enable reliable comparisons with new parse trees. False alarms
(false positives) may result from new legitimate statements whose tree is at a distance from the closest
medoid that is higher than the cluster’s diameter.
To decide the most appropriate number of clusters (i.e., the value of k), we adopt a standard
approach, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) [Aggarwal and Reddy, 2013, Manning et al., 2008].
It entails balancing the trade-off between the goodness of fit of the model and the size of the model.
The underlying rationale is to increase the complexity of the model (i.e., k increases) as far as the
gain in precision is high, and stop when the increase in precision is not significant. To achieve this
objective, we adopt a penalty factor for each new cluster. To determine the number of clusters in this
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way, we select the best k that minimizes the fitness function f composed of two terms: (i) distortion,
a measure of the extent to which SQL statements deviate from the prototype of their clusters (e.g.,
RSS for k-medoids); and (ii) the model complexity that is proportional to the number of clusters:
f (k) = RSS(k)+2 ·M · k , (8.1)
where RSS is the residue sum of square, i.e. the error that we commit by approximating each
observation in a cluster by the corresponding medoid, and M is the dimensionality of the vector
space. In our case M=1, because the only feature used in clustering is the tree-edit distance.
The resulting optimal set of clusters, each associated with a medoid and diameter, represent the
safe model used as an oracle to classify newly executed SQL statements. Table 8.1 shows the final
clustering configuration for the running example.
Table 8.1. Clustering results for the running example.
Cluster Medoid Elements
1 stmt1 stmt1, stmt2
2 stmt3 stmt3
8.3.6 Classification
Intercepted SQL statements undergo the testing (classifying) process depicted in Figure 8.2: they
are parsed, pruned, and eventually classified as safe or malicious. The classification procedure is
described with respect to the test sample (a malicious statement) shown in Figure 8.6 and consists of
the following steps:
1. Parsing and Pruning: When the test SQL statement (Figure 8.6b) is intercepted by our
database proxy, it is parsed (Figure 8.6c, malicious injected code highlighted in red) and pruned
(Figure 8.6d, pruning highlighted in green) as described previously.
2. Computing Distance: The tree edit distance is used to identify the closest cluster in the safe
model. To compute this result, the pruned parse tree T of the test (Figure 8.6d) is compared to the
pruned parse tree of each medoid. In our example, the distances from the medoids are shown in
Figure 8.6a as 18 and 11, respectively.
The medoid with the smallest distance from the test (stmt3 in our example) determines the nearest
cluster (cluster 2). Determining the nearest cluster is fast since the medoids’ parse trees are pre-
computed and only k tree edit distances need to be evaluated. In the example only two comparisons
are required.
3. Distance-versus-diameter classification: We check whether the test fits the nearest cluster by
comparing its diameter and the distance between the test parse tree and medoid. Alternative measures
could be used, such as the distance corresponding to the 95th percentile of cluster elements instead of
its diameter, to deal with potential outliers. However, this is out of scope for this work.
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In our example, the diameter4 of cluster 2 is equal to 0. We compare the distance between the test
T and the nearest medoid (distance is 11) with the diameter (equals to 0). When the distance to the
medoid is smaller than or equal to the diameter, the test is deemed to fit this cluster and it is classified
as a safe execution. However, in our example the test falls outside of the cluster border (distance >
diameter) and is classified as a potential attack.
Cluster Medoid Diameter Test distance
1 stmt1 0 18
2 stmt3 0 11
(a) Cluster diameters and distance
select user, password from users
where id = 4 or role = role;
(b) Statement
[root]
[select]
select [fields] [where]
user password where [expression]
[expression] or [expression]
id = 4 role = role
(c) Parse tree
[root]
[select]
select [fields] [where]
user password where [expression]
[expression] or [expression]
id = ? role = role
(d) Pruned parse tree
Figure 8.6. Classification of a malicious statement.
8.4 Experimental Evaluation
This section presents the experimental evaluation designed and conducted to assess the proposed
security oracle.
8.4.1 Research Questions and Variable Selection
The first research question concerns the accuracy of the oracle in classifying SQL statements. Missed
attacks may lead to unaddressed security defects and false alarms lead to significant wasted effort,
which should remain within reasonable bounds.
RQ1: How accurate is SOFIA in classifying legitimate SQL statements and SQLi attacks?
The second research question is about the amount of time taken by the classifier to make a decision
on a newly observed SQL statement. Fast run-time classification of attacks during testing is important
to support efficient test automation.
RQ2: How fast is SOFIA in classifying SQL statements as legitimate or attacks?
4Because of the small size of the running example, each cluster contains just one pruned parse tree, so diameter is
equal to 0.
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The third research questions is meant to compare SOFIA with available and comparable alterna-
tive solutions, which can be considered a baseline on which to improve, both in terms of classification
accuracy and speed.
RQ3: How does SOFIA compare to main-stream alternative tools in terms of accuracy and
speed?
Accuracy in our context is characterised by attack detection rate (we want to detect as many attacks
as possible) and false positive rate. We need to minimise false positives as they trigger unnecessary
manual analysis, which is expensive. The more false positives, the more analysis effort is being
wasted and the scalability of the approach is being compromised. Accuracy is quantified by the
standard Recall and FPR (False Positive Rate) metrics from information retrieval:
• True Positives (TP): The number of actual attacks that are correctly classified by the oracle as
attacks;
• False Positives (FP): The number of legitimate statements that are incorrectly classified by the
oracle as attacks;
• True Negatives (TN): The number of legitimate statements that are correctly classified by the
oracle as safe;
• False Negatives (FN): The number of actual attacks that are incorrectly classified by the oracle
as safe statements;
• Recall: The ratio between the correctly detected attacks and all the actual attacks:
T P
T P+FN
(8.2)
• FPR: The ratio between false positives and all the actual legitimate statements:
FP
FP+T N
(8.3)
Classification time is measured as follows:
• C-Time: Amount of time spent by the classifier to make a decision on a test outcome.
Time is measured by instrumenting the oracle. System time is probed before starting and after con-
cluding the complete classification procedure for each SQL statement. It includes the amount of time
spent for parsing the statement, pruning its tree, and the amount of time for computing its distances
to the medoids of the safe model oracle.
The amount of time required to train the oracle is less interesting because training is done just
once in a while and has therefore limited practical implications. It will not be further discussed here.
8.4.2 Subject Applications
The subject applications considered in this study are web applications and web services that use an
SQL relational database. Moreover, since the security oracle will be assessed on real vulnerabilities,
we selected applications by inspecting their bug-tracking systems and the Common Vulnerabilities
98
8.4. Experimental Evaluation
and Exposures repository5 that keeps track of publicly known vulnerabilities and exposures. The
chosen subject applications contain real SQL-injection vulnerabilities.
The applications considered in the study are:
• Hotel Reservation Service: written in PHP, Hotel Reservation Service is a service-oriented
based system providing web services for room reservation. It was developed and used by Coffey
et al. [Coffey et al., 2010a].
• SugarCRM: written in PHP, SugarCRM is a popular customer relationship management sys-
tem6.
• Taskfreak: written in PHP, Taskfreak is a web project management application7.
• TheOrganizer: a web application that supports management and organisation of the activities
in a personal agenda8. The server is written in Java (using Servlets, J2EE and Spring JDBC).
• Wordpress: written in PHP, Wordpress is a popular blogging and news publishing platform9.
Wordpress has many utility plugins that are vulnerable to SQLi . We have two variants of
Wordpress, one with the newstatpress plugin10 that provides access statistics to Wordpress; the
other with landing-pages11, a plugin for customising templates and attracting more visits to
blogging sites.
We use the test suites of the subject applications for generating training data. Wordpress comes
with a large test suite of more than 3700 phpunit test cases. For Taskfreak and TheOrganizer, we
reuse the test suites generated by available techniques [Tonella et al., 2014, Nguyen et al., 2012] and
its accompanying tool12. For the remaining two, HRS and SugarCRM, we manually defined test
suites that exercise all operations of their web services with various domain inputs.
Our reliance on real vulnerabilities in applications makes our results more representative of the
current situation though it is impossible to predict what these results will be with future types of
vulnerabilities. However, as described above, because our approach does not learn from specific
attacks and relies on learning to characterise safe statements, we hope that the safe model will be able
to handle future types of vulnerabilities as well.
8.4.3 Attack Generation
To evaluate the classifier, both legitimate executions and attacks are required. However, our oracle
is independent of the input data generation strategy adopted to generate the attacks. Thus, we will
evaluate the accuracy of the oracle with diverse attack generation tools:
• Burpsuite : A commercial security testing tool suite13. It has a vulnerability scanner that targets
many types of vulnerabilities, including those in the OWASP top 10 [Williams and Wichers,
5https://cve.mitre.org
6http://www.sugarcrm.com
7http://www.taskfreak.com
8http://www.apress.com/9781590596951
9https://wordpress.org
10https://wordpress.org/plugins/newstatpress
11https://wordpress.org/plugins/landing-pages
12http://selab.fbk.eu/magic
13http://portswigger.net/burp
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2013]. For detecting SQLi , Burpsuite (version 1.6.23) has a fixed list of 134 built-in SQLi test
payloads, such as:
’a or 1=1−− | //∗ | replace | drop table
When scanning for SQLi vulnerabilities, Burpsuite uses these payloads as request parameters
and submits them to a target system. It then analyses the obtained responses from the system to
detect SQL code or error messages in order to report SQLi issues.
• SqlMap : A popular open source tool for penetration testers to detect and exploit SQLi vulnera-
bilities14. It supports various database management systems and implements many heuristics to
generate test payloads for different types of SQLi, including boolean-based blind, time-based
blind, error-based, UNION query-based, stacked queries and out-of-band.
• Xavier : A framework for the automated testing of web services for SQLi vulnerabilities [Appelt
et al., 2014, Appelt et al., 2015]. Powered by a grammar developed specifically for SQLi attacks
and machine learning, Xavier can generate diverse test payloads that can bypass web application
firewalls and detect SQLi vulnerabilities.
8.4.4 Alternative Oracles
Apart from assessing SOFIA on diverse applications, it is interesting to investigate how it fares when
compared to existing tools with similar goals. We found only two alternative tools: AntiSQL and
GreenSQL 15.
AntiSQL is a tool provided by the vendor of the SQL parser we use in our work, which takes log
files containing SQL statements as inputs, and reports whether their content is classified as attacks or
legitimate statements.
GreenSQL is a popular database security solution for controlling database accesses, blocking
SQLi attacks, among other features. It intercepts communications between applications and databases,
learns patterns of regular SQL statements, and then, blocks malicious ones from getting to databases
under protection.
8.4.5 Experimental Procedure
To collect SQL statements, we install and configure the subject applications, each on a separate vir-
tual machine having mysql and mysql-proxy ready. mysql-proxy helps intercept and log all the SQL
statements that an application sends to its database. We, then, execute the test suite that comes with
each application to collect legitimate executions, i.e., safe statements. After that, we run the attack
tools to generate attacks. The logs of attack tools are manually analysed and statements are labelled
as attack or safe. Such analysis is required as safe statements can result from attacks since the system
might perform routine updates or run additional queries before executing the attack statements. Note
that the labelling task is only relevant for our assessment purposes; it is not needed in the real usage
of the oracle.
14http://sqlmap.org
15http://www.greensql.com
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We adopt a 10-fold validation strategy to check our oracle on different partitions of training and
testing data. The training data of each subject application, consisting exclusively of safe statements,
is divided randomly into 10 sets of approximately the same size, to form 10 partitions:
• Nine sets of legitimate statements represent the training set. They are used to train the safe
model of the oracle. In our case, this is done only on legitimate statements and there is no need
to split attacks across training and testing sets;
• The remaining set of legitimate statements is merged with the attacks to form the testing set.
The oracle is used to classify each entry in the testing set using the safe model.
This process is iterated 10 times, once per each of the 10 possible partitions. The classification
elaborated by the oracle for the testing set is compared with the actual labelling, to evaluate the
oracle accuracy. The 10-fold validation, including training and testing for all subject applications,
was executed using a HPC (high-performance computing) system, where the CPU speed on nodes is
2.26GHz, and 4Gb RAM was available to each process.
8.4.6 Experimental Results
Table 8.2 reports the number of SQL statements per application that have been considered in our
study. The first two columns contain the name of the application and the tool used to generate the
attacks, respectively. The subsequent columns report the number of legitimate statements and the
number of successful attacks. The last two columns indicate the number of distinct pruned trees for
legitimate statements and attacks. We cannot explore all combinations subject applications and tools
because of certain application characteristics (web-based and web services) and the intended usage
of the tools: Xavier targets web services while the others target standard web-based applications. In
total, we obtain nine datasets for the experimental evaluation.
Table 8.2. Summary of the datasets used in our experiment: nine datasets obtained from
six applications and three attack tools.
Application T. Tool #Legit. #Attack #Pruned #Pruned
Legit. Attack
HotelRS Xavier 10,392 1,871 2,124 442
SugarCRM Xavier 100,683 196 52 78
Taskfreak burpsuite 7,502 3 29 2
Taskfreak sqlmap 7,503 4 30 2
Theorganizer burpsuite 1,516 28 27 17
Theorganizer sqlmap 1,616 27 25 18
Wordpress-newstatpress burpsuite 196,556 314 860 277
Wordpress-newstatpress sqlmap 148,325 4 809 2
Wordpress-landingpage sqlmap 171,487 170 843 65
We can observe, based on the data shown in Table 8.2, that the datasets used in our experiments
are diverse in terms of the number of safe statements, ranging from 1k to 170k. Likewise, the number
of attack statements generated by different tools varies from three to 1,871 attacks. Also, we can
see that the number of parse trees after pruning is significantly reduced. For example, for subject
Wordpress-landingpage and tool sqlmap, there were originally more than 171k safe statements and
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170 attacks. However, after pruning, there are only 843 safe and 65 attack cases left, respectively.
Overall, the percentage of reduction for all subject applications after tree pruning ranges from 79%
to more than 99%. As a result, pruning helps reducing the time required by SOFIA, especially for
training. Note that burpsuite cannot generate any attack on Wordpress-landingpage and, therefore,
this pair is not investigated.
Table 8.3 provides experimental results. For each application, the performance of SOFIA is mea-
sured using Recall, false positive rate, and C-Time, as previously described. The values in the table
represent the average over the 10 partitions of training/testing data and executions.
Table 8.3. Results of our approach: data averaged from 10-fold cross validation. T.(ms)
is classification C-Time measured in millisecond.
App./tool TP FP TN FN Recall FPR T.(ms)
HotelRS/ Xavier 1,871 0.0 1,039.2 0 1.0 0.000 25.14
SugarCRM/ Xavier 196 1.0 10,067.3 0 1.0 0.000 463.77
Taskfreak/ burpsuite 3 0.3 749.9 0 1.0 0.000 48.13
Taskfreak/ sqlmap 4 0.4 749.9 0 1.0 0.001 152.91
Theorganizer/ burpsuite 28 0.9 150.7 0 1.0 0.006 26.11
Theorganizer/ sqlmap 27 0.5 161.1 0 1.0 0.003 29.07
Wordpress-newstat/ burpsuite 4 28.5 14,804.0 0 1.0 0.002 33.70
Wordpress-newstat/ sqlmap 170 29.3 17,119.4 0 1.0 0.002 28.92
Wordpress-landingpage/ sqlmap 314 28.0 19,627.6 0 1.0 0.001 20.30
Regarding RQ1, results in Table 8.3 show that SOFIA yields a perfect Recall of 100% for all the
subject applications and achieves a very low false positive rate across all applications (0.006 at the
highest). When we consider the absolute number of false positives (FP), they are mostly below 1.0
on average. The highest FP is only 29.3, therefore suggesting that manual analysis is feasible even in
the worst case.
Thus we can provide a clear answer to RQ1:
SOFIA delivers a near-perfect accuracy in classifying both legitimate SQL statements and
attacks.
Moreover, considering RQ2, the time required to classify a new statement is small, with an average
across case studies of 92ms and a median of 29ms. For most of the case studies, classification takes
around 30ms per statement, with the exception of Sugar-xavier that takes more than 400ms. The
reason for this difference is that, on average, the parse trees of SQL statements used by Sugar are
larger and thus lead to longer tree-edit distance calculations.
Thus we can answer RQ2:
SOFIA is fast in classifying SQL statements, taking on average 92ms per classification.
Furthermore, to answer RQ3, we compared SOFIA to AntiSQL and GreenSQL .
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Following the same procedure as for SOFIA, we ran these two industrial tools against all nine
datasets and measured their accuracy and time. GreenSQL was given the same training data that
had been used to train SOFIA. AntiSQL inspects SQL statements based on its own SQLi filters and,
therefore, no training was needed. The same testing data were then checked by GreenSQL and Anti-
SQL . For each dataset, TP and FN were measured by counting the number of attack SQL statements
correctly classified as attacks or incorrectly classified as safe, respectively. Likewise, we measured
the average number of safe statements classified as attacks (FP) and safe (TN). Further, we measured
the average execution time the tools required to parse and check a statement.
Table 8.4. Results of AntiSQL and GreenSQL . T.(ms) is the average time in millisecond
the tools need to process one statement.
App/tool TP FP TN FN Recall FPR T.(ms)
AntiSQL
HotelRS/ Xavier 1,579 827.0 212.2 292 0.84 0.796 320
SugarCRM/ Xavier 50 1,237.6 8,830.7 146 0.25 0.123 314
Taskfreak/ burpsuite 1 12.9 737.3 2 0.33 0.017 250
Taskfreak/ sqlmap 4 13.0 737.3 0 1.00 0.017 303
Theorganizer/ burpsuite 28 123.0 28.6 0 1.00 0.811 302
Theorganizer/ sqlmap 27 133.0 28.6 0 1.00 0.823 312
Wordpress-newstatpress/ burpsuite 0 5,389.6 9,442.9 4 0 0.363 306
Wordpress-newstatpress/ sqlmap 154 5.562.0 11,586.7 16 0.91 0.324 294
Wordpress-landingpage/ sqlmap 155 5,682.0 13,973.6 159 0.49 0.289 300
GreenSQL
HotelRS/ Xavier 1,871 0.0 1.039.2 0 1.0 0.000 6
SugarCRM/ Xavier 133 2,020.6 8.047.7 63 0.68 0.201 5
Taskfreak/ burpsuite 3 0.3 749.9 0 1.0 0.000 6
Taskfreak/ sqlmap 4 0.4 749.9 0 1.0 0.001 5
Theorganizer/ burpsuite 28 59.1 92.5 0 1.0 0.390 5
Theorganizer/ sqlmap 27 58.7 102.9 0 1.0 0.363 5
Wordpress-newstatpress/ burpsuite 4 1,372.0 13,460.0 0 1.0 0.093 5
Wordpress-newstatpress/ sqlmap 170 1,360.4 15,788.3 0 1.0 0.079 5
Wordpress-landingpage/ sqlmap 314 1,671.6 17,984.0 0 1.0 0.085 5
Table 8.4 shows the Recall, FPR, and execution time of AntiSQL and GreenSQL . We can observe
that FPR and Recall of AntiSQL are significantly worse compared to those of SOFIA. AntiSQL
missed many attacks on all the case studies (FN > 0) and, as a result, Recall of some cases is very low.
It wrongly classified safe statements as attacks (high FP rate) on many cases, leading to a poor FPR
of 0.823 (or 82.3%). In particular, no attack was correctly identified on one case (TP = 0). GreenSQL
is as good as SOFIA in all but one subject (SugarCRM) with respect to Recall. However, GreenSQL
reported many false positives that resulted in an order of magnitude higher FPR (up to 0.363) as
compared to that of SOFIA (0.006).
Regarding the time taken to process an SQL file, AntiSQL takes on average 300ms, which is
higher than the average time required by SOFIA (92ms). GreenSQL takes only about 5ms and is
therefore faster than SOFIA at the cost of a much higher number of false positives. It is worth noticing
that GreenSQL is a leading industrial tool while SOFIA is a currently research prototype. Besides,
because of technical reasons, GreenSQL could not run on the HPC but on a server that happened to
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have a higher CPU frequency than the computer used for SOFIA and AntiSQL . This setting clearly
favoured GreenSQL in detecting attacks faster and prevents us from drawing objective conclusions
regarding its comparison with SOFIA regarding its run-time speed.
To compare accuracy and classification time, we used the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. The use
of non-parametric tests requires no distributional assumption. Such a test checks whether differences
in performance recorded for SOFIA and AntiSQL are statistically significant16. Results show that
SOFIA performs significantly better than AntiSQL with respect to Recall, FPR and time (p-values
are, respectively, 0.028, 0.008 and 0.011). Similarly, SOFIA fares significantly better than GreenSQL
in terms of FPR (p-value = 0.028). Thus, we can provide a clear answer to RQ3:
SOFIA is significantly more accurate than AntiSQL and GreenSQL and significantly faster
than AntiSQL in classifying legitimate SQL statements and SQLi attacks.
8.4.7 Threats to Validity
To help increase the external validity of our results, which is the main challenge in our study, we relied
on various applications from different domains and written using different programming languages,
and three different attack generation tools. Further, to ensure our accuracy results were realistic, we
resorted to standard 10-fold validation involving multiple training/testing data sets. However, we
have to recognise the inherent limitations of such studies, as we cannot predict accuracy on future
vulnerabilities. The fact that our learning approach does not rely on the specific vulnerabilities in our
application systems helps alleviate this problem but does not eliminate it entirely.
8.5 Related Work
We review SQLi detection techniques that are based on analysing SQL statements at run-time. Ta-
ble 8.5 summarizes which of our security oracle requirements (see Section 8.2.1) are met by related
work. Our requirements are: Req1 training is independent from known attacks; Req2 classification
is neither based on the knowledge of test input data nor on the input data generation algorithm; and
Req3 analysis does not require access to source code.
Table 8.5. Security oracle requirements met by related work.
Papers Req 1 Req 2 Req3
Halfond et al. [Halfond and Orso, 2005a]
Bisht et al. [Bisht et al., 2010]
Buehrer et al. [Buehrer et al., 2005]
Kemalis et al. [Kemalis and Tzouramanis, 2008]
X X –
Pinzon et al. [Pinzón et al., 2013] – X X
Liu et al. [Liu et al., 2009]
Valeur et al. [Valeur et al., 2005]
X X X
Whitebox approaches [Halfond and Orso, 2005a, Bisht et al., 2010, Buehrer et al., 2005, Kemalis
and Tzouramanis, 2008] require the source code to be available for instrumentation or analysis, so
16We assume a 95% confidence level, so a p-value < 0.05 indicates a statistically significant result.
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they do not meet requirement Req3. Halfond et al. proposed AMNESIA [Halfond and Orso, 2005a],
a method based on program analysis to build models (non-deterministic finite automata) for each and
every legitimate query of an application. The application is instrumented and each SQL query sent
to the database is validated by finding an accepting path in the automaton. If not possible, the query
is considered to be an attack. Bisht et al. proposed CANDID [Bisht et al., 2010], an approach that
compares a developer’s intended query structure with the actual query structure found during program
execution. While both AMNESIA and CANDID show promising evaluation results and they meet
requirement Req1 and Req2, but they require access to the source code and its instrumentation, which
limits their applicability and violates requirement Req3.
Buehrer et al. have proposed SQLGuard, which compares parse trees of each SQL statement be-
fore and after the inclusion of user inputs at runtime [Buehrer et al., 2005]. If the trees corresponding
to a statement (with and without user inputs) are different after removing constants, then the statement
is considered to result from SQLi attacks. In comparison to our approach, which does not require any
change to the source code, the application of SQLGuard requires SQL queries to be rewritten using a
Java library provided by SQLGuard’s authors, thus Req3 is not fully met.
Several approaches based on anomaly detection have been proposed in the literature [Kemalis
and Tzouramanis, 2008, Liu et al., 2009, Pinzón et al., 2013, Valeur et al., 2005]. Many of them
look similar to ours because they contain the same two high-level steps: training and detection. We
provide below a detailed comparison with our work, which aims at addressing three main limitations
of practical importance: false positives, the difficulty to obtain a somewhat complete set of of actual
and varied attacks for learning purposes, and the need to handle new attack variants.
Kemalis et al. proposed SQL-IDS, a specification-based approach to detect malicious SQL state-
ments [Kemalis and Tzouramanis, 2008]. Even if this approach does analyse source code directly,
the user has to provide the specification of all benign SQL statements for the application under pro-
tection. SQL-IDS monitors the application during runtime and each query that does not comply with
the specification is treated as malicious. Req3 is not fully met by this approach, because it requires
precise knowledge of the source code to be manually provided to the tool. In our proposed approach,
the user does not have to provide any specification for benign statements, because the safe model is
automatically inferred from the learning set.
The remaining approaches are black box, i.e. they do not require source code, so they meet re-
quirement Req3. Pinzon et al. proposed an anomaly detection approach combining neural networks
and support vector machine to classify SQL queries into benign or malicious statements [Pinzón et al.,
2013]. In contrast to our approach, they employ supervised machine learning techniques that require
a sufficient number of known attack statements. As it is very much driven by what known attacks
were fed to the learner, such an approach does not met requirement Req1 and it might have difficulties
recognising new attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, only two approaches [Liu et al., 2009] [Valeur et al., 2005] fully
meet all of our three requirements. However, we overcome their limitations by achieving (i) low
sensitivity to learning set incompleteness and (ii) a very low false positive rate.
Liu et al. proposed SQLProb [Liu et al., 2009], a tool that uses string alignment to detect the part
of an SQL query that corresponds to user input, by detecting the difference between a new query
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(requirements Req2 and Req3) and all the queries observed at learning time (requirement Req1). The
tool reports an anomaly when the part of the parse tree that corresponds to detected user input contains
non-constant leaf nodes (e.g., arithmetic or logic operators). As one might expect, the reliability of
this approach is very sensitive to the completeness of learning, which is whether all types of queries
are accounted for. Completeness is required to identify correctly the user input in the SQL query.
Identifying user inputs is a difficult and error-prone step that could lead to false positives when training
is partial. Unfortunately, the authors did not report false positives. After investigation, it turned out
that the tool was not available and therefore a comparative study was not possible. Nevertheless, our
approach does not entail extracting user inputs and is therefore by design more robust. We do not need
all types and variants of safe queries to be available at the training phase and, thanks to the distance
measure that we adopt, as demonstrated by our empirical study, we obtain accurate results even when
we have no guarantee of completeness during training17.
Valeur et al. [Valeur et al., 2005] used machine learning to learn relevant characteristics from user
inputs of benign SQL queries. In the training phase, several statistical models characterising relevant
features, such as character distribution and string length, are learned from attack-free SQL queries
(requirement Req1), in order to capture patterns and ranges of expected values. In the detection phase,
a query is intercepted (requirements Req2 and Req3) and parsed, and its input values are compared
to detect anomalies against models resulting from training queries with identical parse tree structure.
This approach requires an exact match between the parse tree to classify and those in the learning set,
while we tolerate a degree of difference using tree distance. Moreover, Valeur et al. learn statistical
distributions of values from legitimate SQL statements, while we remove these values and consider
only pruned parse trees. These two fundamental differences allow us to dramatically reduce false
positives based on results reported by Valeur et al. In our approach, legitimate statements are correctly
classified as safe if they belong (i.e., show acceptable distance) to one of the clusters of our model.
Our approach is therefore more resilient, as demonstrated by our empirical results.
8.6 Summary
Having in mind realistic industrial settings, we elicited three requirements for an ideal security oracle
for security testing of SQLi vulnerabilities. We presented a novel approach that satisfies all of these
requirements and we implemented it into a tool that we call SOFIA.
SOFIA learns a safe model characterising legitimate SQL statements, based on information logged
during normal system executions. To do so, SQL statements are parsed and then parse trees are pruned
to remove information that is irrelevant to whether an SQL statement is safe or not. Based on their
tree-edit distance, similar parse trees are grouped using clustering and the resulting set of clusters is
used as a safe models. SOFIA classifies new SQL statements by comparing and contrasting them
with these clusters. Executions whose SQL statements do not sufficiently fit into any of the clusters
of the safe model are classified as attacks.
We assessed the accuracy of SOFIA as a security oracle with three different attack generation
tools on six PHP and Java systems. No attack was missed and the rate of false positives was very
17Recall that our training set of queries is based on functional test suites, when available, and otherwise monitoring
usage.
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low, thus making SOFIA a reliable and cost-effective approach. Further, the classification of SQL
statements was on average below 100ms, thus making it possible to execute a large number of test
cases within time constraints. Last, SOFIA significantly outperformed two widely used alternative
tools in terms of classification accuracy and execution speed for one of the tools.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarises our research contributions and gives a perspective for future research activ-
ities in the area.
9.1 Summary
This dissertation presents several security testing approaches to assess web applications and services
for SQLi vulnerabilities. Our work was done in collaboration with SIX Payment Services, a leading
financial service provider in Luxembourg and Switzerland. We analysed the challenges of security
testing in an industrial context and we identified several factors that might limit the applicability or
effectiveness of existing security testing approaches in such a context. The key limiting factors are:
• The source code of the core business application used at SIX can typically not be analysed
or modified for the purpose of testing, because several components are developed by external
parties. However, the interactions between the application and its environment (e.g. network or
database calls) can be monitored to guide the testing. For this purpose, common components in
corporate IT environments, e.g. DIDS, can be leveraged to increase the accuracy of test oracles.
• Industry standards such as PCI-DSS require extensive testing efforts. Given time and resource
constraints, manual labour becomes a bottleneck and security properties are often not suffi-
ciently tested. Testing techniques with a high degree of automation can mitigate the lack of
manual labour.
• Payment card processors, such as our industrial partner, typically use WAFs to protect their web
services from cyberattacks. Testing techniques should consider WAFs when assessing such web
services for vulnerabilities, since vulnerabilities that are exploitable despite a WAF being in
place are more severe and, thus, should be prioritised. Furthermore, testing techniques should
systematically check the attack detection capabilities of WAFs in order to provide effective
protection and prevent web service from being exploited.
To address these issues, this dissertation proposes several security testing approaches that are au-
tomated, applicable in black box testing scenarios, able to assess and bypass WAFs, and use an
accurate test oracle, which is based on DIDSs. We empirically evaluated each proposed approach
by conducting an industrial case study and/or by using popular open source software as subject appli-
cations.
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Chapter 4 assessed the influence of common components in corporate IT environments, namely
WAFs and DIDSs, on the effectiveness of black box security testing approaches. We proposed that
testing through a WAF can be used to detect vulnerabilities in web services that are insufficiently
protected and, thus, should be prioritised in debugging efforts. Furthermore, we proposed to base
test oracles on DIDS to achieve a higher effectiveness and efficiency. In the evaluation, we compared
our prototype implementation to SqlMap, a state-of-the-art penetration testing tool. We found that
testing through a WAF can indeed be used to prioritise vulnerabilities and a DIDS can increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of black box testing techniques. Our prototype detected more vulnera-
bilities than SqlMap, specifically if the subject application was protected by a WAF, and it required
fewer tries until a vulnerability was detected. However, we also concluded that if a WAF protected
the web services our prototype could not generate SQLi attacks that lead to syntactically correct SQL
statements and, hence, it was unclear if the vulnerabilities were exploitable.
Chapter 5 built on the idea of using a DIDS as test oracle and combined it with an input genera-
tion approach that can generate a diverse set of SQLi attacks. Starting from “legal” initial test cases,
the input generation approach applies a set of mutation operators that are specifically designed to
increase the likelihood of generating syntactically correct SQL statements that can reveal SQLi vul-
nerabilities. In our evaluation, we compared our input generation approach to a baseline approach and
found it is faster and significantly more likely to detect vulnerabilities within a limited time budget.
Moreover, when the subject systems are protected by a WAF, our approach can still generate a good
amount of attacks that get through the firewall and lead to executable SQL statements for all-but-one
vulnerabilities.
In Chapter 6, we focused our research on testing WAFs. We presented a machine learning-driven
testing approach to automatically detect holes in WAFs that let SQL injection attacks bypass them.
At the beginning, the approach automatically generates a diverse set of attacks and then submits them
to a system that is protected by a WAF. Incrementally learning from the attacks that are blocked or
bypassing the WAF, our approach selects attacks that exhibit characteristics associated with bypassing
the WAF and mutates them to efficiently generate new bypassing attacks. We developed a tool that
implements the approach and evaluated it on ModSecurity, a widely used WAF, and a proprietary
WAF of our industrial partner. Our evaluation indicated that our proposed technique is efficient at
generating SQL injection attacks that can bypass a WAF and can be used to identify successful attack
patterns.
Chapter 7 introduced an approach to infer a WAF filter rule from the bypassing attacks that were
identified with our proposed WAF testing approach presented in the previous chapter. The goal of
the inferred filter rule is to identify all bypassing attacks without matching any legitimate request.
When such a filter rule is added to the WAF’s rule set, the previously bypassing attacks are correctly
identified without adversely affecting the legitimate usage of the system. Experimental results showed
that the generated filter rule is effective at blocking the bypassing attacks (recall is between 49% and
96%), while inducing a small number of false positives (false positive rate is between 0% and 3%)
and, thus, is effective at repairing a WAF.
Chapter 8 presented a test oracle that was specifically designed to meet the requirements of testing
for SQLi vulnerabilities in an industrial context. The oracle is programming-language and source-
code independent, and can be used with various attack generation tools. Moreover, because it does
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not rely on known attacks, the oracle is meant to also detect types of SQLi attacks that might be
unknown at learning time. We proposed to recast the oracle challenge as a one-class classification
problem where we learn to characterise legitimate SQL statements to accurately distinguish them
from SQLi attack statements. We have carried out an experimental validation on six applications,
of which two are large and widely used. The oracle was used to detect real SQLi vulnerabilities
with inputs generated by three attack generation tools. The obtained results show that the oracle is
computationally fast and achieves a recall rate of 100% (i.e., missing no attacks) with a low false
positive rate (0.6%).
9.2 Future Work
In today’s applications, SQL injection vulnerabilities are common and testing for SQLi is of high
importance. However, future application frameworks might embrace alternative technologies and
other injection vulnerabilities specific to these technologies might become more important.
Injection vulnerabilities follow a common pattern: An injection vulnerability occurs if an appli-
cation uses untrusted input data that was not sanitised to build commands for an external interpreter,
e.g. Unix Shells, script interpreters such as Perl or Python, or LDAP. This dissertation presents testing
approaches specific to SQL injection, but the basic principals and techniques can be applied to other
kinds of injection vulnerabilities. For example, we increased the accuracy of test oracles for SQLi by
monitoring the SQL statements an application under test sends to the database. By doing so, our ora-
cle can precisely identify if a SQLi test case resulted in a malicious SQL statement and, thus, decide if
the application is vulnerable. Similarly, this concept can be applied to other injection vulnerabilities
like XPATH or LDAP injection. Commands sent to the corresponding interpreters could be moni-
tored (e.g. by using network proxies, system call interposing, or setting the application under test to
a verbose log level) and malicious queries could be detected in a similar fashion as in our proposed
SQLi test oracle. Further research is necessary to devise input generation techniques; for example, a
set of input mutation operators such as µ4SQL, for other injection vulnerabilities. In addition, further
research is necessary to evaluate if our clustering methodology proposed in SOFIA is suitable in the
context of other injection vulnerabilities.
Our proposed technique to test WAFs can also be extended to assess the detection rate of other
kinds of attacks. The SQLi attacks of our approach are generated from a context-free grammar.
However, the approach is not limited to a specific grammar, but can work with any context-free
grammar. Therefore, similar grammars can be formulated for other kinds of attacks and simply be
replaced with the SQLi grammar. The implementation of our technique allows for the easy adaptation
of other attack grammars, since the grammar is defined in an external text file that can be swapped.
Having several attack grammars available would increases the test coverage of a WAF’s rule set
and an IT Security Engineer could choose the attack grammars that fits best the risk profile of the
protected system. Further research is necessary to devise attack grammars for other vulnerabilities
that accurately reflect attacks on applications in practice and account for the various obfuscation
techniques used by attackers.
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Appendix A
Investigating the difference between
ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D
As discussed in Section 6.1.3, the variable MAXM controls how ML-Driven spends the test budget. For
ML-Driven D, MAXM is smaller and, thus, fewer tests are selected for mutation, but more mutants are
generated per test. For ML-Driven B, MAXM is larger and, thus, more tests are selected for mutation,
but fewer mutants are generated per test. In total, both techniques spend the same test budget.
In earlier work [Appelt et al., 2015], we compared the two variants of ML-Driven: ML-Driven
B (MAXM = 10) and ML-Driven D (MAXM = 100). This appendix summarises the comparison out-
comes and investigates the reason behind the difference between ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D.
A.1 Performance Comparison
We evaluated ML-Driven with a popular open-source WAF, ModSecurity, by measuring how many
bypassing attacks ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D can generate over time [Appelt et al., 2015]. To
account for the degree of randomness involved in ML-Driven, we repeated each test run 10 times.
Each time a new test was generated, we have noted the passing wall-clock time and then executed it
to see whether or not it could bypass the WAF. We compare the performance of the techniques based
on the cumulative number of bypassing tests generated over time. Figure A.1 depicts the average
number of distinct, bypassing tests generated over time.
A.2 Observation
We can observe that in the early stages ML-Driven D finds consistently more bypassing attacks than
ML-Driven B does. This turns around only after a certain amount of time is spend in the test execution.
From a point in time onwards, ML-Driven B finds consistently more bypassing attacks than ML-
Driven D does, and thus the trend of the earlier stages is inverted. Note that this trend is the same for
each tested parameter and all repetitions.
This gap in performance is unsatisfactory for several reasons. To maximize the number of by-
passes found, the user has to choose between ML-Driven D and ML-Driven B before the test runs
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Figure A.1. Average number of bypassing attacks found for ModSecurity (10 repetitions
each) with RAN, ML-Driven B, and ML-Driven D. The latter two were run with K =
40%.
starts based on how much time is available. For example, based on the results of Figure A.1, the
user should choose ML-Driven D if less than 80 minutes are available, and otherwise ML-Driven B.
Moreover, it is unsatisfactory from a scientific standpoint, since both, ML-Driven B and ML-Driven
D, implement the same algorithm, only the value assigned to parameter MMAX differs. This raises the
question of what causes the difference in effectiveness and if a superior choice of parameters exists,
which combines the advantages of ML-Driven D and ML-Driven B.
To answer this question, the difference between ML-Driven D and ML-Driven B has to be re-
viewed and its impact on the test procedure has to be analysed. As discussed in Section 6.1, the
difference between both strategies lies in how the test budget is spent. While ML-Driven D selects
only a few candidate attacks for mutation and mutates each candidate more often, ML-Driven B se-
lects more candidate attacks for mutation and mutates each candidate fewer times. As a consequence,
both strategies produce the same number of mutants, but ML-Driven D generates more mutants per
candidate while ML-Driven B selects more candidate attacks for mutation.
A.3 Analysis
Let T = [tstart , tend] be the time interval for the test process and tp ∈ T be the point in time after which
ML-Driven B finds more bypassing attacks. tp divides T into two subintervals [tstart , tp], during which
ML-Driven D is more effective, and [tp, tend], during which ML-Driven B is more effective. In the
following, both time intervals are examined separately to explain why ML-Driven D or ML-Driven B
is more effective during a time interval.
Time interval [tstart , tp]. Table A.1 and A.2 show the average bypassing probability of the candi-
date attacks, which are selected for mutation, for ML-Driven B and ML-Driven D, respectively. For
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each iteration, the chosen candidates are separated into a high probability group Ghigh, for which the
bypassing probability is higher than 90%, a medium probability group Gmed , for which the bypass-
ing probability is between 10% and 90%, and a low bypassing probability group Glow, for which the
bypassing probability is below 10%.
Table A.1. Number of candidate attacks selected for mutation grouped by their bypass-
ing probability for ML-Driven D.
Iteration Glow Gmed Ghigh
1 3.6 0.2 10.5
2 0 0 15.7
3 0 0 9.6
4 0 0 10.3
5 0 0 11
6 0 0 11.8
7 0 0 12.9
8 0 0 13.6
9 0 0 13.3
Table A.2. Number of candidate attacks selected for mutation grouped by their bypass-
ing probability for ML-Driven B.
Iteration Glow Gmed Ghigh
1 78.4 0 10.2
2 50.2 0.5 30.2
3 34.3 0.4 36.4
4 3.7 0.1 60.3
5 0 0 66.2
6 0 0 68.8
7 0 0 73.1
8 0 0 77.3
9 0 0 77.7
For ML-Driven D, in the first iteration 10.5 candidates are in Ghigh and 3.6 candidates are in Glow.
In the following iterations, all candidates are in Ghigh. For ML-Driven B, in the first iteration 10.2
candidates are in Ghigh and 78.4 candidates are in Glow. In the following iterations, the number of
candidates in Ghigh increases in the second iteration to 30.2, in the third iteration to 36.4, and in the
fourth iteration to 60.3 while the number of candidates in Glow decreases in the second iteration to
50.2, in the third iteration to 34.3, and in the fourth iteration to 3.7. Starting from the fifth iteration,
all candidates are in Ghigh. In summary, ML-Driven D selects attacks for mutation almost exclusively
from Ghigh while ML-Driven B selects in the first three iterations a significant number of attacks from
Glow.
To assess how the selected candidate attacks influence the number of bypassing attacks, we ex-
amine which candidates are successful in generating bypassing mutants. Table A.3 and A.4 show the
number of blocked and bypassing mutants separated by group to which the candidate attack belongs
to. For ML-Driven D, 58.3 bypassing mutants are generated from candidates belonging to Ghigh and
1.5 bypassing mutants are generated from candidates belonging to Glow. Similarly, 2276.8 blocked
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Table A.3. Number of bypassing and blocked mutants generated from candidates be-
longing to Glow and Ghigh for ML-Driven D.
Iteration Bypassing Blocked
Glow Ghigh Glow Ghigh
1 1.5 58.3 944.2 2276.8
2 0 61.9 0 3799.8
3 0 93 0 3667.8
4 0 82.4 0 3604.2
5 0 82.9 0 3589.8
6 0 56.1 0 3649.2
7 0 48.8 0 3601.8
8 0 31.4 0 3639.8
9 0 38.5 0 3744.9
Table A.4. Number of bypassing and blocked mutants generated from candidates be-
longing to Glow and Ghigh for ML-Driven B.
Iteration Bypassing Blocked
Glow Ghigh Glow Ghigh
1 5.7 24.5 3097.3 338.6
2 2.6 29.6 2706.9 759.9
3 2.6 62.6 2061 1452.4
4 0.1 134.7 230.5 3028.5
5 0 125.4 0 3281.4
6 0 95.3 0 3294.1
7 0 93.6 0 3294
8 0 79.6 0 3347.1
9 0 55.5 0 3370.4
mutants are from candidates belonging to Ghigh and 944.2 mutants are from candidates belonging
to Glow. In the following iterations, all candidates are selected from Ghigh. For ML-Driven B, 24.5
bypassing mutants are generated from candidates belonging to Ghigh and 5.7 are generated from can-
didates belonging to Glow. Similarly, 338.6 blocked mutants are generated from candidates belonging
to Ghigh and 3097.3 mutants are from candidates belonging to Glow.
To conclude, the large majority of bypassing attacks is generated as expected from candidates
belonging to Ghigh and attacks generated from Glow are likely to be blocked. More interestingly, the
presented data underlines that ML-Driven D is more successful at the beginning than ML-Driven B
because it spends the test budget to a significantly larger fraction on candidate attacks from Ghigh and
thus generates more bypassing mutants.
Based on the presented analysis we find that during the early stages of the test process only a small
number of candidate attacks have a high probability of bypassing the firewall. ML-Driven D is more
effective during this stage of the test process, because the strategy spends the mutation budget on the
few known candidates that have a high likelihood of bypassing the firewall and is then more likely to
generate bypassing attacks. On the other hand, ML-Driven B is less effective in the earlier stages of
the test process because the strategy spends more mutation budget on candidate attacks that have a
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lower likelihood of bypassing the firewall.
Time interval [tp, tend]. From the fifth iteration onwards both strategies select candidate attacks
from Ghigh only. Nevertheless, ML-Driven B surpasses ML-Driven D in the number of bypassing
attacks, hence there must be an additional factor influencing effectiveness. To analyse this, we in-
troduce the measure of mutation efficiency. Let MB be the number of bypassing mutants and MT the
total number of mutants that are generated from a candidate attack, then mutation efficiency Me f f is
the ratio MB/MT .
Table A.5 and A.6 show the mutation efficiency per iteration for ML-Driven B and ML-Driven
D. Starting from iteration 4, when both strategies select candidates almost exclusively from Ghigh, the
mutation efficiency is 0.04 for ML-Driven B and only 0.02 for ML-Driven D. Similarly, the mutation
efficiency in all following iterations is higher for ML-Driven B than for ML-Driven D.
Table A.5. Mutation efficiency for ML-Driven B.
Iteration MB MT ME f f
1 0.34 38.78 0.01
2 0.40 43.00 0.01
3 0.92 49.74 0.02
4 2.10 50.91 0.04
5 1.89 49.57 0.04
6 1.39 47.88 0.03
7 1.28 45.06 0.03
8 1.03 43.30 0.02
9 0.71 43.38 0.02
Table A.6. Mutation efficiency for ML-Driven D.
Iteration MB MT ME f f
1 4.21 227.45 0.02
2 3.95 242.15 0.02
3 9.67 381.45 0.03
4 7.99 349.66 0.02
5 7.54 326.34 0.02
6 4.77 310.07 0.02
7 3.78 278.71 0.01
8 2.31 267.33 0.01
9 2.90 281.41 0.01
To conclude, ML-Driven B in comparison to ML-Driven D generates fewer bypassing mutants
per candidate, but it also generates less mutants per candidate in total. For ML-Driven B, the ratio
of bypassing mutants divided by the total number of mutants is higher, hence mutation efficiency is
favourable to ML-Driven B which surpasses ML-Driven D in later iterations.
The analysed data suggests that distributing the mutation budget equally between candidates from
Ghigh is more efficient than focusing the budget on a few Ghigh candidates.
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Appendix B
Testing Web Application Firewalls: Test
Results Per Parameter
This appendix lists the evaluation results of the WAF testing technique in more detail (see Chapter 6).
Due to space constrains in Chapter 6, we divided test runs with a similar number of bypassing attacks
into groups and computed the average. This appendix presents the results of each test run separately.
The figures are organised as follows:
• The figure on the left shows the average number of bypassing tests found for a tested operation.
• The figure on the right shows the statistical variation for the data in the left figure (10 repeti-
tions).
B.1 Results for ModSecurity
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Figure B.1. Test result for operation confirmRoom.
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Figure B.2. Test result for operation getCustomerByID.
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Figure B.3. Test result for operation doPayment.
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Figure B.4. Test result for operation expireTicket.
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Figure B.5. Test result for operation searchByModule.
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Figure B.6. Test result for operation getEntries.
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Figure B.7. Test result for operation getRelationships.
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Figure B.8. Test result for operation simulatePayment.
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Figure B.9. Test result for operation setEntry.
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B.2 Results for a proprietary WAF
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Figure B.10. Test result for operation AddressLine2.
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Figure B.11. Test result for operation AddressLine3.
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Figure B.12. Test result for operation AddressLine4.
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Figure B.13. Test result for operation AddressLine5.
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Figure B.14. Test result for operation BankAccount.
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Figure B.15. Test result for operation BankReference.
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Figure B.16. Test result for operation ClearingRef.
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Figure B.17. Test result for operation ClientClass.
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Figure B.18. Test result for operation Email.
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Figure B.19. Test result for operation FaxNumber.
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Figure B.20. Test result for operation FirstName.
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Figure B.21. Test result for operation Label.
0 125 250 375 500
Time (minutes)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
D
t
ML-Driven E
ML-Driven B
ML-Driven D
RAN
0 125 250 375 500
Time (minutes)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
D
t
ML-Driven E
ML-Driven B
ML-Driven D
RAN
Figure B.22. Test result for operation LastName.
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Figure B.23. Test result for operation Line4.
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Figure B.24. Test result for operation Line5.
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Figure B.25. Test result for operation Locality.
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Figure B.26. Test result for operation MaidenName.
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Figure B.27. Test result for operation MerchantId.
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Figure B.28. Test result for operation MerchantLocality.
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Figure B.29. Test result for operation MotherName.
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Figure B.30. Test result for operation Passeport.
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Figure B.31. Test result for operation PaymentOption.
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Figure B.32. Test result for operation PhoneNumber.
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Figure B.33. Test result for operation PostalCode.
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Figure B.34. Test result for operation RequestId.
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Figure B.35. Test result for operation SocialNumber.
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Figure B.36. Test result for operation Title.
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Figure B.37. Test result for operation UserName.
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